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I. INTRODUCTION
"Command and Control" as a term of military ait suffers from the same
definitional malady as the temi "strategy." TTiere are, it seems, as many definitions as
articles on either subject. The definition which provides the clearest meaning is Roger
Beaumont's "extension of authority over distance."' The authority extended is the
commander's, whether of a flight of two aircraft with the distance being a matter of
feet, a company over a few kilometers, a naval squadron over the horizon, or of the
president extending his authority as commander-in-chief over the thousands of miles
between the White House Situation Room and a distant battlefield. The medium of
extension is communications, thus compounding the acronym to command, control, and
communications. Communications are necessarily electronically filtered to handle the
volume and enhance the clarity of transmissions. The human analogue of the
electronic filter is the commander's staff which has similar functions of handling
volume and enhancing clarity. Tremendous advances have been made in the technical
performance of electronic filters; advancement in the capabilities of the human filters
has been far less spectacular.
This thesis addresses the human filters of command and control-the military
staff. Over the last decade, command and control has become a central theme for
reform arguments for simpler, more robust military capabilities. Indirectly, command
and control reform was the central issue in the finale of the reform movement, the
Goldwatcr-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. That Act was the culmination
of a decade of defense reform debate. The American defense establishment and the
"military reform movement"' settled on the Act's compromise "half measures" in the
'Beaumont, R., The Nerves of War , p. 8, AFCEA Intl. Press, 1986.
*A loosely coordinated group of legislators, congressional staff members.
Department of Defense civilians, retired officers and a few, necessarily anonymous,
active duty military officers centered on the oversubscribed congressional Military
Reform Caucus. Sec Kross, W., Military Reform, pp. 12-15, National Defense Univ.
Press, 1985.
finest traditions of American consensus politics. The debate centered on institutional
power and the Act's most important remedies redistributed power among the main
players in the defense establishment.' These new arrangements of power are supposed
to meet the challenges ahead in the last decade of the twentieth century and into the
twenty-first century; but, in the author's opinion, the chief ills of our defense
establishment concern not who holds bureaucratic power, but what "they" do with that
power.
There can be little surprise that an American political debate, even one about the
military, should revolve around the question of power. Representative democracy is
necessarily about groups vying for power and our military is certainly not immune to
this tendency. The quintessential American defense debate has almost always been
between one service group seeking power at the expense of another. Interservice
rivalry was bom in the American Revolution and came of age in the debate between
"brick and mortar" continentalists and "blue water" battleship navalists.* Whether in
struggles of Army versus Navy, Air Force versus Navy or Army versus Marines, the
military services have always displayed a strong chauvinism based primarily on the
"need" to protect missions and roles which conflict with those of the other services and
inevitably this chauvinism has led to interservice rivalry. This same chauvinism is also
evident in tfie intraservice rivalries between the strategic and tacdcal air forces, among
the surface, submarine and aviation "communities" of the Navy and among the various
combat and support arms of the Anny and Marine Corps. Thus the defense reform
"joinmess" debate of the eighties naturally centered on power: if only this or that
reform is implemented then the "good guys" will save the country from the wrong-
headed, if honorable, "bad guys" and finally "put tfie Key West Agreement right."
The author has no quarrel with the particulars of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and
strongly supports the transfer of influence to the combatant commanders. The quarrel
is with the mistaken belief that the Act cures much less even addiesses the fundamental
ills of our defense establishment.
*Millis, W., Aims and Men, pp. 131-210, Rutgers Univ. Press, 1981. See also
Weigley, R.F., The American Way of War , pp. 167-192, Indiana Univ. Press, 1977,
and Millett, AA., and Maslowski, P., For the Common E)efense
. pjp. 233-265, Free
Press, 1984.
The participants in the most recent debate seem to be nearly unanimous in
framing the central problem: America has no coherent national military strategy.'
Where they go from there seems to depend on their particular agenda. Some would
argue that without such a national military strategy, procurement specifically and
defense management in general are bound to be incoherent, inconsistent and fraught
with "fraud, waste and abuse." Without an overall strategy, others believe the defense
establishment is at the mercy of the separate services and their individual service
programs. The civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense have either usurped
the traditional prerogative of the military to design a workable military strategy or the
military has ignored its tactical, operational and strategic responsibilities, forcing
usurpation on the civilians.
A common thread in all of these "apparent" defense deficiencies and the
Cassandra calls for attention by the various elements in the debate is, in the author's
opinion, the absence of a core of (uniformed) military thinkers of sufficient repute with
the civilian leadership* to design, defend, implement and execute a coherent national
military strategy. The defense reform debate of the eighties missed the point; the
problem is not malapportioned power, therefore the solution cannot be a readjustment
of power within the Defense Department. The problem is the perceived quality and
reputation of the military officers responsible for designing, defending, implementing
and executing a coherent national military strategy. If the problem is quality and
reputation, the solution must be excellence.
Excellence as a concept has been cheapened to the level of an advertising slogan
through overuse,' but there is no better concept to describe the requisite capacity of
staff ofBcers serving at our national military headquarters. The usual historical
The single exception being those chiefly responsible, the serving national
command authority, the President and Secretary of Defense, and the ser\ing chiefs of
staff. For an excellent discussion of the vagaries of strategic thinking see Builder, C,
The Masks of War, pp. 45-92, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1989.
•Both in and out of government.
^.g. tfic 1986 "Aimy of Excellence" which had more to do with retention than
excellence.
example of staff officers with a tradition of excellence and a reputation for military
acuity and sound strategic, operational and tactical planning and execution capabilities
is the Prussian General Staff.
The fundamental explanation of German combat ability, and of the quality of
German military power as demonstrated in two world wars, lay in the organization
and operation of the Pmssian/German General Staff. In military history, consistent
performance comparable to that of the German armies in World Wars I and n can
be found only in armies led by such military geniuses as Alexander, Hannibal,
Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Genghis Khan, and Napoleon. Such a comparison
automatically suggests that through the General Staff the Germans had
institutionalized military excellence....'
Ehipuy continues:
It was the essential quality of the General Staff, as it seems originally to have been
envisaged by Schamhorst, that it enabled men who individually lacked the qualities
of a genius to perform institutionally in a manner that would provide results
ordinarily achievable only by genius.'
Congress addressed a proposed American general staff—based on the Prussian
General Staff—three times in our history, before World War I, after World War n and
during the 1980's. The pre-World War I debate, inspired by Emory Upton's glowing
report on Moltke's German General Staff of the ISTO's'" and resolved by Secretary of
War Elihu Root in 1903, resulted in an American General Staff Corps which served
the U. S. Aimy through World War IT. The 1947, 1958 and 1986 debates were, at
least on the question of the continuation of an American General Staff, highly
emotional and germanophobic. These debates were carried out with little or no input
from serving military officers. It is now time for military officers to pick up the
mantie of the tragic Upton and address rationally the requirement for an American
general staff and the connected concept of military excellence.
Each generation of officers has a solemn duty and responsibility—to the nation
and its sons those officers may lead into combat—to examine critically the strategic and
•Dupuy, T.N., A Genius for War The German Army and General Staff. 1807-
1945 . p. 302, Prentice-Hail, 1977.
Ibid., p. 307.
'*Upton, E., Armies of Asia and Europe . Greenwood Press, 1968.
tactical preconceptions, usually founded on past wars, which enervate the ethos of the
presctu generation of military and political leaders. This task may well call into
question the fundamental beliefs upon which our military traditions rely for coherence
and consistency. Surprisingly, this is most difficult for American officers because the
conceptual roots of our military traditions are primarily civilian, not military.
The most fundamental precept of American officership is acceptance of "civilian
control of the military." Apart from this "constitutional commandment," there is no
touchstone for the American officer cum citizen—except his status as citizen and his
oath to protect and defend the constitution. As we address the vital questions of
defense organization, strategy and doctrine, how we might better plan for and fight a
future war, we must continually deal with this requirement for civilian control.
A clear practical lesson of the present interpretation of the civUian control reality,
as exemplified in the defense reform debates of the last forty years, is that reform of
our military establishment is a civilian responsibility. The American military has an
obvious advisory role, but a balanced reading of recent events" suggests that that role
requires public agreement with the executive branch, the only alternative open to
uniformed leaders being resignation.'* Thus, derivatively, open, public debate on
military reform is a civilian matter, not a military responsibility, even—perhaps,
especially—in so basic an area of military performance as defense organization. This
reality does not however, release the officer corps from the responsibility to challenge
our leadership's preconceptions; preconceptions which may block effective operational
planning and execution on our next battlefield.
"The chilling effects of this principle are difficult to document because it is in the
interests of all parties involved to keep them private; however the Singlaub affair and
the recent public admonishment of the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Welch, by
Secretary of Defense Cheney certainly should give the observer some sense of the
openness of public discussion of defense matters by unifonned ufficeis.
'*What this means for junior officers interested in anything approaching tmly open
public comment goes almost without saying. The recent demise of the Air University
Review after a particularly candid exchange of views on the Air Force's security
review procedures is a rather stark example. After a short period of time a new
journal, Airpower. reappeared after the Review was cancelled due to fiscal restraints.
Nowhere has the civilian responsibility for military reform more clearly abrogated
military input and politicized the discussion of proposed reform than in the debate over
an American general staff. Over the past century, the general staff concept, once the
central issue in American defense organization reform debates, has become the dead
letter of defense reform. Although an American general staff was accepted in a
modified form in 1903, during the second half of the twentieth century various
constituencies have "shouted down" an American general staff (and therewith any
institutional excellence which might have flown horn such an institution to the greater
officers' corps). In the few cases where opponents of the general staff concept—as
exemplified by the Prussian General Staff-have bothered with justification, they have
posited historically-derived suppositions of linkage between the general staff system and
Pmssian militarism, anti-democratic institutional biases, elitism and military dominance
of civil-military relations.
Some of these suppositions seem historically questionable, others patently
absurd,'* while the larger argument appears irrelevant to an American military with
such a clear tradition of "civilian control of the military." Moreover, many statements
of opposition to an American general staff are heavily laden with emotionally
germanophobic prejudice—in large measure a reaction to aspects of German behavior
in World Wars I and EI which, insofar as they reflect on the German General staff
system, were aberrant expressions of larger societal failures wholly distorting the legacy
of the General Staffs originators. Over the last century, this prejudice'* seems to have
acquired the status of religious precept and something i^roaching a tenet of American
defense organization has emerged: whatever form of defense organization we may
"Are we to suppose that an egalitarian, democratic nulitaiy would be the best
defender of an egalitarian, democratic society? If so we should return to election of
our officers and vote on tactics.
'*In 1956, then Senator Hubert Humphrey described the general staff system as
"anathema to every concept of democracy." Staff Report to the Committee on Armed
Services United States Senate, Defense Organization: The Need for Change . 99th
Congress, 1st Session, October 16, 1985, p. 235, U.S. Government Printing Office,
1985.
accept it should bear no similarity to the Prussian General Staff; for that form of
organization is distinctly un-American, the antithesis of civilian control of the military.
The post-World War n congressional "distaste for German military institutions"
eventually led to the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act's prohibition of the Joint Staff
from organizing itself or operating "as an overall Armed Forces General Staff." This
codified prohibition of an American General Staff came after the House Armed
Services Committee found that "a general staff organization.. .is a fundamentally faUible,
and thus dangerous, instrument for determination of national policy" which possessed
the following deficiencies: "(1) a failure to systematically consider the full range of
altematives; (2) rigidity of thought; (3) an attempt to control national policies that are
beyond military affairs; (4) isolation of civilian officials from other points of view; and
(5) erosion of civilian control of the military by concentrating too much power in the
hands of the military officers immediately below the senior civilian official." The 1985
Senate Staff Report on Defense Organization precedent to the Goldwater-Nichols Act
stated "these congressional criticisms are highly inaccurate and cannot be supported by
historical analysis of the work of General Staffs, particularly those of Prussia and
Germany.""
One voice was missing from this debate. The absence of clear, objective military
thinking'* in national military strategy and on the proper path of defense reform is the
direct result of not having a resident elite corps of staff officers at the national level
with standing in the defense establishment. The absence of such military voices is due
to the demise of the American general staff and is indicative of a larger deficiency of
independent minds within the officers' corps of all the services. The bitter irony is
that at the same time as we see an explosion of interest in the tactical excellence of
the Wehmiacht . seek to leam the proper lessons from the German understanding of war
"as it really is" and concepts such as auftragstaktik . and attempt to instill in our junior
"Ibid., pp. 230-235. The report continues, "In fact, these criticisms more
accurately reflect the actual deficiencies of the current Joint Staff than they do the
imagined shortcomings of the General Staff concept."
**Which the author would assert can best be found in the minds of those who
might die as a result of emotionalism and subjectivity.
officers the traits of initiative, originality and independence of mind so harmoniously
present in the German officer, the consensus on the evils of the German military
system—conveniently though incorrectly encapsulated in the Prussian General Staff-
closes off the necessary correlate of precisely that which we must begin to understand
about the German military if we are to adopt the tactical expressions of that excellence,
the essence of Prussian officership.
The National Security Act and Goldwater-Nichols debates seem to have fixed our
attention on power relationships as the only measure of reform but we cannot fix the
problems we face by changing names and rearranging boxes on organization charts.'^
To begin to approach the real problems we face past prejudices and the biases of our
present must be overcome to find the key to German military excellence. It is the
author's thesis that there is something unique about the Prussian officer of the
nineteenth century and that, if we are to understand those qualities of Pnisso-German
officership which generated the tactics and methods many now wish to emulate, we
must carefully examine the historical roots of the Pmssian officers' corps and attempt
to resolve the essence of Prussian officership.
The purpose of this study is to examine the historical reality surrounding the
development of the Prussian officers' corps and the Prussian General Staff system and
attempt to discover the basis of that institution's tradition of excellence. The initial
approach to this study was to begin with the Prussian General Staff in the years before
the Wars of Unification; however, it quickly became clear that it was necessary to go
back to the inception of the General Staff during the Prussian reform era prior to the
War of Liberation. This search for a beginning point eventually led to the
"transformation of war" which occurred between the time of Frederick n and Napoleon,
'Individual excellence cannot be placed on a wiring diagram but the military
education debate in the Skelton House Panel on Military Education seems to be just
such an abortive attempt. Of nine specific recommendations six deal with conceptual
framewoiks (complete with the requisite wiring diagram), phases, positions and power,
name changes, and use of examinations and writing as "essential elements of graduate-
level education." Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Executive
Summary of the Report of the Panel on Military Education . 100th Congress, 2d
Session, November 18, 1988, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.
for it was this transformation that precipitated the Prussian Reform Movement and laid
the necessary groundworic for both the development of the Prussian officers' corps
and the inception and initial development of the Prussian General Staff.
The Prussian Reform Movement provides a paradigm for defense reform which
we should not ignore. To provide a framework for understanding this paradigm the
nature of war is described in its constituent parts followed by comparisons of the
Frederickian system and the Napoleonic system which the author believes may be
styled "modem war." After an elaboration of the reasons for the decline of the
Frederickian system, the thesis addresses the largely unsuccessful initial attempts by
Prussia to reform and the preconditions for and execution of the later, successful
reforms. The author then addresses the approach of the Prussian reformers to answer
the Napoleonic challenge through both fundamental reform of the Prussian defense
establishment and, by applying a new realism to the art of war, redefining the
profession of arms. In the final chapters the author ^)plies the Pmssian paradigm of
defense reform to our unique American circumstances and attempts to resolve the
implications of the Prussian example for our future defense.
At the center of the Prussian Reform Movement the author found not the
beginnings of the institution of .the General Staff but the many individuals who came
together to transform the Frederickian system into a vehicle for the liberation of their
nation. And so after many months of looking for the "secret" of the tradition of
excellence of the institution of the Prussian General Staff the author found that the
schwerpunkt of this study is not the institution but the individual and that is fitting for
the essence of Prussian officership is not an institutional excellence but a collective
excellence of individuals.
U. THE CONSTITUENTS OF THE NATURE OF WAR
Since men first began to think of themselves as members of a group set apart
from the rest of mankind, it has been necessary to organize society to defend lives,
liberties and possessions against those apart. Within this clear need exists a deep
dilemma: how to organize that defense so that it constitutes a reliable deterrent to those
^art without the possible sacrifice of some or all of the liberties so defended. This
age-old question of defense organization is still before us today with but little promise
of solution. To attempt to find right paths for our own efforts at solving this dUemma
we must look at other men in other times who dealt with the same problems and
discovered their own answers.
One such group was the Prussian Reform Movement led by Heinrich Friedrich
Karl vom und zum Stein, Gerhard Johann David von Schamhorst, August Wilhelm
Neithardt von Gneisenau, Hermann von Boyen, Carl von Qausewitz, and Karl Wilhelm
von Grolman. These men and many Prussian officers such as General Hans David
Ludwig von Yorck who, while not reformers, nevertheless shared their immediate goal
of victory over Napoleon, were anxious to see Prussia's army find its way out of the
Frederickian past into the dawn of a new era of warfare and to create an army able
to stand up to the revolutionary army of France and the aftermath of the
"transformation of war"" that that army had wrought.
In the process of awakening the Prussian army which, as Prussia's Queen Louise,
wife of Frederick William HI, wrote, "went to sleep on the laurels of Frederick the
Great"," the Prussian reformers laid the foundation for the continuation of the proud
heritage of Prussian arms. Out of this process of reform and the reformer's struggle
to save the essential core of the traditions of the Frederickian system while creating the
necessary "new" with which to deal with the transformation of war came a Prussian
"Colin, J.L.A., The Transformation of War, trans. L.H.R. Pope-Hennessy, H.
Rees, 1912.
"Craig, G.A., The Politics of the Pmssian Army , p. 56, Oxford Univ. Press, 1979.
10
army which did not lose a war for the rest of the nineteenth century, a Prussian Great
Generjil Staff which became the envy of the world's armies and worthy of their
emulation, and a Prussian officer who was the essential core of both.
The origins of this Prussian officer and the Pmssian general staff concept are to
be found in the period of the "transformation of war" between Frederick the Great and
Napoleon. It is first necessary to understand this transformation and the effects it had
on the nature of war before beginning a detailed study of the Prussian Reform
Movement. To aid in this elaboration of the change in the nature of war between
Frederick and Napoleon the nature of war will be treated in eight constituents: combat,
death, causes, attributes, armies, means, costs, and superstructure.^® Within this
framework it is possible to understand the radical change in the nature of war which
should be expected during this great social and political cataclysm in European history;
and as well those constituents which could have but did not change and also those
enduring constituents of the nature of war which remain constant in all times.
A. COMBAT
Men go to war to win. No tribe, state, or nation has ever waged war expressly
to lose. For war to exist there must be at least two antagonists with conflicting aims
or views, each wishing to "win" more than he desires to remain at peace; then, finally,
peaceful conflict becomes armed conflict, combat, resulting in victor and vanquished.
Oausewitz, using the German Gefecht meaning "an episode of fighting, combat,"
describes combat as "the essential military activity"*' which "no matter how it is
constituted....remains unchanged. That is what we mean by war."" This is the most
fundamental and, arguably, unchangeable constituent of war, the conflict of antagonists
physically expressed in fighting. The sources of conflict can be territorial, religious,
"The author fully acknowledges the pretentiousness of such a short treatment of
an admittedly difficult typological problem. Where possible the author has followed
the master, Clausewitz.




political, economic, moral or even personal, but without conflict war makes sport of
men's blood.
B. DEATH
Conflict can, of course, exist without war. War cannot exist without conflict and
to be war the conflict must be among armed men. Conflict among armed men—
combat-results in death. War without conflict and death is not possible.^ Death in
conflict bespeaks violence. The level of violence and the manner of death surely
changed between Lcuthen and Waterloo; but whether death is by pike or bayonet,
musket or rifle are questions of efficiency and technology. Men die in war. That is
unchanging.
In all times when we speak of war we ask: who won, who lost, at what price
in lives? These questions of combat and death are fundamentally unchanging; other
questions require a knowledge of the times, the texture of history, to allow the inquirer
to frame the questions we here ask of war.
C. CAUSES
The question of what caused a war is usually a question asked only after war is
over and even then it is especially to be heard on the quiet lips of those who
experienced it: why? Before the war, the situation is different, war seems so right to
those who feel the call of glory and pride of arms." We have said that men die in
war and surely the cliches of "the worid sliding into war" are just that, cliches. Men
must decide to wage war and however neatiy we phrase the fomiulations of the causes
of war it must still come down to one man having the idea of war and spreading the
idea far enough within the counsels of state to bring war about.
The defeated and thus exiled Athenian general Thucydides wrote in his military
history on the causes of the Peloponnesian War
''Wars on dnigs, crime and illiteracy are mere false aphorisms, neologisms for
the age of Rambo.
**Surely, the author was not alone in that feeling of quiet desperation as a high
school senior in 1965 that his war might end before he "could get in it."
12
All this came upon them with the late war, which was begun by the Athenians and
Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty years' truce made after the conquest
of Huboca. lo the question wh> lhe> broke the tieaty, 1 answer by placing first
an account of their grounds of complaint and points of difference, that no one may
ever have to ask the immediate cause which plimged the Hellenes into a war of
such magnitude. The real cause I consider to be the one which was formally
most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm
which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable." [Emphasis added.]
Michael Howard, in his essay "The Causes of Wars" points to this passage as an
indication of a timeless verity. Paraphrasing Thucydides, he finds as the analogous
cause of World War I that:
Finally the point was reached when German strength attained a p)eak plain for all
to see, and the Germans began to encroach upon Britain's allies. It was at this
point that Britain felt the position to be no longer tolerable and decided by starting
this present war to employ all her energies in attacking and if possible destroying
the power of Germany."
Writing of the causes of war just before the French Revolution, Jeremy Bentham
foimd five: colonial rivalry, the feudal system, religious antipathy, the rage of conquest
and uncertain succession." It is an interesting list but when one generalizes it we find
that Thucydides might agree for it includes those elements which make man unique—
his power as reflected in his possessions, his relationship to his God, God's earthly
vicars, both temporal and spiritual, and his fellow men—and that element which makes
men go beyond defense of the particular, that is rational, to the irrational "rage of
conquest." Bentham's list is clearly a product of the enlightenment reflecting the
divisions of the Ancien Regime . Frederick the Great was also a product of both the
enlightenment and the Ancien Regime and for Frederick "war was to be preeminently
a function of Staatspolitik. and so it has remained ever since."" Bentham chose the
^*rhucydidcs, The Complete Writings of Thucydides: The Pelotwnnesian War,
trans. J.H. Finlcy, Jr., p.l5, Random House, 1951.
"Howard, M., The Causes of War , p. 20, Harvard Univ. Press, 1983.
"Bentham, J., A Plan for a Universal and Pert?emal Peace , p. 25, Grotius Society,
1927. Quoted in Howard, M., War and the Liberal Conscience , p. 33, Rutgers Univ.
Press, 1978.
"Howard, The Causes of War , p. 13.
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phrase "rage of conquest" before the Revolution, but no phrase could better characterize
tlie spirit of Napoleon's march across Europe; however Napoleon and Frederick, though
on a different scale, are both demonstrating the fundamental truth that all war's are
about power. "The vanity of nationalism, the will to spread an ideology, the protection
of kinsmen in an adjacent land, the desire for more territory... all these represent power
in different wrappings. The conflicting aims of rival nations are always conflicts of
power."" It might be argued that whatever the cause of war, it is not a constituent of
war for, while it is a necessary prelude to and precondition for war the cause is
irrelevant to the prosecution of the war. This could not be more false and is in fact
central to the tragedy of the First World War when cause and object, politics and war,
became separated. Qausewitz, sometimes accused as creator of this abomination, is
in fact father to the opposite idea. He describes the political object of war as "the
original motive for the war"** and later speaks of the "political purpose" of war as the
objective guiding military action."
The cause of war for the Frederickian and Napoleonic systems was power—
whether to defend or aggrandize the territorial holdings of the state. Though there is
in Napoleonic War some altruistic spreading of revolutionary and Napoleonic ideas, in
the main Napoleon is doing no more than Frederick, increasing his holdings to increase
his state. Whatever individual French soldiers might have thought they were fighting
for—liberty, equality, fraternity—is largely irrelevant to causation (however important it
was to execution); what mattered was the will of the ruler, only Frederick and
Napoleon determined the cause of war.
^lainey, G., The Causes of War , p. 149, Free Press, 1973. Quoted in Howard,
The Causes of War, p. 13. For a warning against theoretical oversimplification of the
causes of war sec Brodie, B., War and Politics , p. 339-340, Macmillan, 1973.




Whatever the causes of war we must admit to an essence of war--its fundamental
attributes. This constituent includes all those concepts which belong neither to tactics
nor strategy, states nor nations; but those aspects of fighting wars which are usually
beyond the understanding of men who have not felt the loneliness of "death at the
door." The attributes of war are of the nature of men: chivalry, honor, fear, error,
fatigue, and the capriciousness of attempted execution of planned action. The first two
aspects of Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity," violence and chance, and his related
concept of friction describe clearly this very human, elemental constituent of war,
"corrqjosed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, ... a blind natural force" which
is an enduring constituent of the nature of war.'*
These four constituents, combat, death, causes and attributes, did not change
between the reigns of Frederick and Napoleon. The four remaining constituents
changed dramatically. Fundamental concepts such as we treat here usually do not
change in the instant but over time and the seeds of what may appear a dramatic
change are, no doubt, firmly planted in the fields of the past. Even the apparent
exception—the flash of individual genius and creativity—has the parent, education. We
often cannot uncover the roots of genius, but they are there. With this understanding
of the evolutionary nature of change, we can now examine each remaining constituent
under the rubric of Frederickian and Napoleonic warfare. These four remaining
constituents—armies, means, costs, and superstructure—provide a framework for
understanding the changes in the nature of war we posit from the Ancien Regime of





Between 1740 and 1815, armies changed in their size, methods of recruitment,
and organizational forms. Throughout this period armies were the surest symbol of the
power of the state and, therefore, the ruler. This symbolism transcended any
requirement-purpose connection; state requirements for defensive and offensive
intentions were subsumed by the symbolic requirement for power. Power resulted from
the size and proficiency, or the perception of proficiency, of the army.
The size of army required was directly related to the methods of recruitment.
The head of state could, throughout this era, choose between various methods and
mixes of filling the ranks of his army. The determinant was three-fold. How large
an army was required for state purposes, what type of men best served those purposes,
and what organizational forms best utilized the army size and the men selected. The
choices made as to the desired size and character of the army resulted in patterns of
recruitment: mercenary-hire, impressment, volunteer, and broadly-stated, national-
peoples. Overlaying this typology was the choice between foreign and "domestic"
sources of manpower.
The organizational forms of armies also changed. To a not insignificant degree
these changes to the organizational forms of armies—for both administrative and
operational functions—were as much responses to the pressures of increased size and
changes in the types of men making up the armies as they were tactical evolutions of
military thought. Additionally, continuity remains a powerful force even in this
cauldron of change; the resulting tactical expressions of organizational forms, the
uniforms, insignia, customs and, importantly, the traditions of armies remain functions
of history, culture and leadership.
F. MEANS
The means of war armies employ are the weapons and impedimenta secured by
the state from available technology and industrial edacity. The impedimenta of war
arc either officnsive (e.g., sicgecraft), defensive (e.g., permanent and temporary
fortifications), and support (e.g., supply trains). All of these weapons and impedimenta
are the province of technology. The means of war changed during the late eighteenth
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century, but not nearly so much as the economic relationship of technology, industrial
capacity and war-making potential of European states beginning to face the potential
of the Industrial Revolution.
G. COSTS
War is an exercise of power to gain some state objective and with any gain
comes a cost. The costs of war are paid both from state capital and in their real
currency, the lives of men. Soldiers must be paid for their service and must be
supplied and fed. Perhaps the greatest costs of war are incurred in the peacetime
preparation for war and the state purposes which go unfunded in the name of national
defense. There are costs of losing: lost armies, indemnities, territory, honor and even
existence; as well there are costs of winning: spent resources of men, weapons,
ammunition, fodder and food and also the administrative costs of control of acquired
territories and subjects.
H. SUPERSTRUCTURE
The Marxian construct, superstructure, is analogized to include all those forces
at work in society which, while not of war, are so intertwined with war as to become
a constituent of war. The social, political and economic relationships of man and state,
culture and society, labor and capital, army and state, army and society, all bring to
bear certain forces that lead to the spirit of the times; leaders may attempt to ignore,
react against or attempt to harness this Zeitgeist , but whichever course they choose,
however badly they read the history at hand, there will be effects on the conduct of
war.
Such concepts as chivalry, the Ancien Regime , enlightenment, rationalism,
gentlemen, revolution, reacticm, romanticism, progress, modernity, authority, and order
arc the creations of philosophers and historians to describe perceived reality. These
concepts do help explain events and provide the epochal background for examining the
social, political, religious, economic and technological forces at work in the state and
society. If we wish to understand the changes in the nature of war we must examine
the forces at work in civilization—as explained by the concepts listed above—and the
resulting change in society, for it is the ruling expression of societies—whether
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autocratic, republican or democratic—which chooses to wage war and it is the object
of that expression, the people, who pay the price for that decision.
Armies must be led lest they become mobs. The difference between mob and
army is to be found in the relationships of commanders, officers, and soldiers. Are
leaders "elected" by the men led or "selected" by class, ruler, or God? Do men owe
officers allegiance to liege, employer or fellow soldier? Are officers and commander
related by or at odds over class and custom? Is the officer necessary or trivial in the
realm of decision? What is the role and relationship of commander and staff?
Since we seek the "changing nature of war" we must look to war itself. Our
answers are best found in the history of battle and leaders. So our source must be the
two men of action, Frederick and Napoleon, in the century after Frederick n ascends
the throne of Prussia. This is the epoch of the flowering of the Enlightenment, the
cataclysm of 1789, and the reaction, restoration and final defeat of the Ancien Regime .
This is a long story and, though at times it appears that "all is new," the old world did
not suddenly vanish on 14 July, 1789.
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III. FREDERICK AND THE ANCIEN REGIME
Frederick U, King of Prussia from 1740 to 1768, stands as the embodiment of
the warrior-king in the Ancien Regime . It is tempting to see in his generalship the
culmination, perhaps fulfillment, of all that was possible of that age, for "Frederick's
greamess lay not in the inauguration of a new epoch, but in the consummate
expression which he gave to the age into which he had been bom."" We cannot
blame him because he did not, as did Napoleon, stand at the flood gates of modernity
and therefore did not have the opportunity to harness the energies of a new age. We
wish to see in Frederick a perfection of the forms and potential of war in his time.
But this is not quite accurate. For in a real sense he is precursor of what is to come.
In a letter to Voltaire Frederick places himself well, "It's the fashion now to
make war and presumably it wiU last a good long while."** Such sentiment is nearly
impossible to imagine from Napoleon. There is a comfort with the limits of war in
Frederick's words much at odds with the world view of Napoleon. Frederick was
King-acquisitor, Napoleon the Emperor-world conqueror. It is the scale of ambition
which most differentiates the two. Napoleon waged war against an entire continent and
by 1809 had established a Pax Napoleon which rivaled Pax Romana in geographic
scope, if not duration. Frederick waged war because it was the fashion of powerful
kings and his dynasty wanted most to be taken seriously as a power. The Seven
Years* War was as much about the claim of the Hohenzollems to Great Power status
as it was about any Prussian state interest.
"Rosinski, H., The German Army , p. 18, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.
'*Heinl, R.D., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations , p. 343, Naval Institute
Press, 1985.
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A. THE PRUSSIAN ARMY
At the start of the Seven Years' War the size of Frederick's army of 1756 was
150,000 men. This army was two-thirds mercenary and one third Prussian. This
proportion reflects Frederick's decision to reverse the proportion of mercenaries in the
army handed down to him by his father, Frederick William I. That Prussian army of
1740 consisted of 26,000 foreigners and 50,000 Prussians."
The Prussian soldier of the army of 1756 was called a cantonist. The canton
system, codified in the Canton Regulations of 1727, provided each of the king's
regiments with a geographical recraitment area." Once selected, the object of such
regimental recruitment—too modem a word, impressment is more accurate—served for
life. These soldiers, primarily drawn from the peasantry, and their mercenary fellow
soldiers had only several months of active service a year in times of peace; between
April and June they prepared for the annual maneuvers by extremely intensive drill.
The object of this training was an automaton who, without thinking," could execute the
precise march in column to engagement with immediate response to order to line and
could execute the complex series of synchronized actions necessary to reload their
flintlocks and fire in unison—all twice as fast as any army in Europe."
In peacetime, the Prussian army was organized in regiments of ten companies,
not very different in administrative lineage and financial organization fi'om the
"condottiere" of the Seventeenth century." The tactical formation was the battalion of
infantry supported by cavalry squadrons and the armes savant , the artillery and
engineers. The battalion usually deployed in three ranks and fired by platoon. Other
European armies could match neither the innovation of march in step nor Prussian
"Rosinski, The German Army , p. 33.
"Ibid., p. 25.
"Frederick was clear on this, "if my soldiers began to think not one would remain
in the ranks". Heinl, Dictionarv of Military and Naval Quotations , p. 300.
"Dupuy, R.E., and Dupuy, T.N., The Encyclopedia of Military History , p. 611,
Harper and Row, 1977.
'*Rosinski, The German Army , p. 39.
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precision and retained the method of volley fire of larger formations. These
iniiuvntioiis and the well-drilled ability to change direction, front, or both
simultaneously gave Frederick's army a mix of speed and maneuver unmatched in
Europe.
Each regiment in the Frederickian army had its own distinctive uniform. From
the time of Frederick William I the "king's coat" was uniformly bare of omament and
worn by all from the lowest rank to the king himself. The only adornment of rank
was the general's white feather, a necessary, practical, visual accoutrement for
distinguishing the tactical leader on the battlefield.*' The uniform thus provided a sign
that "made all officers equal, and equally the servants of the house of HohenzoUem,"*'
Soldiers will attest to the real, though admittedly symbolic, relationship between the
uniform worn and the ethos of an army. The uniforms of the Prussian army of
Frederick the Great matched the shared nature of their stark, difficult duty, and both
"officers and soldiers lived very frugal, indeed poverty-stricken lives, yet a collective
spirit of 'honor' and sense of duty raised the Prussian army to a level of efficiency—
and cheapness—no other European force came near to equalling"**.
B. MEANS
The means of waging war in the eighteenth century Prussian army were the
flintlock fusil with ring bayonet of the infantry, the sabre of the cavalry and the
cannon and howitzer of the artillery. The flintlock and bayonet replaced the matchlock
musket and pike. The requirements for standard sizes—to accommodate the ringed
bayonet—greatly added to the costs and complexity. In 1718, the Prussian service
introduced the double-ended iron ramrod which had long been in service for pistols.
Superior to the wood then in service in other armies of the day and, combined with
the precision bought by drill, the iron ramrod gave the Prussian infantry a 2.5:1 rate
*lbid., p. 24.
*'McNeill, W.H., The Pursuit of Power
, p. 154, U. of Chicago Press, 1982.
*lbid.
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of fire advantage with a resulting five rounds fired per minute.*' Frederick is the first
to spciik of fire superiority stating m his Military Testament of 1768 that "Battles are
won by fire superiority, infantry firing more rapidly will undoubtedly defeat infantry
firing more slowly."** Like other chefs d'armee . Frederick used his cavalry for shock
and reconnaissance. In two ranks the cavalry charged "boot to boot" with sabres
alone—Frederick forbade the cavalry firearms, though he did use limited mounted
infantry—and, unlike his contemporaries, never interspersed infantry and cavalry.*^
Frederick demonstrated his emphasis on cavalry speed by moving the cavalry
from the flank to the third rank. Ready to exploit any break in the enemy line caused
by his infantry's superior fire, the cavalry would pass through the ft-ont two ranks of
foot soldiers wherever the enemy proved weakest—thus the Jominian principle of attack
with strength at the decisive point. After breaking the line of foot soldiers, the shock
of cavalry would spread fear and chaos through to the enemy rear.**
The rear was also attacked with artillery. Frederick's innovations in the arme
blanche complemented his belief that "artillery decided everything." Frederick
developed horse artillery to support the cavalry; not horse-drawn artillery as existed
elsewhere, but mounted cannoneers, ammunition handlers and ammunition boxes.*' The
main requirement for horse artillery was cannon of reduced weight and Frederick was
the first to take advantage of this technological change. Later, General Gribeauval of
*'E>upuy, T.N., The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare
, p. 150, Bobbs-Merrill,
1980. Ehipuy attributes this rate of fire advantage more to Prussian discipline and drill
than the iron ramrod.
**Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, p. 14, Princeton Univ. Press, 1966.
*'Dupuy and Dupuy, Encyclopedia of Military History , p. 665. Sec also Dupuy,
The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare , p. 151.
**StTachan, H., European Armies and the Conduct of War , p. 18. George Allen
and Unwin, 1983. Sec also Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare , p. 151.
*'Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare
, p. 152. The Prussian cavalry
inclined unacceptable casualties from enemy artillery due to the artillery's inability to
stay with the newly mobile forward-deployed cavalry and therewith to provide counter-
battery fire.
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the French army would follow Frederick's lead and make further progress in this
innovation/' Frederick found greater precision of fire in replacing wedges with screws
for gun elevation and used the trajectory of the howitzer to attack reserves and spread
fear and shock/' Frederick's use of the mobility of mounted artillery combined with
concentration and precision of fire to attack the infantry line and reserves made
maximum use of the two support arms, artillery and cavalry.
Frederick made great strides in breaking the eighteenth century dependence on
depots. The soldier carried three days rations in his knapsack. The regimental supply
train carried an eight day supply of bread and the army train held a full month's
supplies.'*' Under Frederick the Prussian army, "assuredly the most mobile and
formidable European army of its day, could march for a maximum of ten days before
a pause became necessary to bring up bake ovens and rearrange supply lines from the
rear.'"* To a limited degree, the Prussian soldier could live off the land; but the
problem of desertion made Frederick, like all eighteenth century generals, very wary
of this solution to the problem of logistics. Losses due to desertion could range up
to triple the number lost in action after unsuccessful battles."
Siegecraft was not a central part of Frederick's operational art. During the Seven
Years' War he undertook only one major siege. Similarly, fortifications were important
but hardly innovative in use or design and only became important at the end of his
reign as he attempted a strategic defensive of the fiiiits of his long years of war.
Frederick did, however, place great enrqjhasis on canal building which unlike
fortifications became a key part of Prussian strategic planning. Canals ultimately
connected the Oder and Elbe Rivers creating a single internal waterway meeting
"^an Crcveld, M., Technology and War , p. 87, Free Press, 1989.
**Ibid., p. 33.
*E)upuy and Dupuy, Encyclopedia of Military History , p. 666. See also Dupuy,
The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, p. 150.
"McNeill, The Pursuit of Power , p. 159.
"Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare , p. 150.
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Frederick's requirement for the "speedy and secure movement of grain and other
supplies.""
C. COSTS
In the eighteenth century, Prussia was the poorest of the Great Powers. The
standing army was the HohenzoUem idee fixe because it was all that separated Prussia
from second class status. The greatest riches of Prussia were the unbelievably intense
desires of the HohenzoUems to be "great" and the energy of the dynastic heirs. That
energy allowed the line from the Great Elector to Frederick the Great to slowly build
a military power that was the envy of Europe from a nation which, at Frederick's
accession in 1740, had only a population of two and a half million to support an army
of 80,000 men with a revenue of one million pounds sterling."
The economic weaknesses of Prussia, its march lands, small population, and even
smaller income, were not great impediments to Frederick's abUity to wage war. As
William McNeill points out the "supply of weapons, gunpowder, uniforms, and other
equipment did not normally set limits on military enterprise" during the eighteenth
century, "Costs of such items were comparatively small." During the Seven Years'
War Prussia's expenditures for materiel amounted to only thirteen per cent of total
expenses, while weapons, gunpowder and lead amounted to only one percent."
In 1752 the army received ninety per cent of the Prussian budget while in 1754
of the entire Prussian budget of 6 million thalers five million was spent on the army
leaving only one million for all other state purposes.** Thus in Frederick the Great we
see a monarch willing to pay an unbelievable price in both lives and currency from his
"McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, p. 163.
'*Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare , p. 149. At the end of
Frederick's reign in 1786 the population had doubled to five milliun and the amiy had
grown to 200,000 men and absorbed four-fiftfis of the state's revenue.
"McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, pp. 159-160.
'•Prcston, RwA., and Wise, S.F., Men in Arms , p. 146, Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1979.
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own holdings as well as surrendering much of his reign to the rigors of campaigning,
all to maintain his personal possession—the Prussian Army. This professional, largely
mercenary force, administered and supported by a bureaucracy as attuned to the spirit
of the army as any in history," existed to allow the state to exist. Prussia's strategic
position, surrounded by Great Powers, the battleground of Europe, allowed no other
possibility, save extinction.
D. SUPERSTRUCTURE
The Prussian social and economic arrangement during Frederick's reign, which
Friedrich Meinecke called "the old and dilapidated superstructure,"" required the
bourgeoisie to produce the means of war and pay the taxes, the peasantry to supply the
food, fodder and men, while the nobility gave their sons to lead the army.^' The 1727
Canton Regulation decreed "all inhabitants of the state are bom to bear arms."*** In
fact, economic reality meant otherwise. Frederick, even more than his ancestors, was
extremely liberal with exemptions to conscription. Even the peasant soldier was
granted leave for harvest. Frederick preferred the mercenary to his own subject partly
because this freed a man to the fields and, outside war and the annual drill period, the
mercenary became another productive subject.*'
The relationships of aristocracy, bourgeoisie , peasant and state centered on the
king. After long years of duress, the nobility grew to value their hold on
commissions; a bond was thereafter forged between king and Junker unique in the
history of armies. The concept of immediate ^jplication of officers to king is perhaps
"Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, pp. 18-19.
"Meinecke, F., The Age of German Liberation , p. 46, ed. P. Paret, U. of
California Press, 1977.
'Tbid., p. 17.




the best example of this tradition.*^ Frederick preferred the nobility, any nobility, for
his officers because he valued most ilie honor he believed them uniquely to possess;
he "knew" the middle class valued only profit and could never achieve his standard of
"subordination and sacrifice of everything to one idea: duty.""
The Junker officer was also well suited to lead the peasant army of Prussia. The
feudal bond of peasant to the landowner was simply transferred to the battlefield.
Frederick's view that the soldier "must be made more afraid of his own officers than
of the dangers to which he is exposed" is at odds with the admiration and gratitude he
showed for the victors of the First and Second Silesian Wars. But this comment—and
worse—came only after the "flower of his army lay dead on the battlefields" of those
wars.**
Paret points out that there were in fact two types of officers even in Frederick's
army-the country noble and the military professional. The first group, the Junker.
"with his close bonds to the land, his central position in the affairs of his native
region, his nearly total authority over the peasants of his estate, who obeyed him as
instinctively in the army as they did on his acres, was a very different man from the
military professional." The differences between the landed nobles and this second
group, who came upon their noble patent only due to its necessity for a commission
and at the state's convenience, were to have a profound influence on the events to
come in the periods of reform and reaction—which can be seen as victories of each
over the other—for "an old-established family could give its members a unique sense
of independence that did not readily adjust itself to the emerging replacement of





sword might be more receptive to the arguments of effectiveness and efficiency, or at
least be unable to put up as strong a defense against them."*'
E. CONCLUSION
It is, perhaps, a mistake to paint the superstructure of the Frederickian system of
goemannce as simply a military machine. In fact, Frederick and his predecessors spent
a great deal of time - Frederick spent "only" ten years of his forty-six year reign on
campaign - attempting to "people" the barren reaches of his country and spent much
effort on commerce, trade and improvements in the Prussian education system. His
Political Testament of 1752 sums up his philosophy of government in its "main
pillars": justice, sound finance, social and economic welfare, the church, and, lastly,
foreign policy and war.**
The eighteenth century is marked by a slow, rational, procedural, limited war of
position. The general was most esteemed who could so position his forces to place
his opponent across the chessboard in such a disadvantageous position that he must cry
"checkmate," without battle, without blood. Frederick's position—inferior numbers,
inferior strategic position—forced him either to capitulate or innovate. His innovation
was to defend through the offensive. His break with his times is best understood in
his willingness to give battle, to attack even when the calculus of the time declared
him loser, to risk everything, and then, win or lose (he lost as many battles as he
won), to continue.
The central features of the Frederickian system were the willingness to give
battle, mobility, speed, fire superiority, concentrated and somewhat coordinated use of
infantry, cavalry and artillery, innovation and improvement in the means of war, and
unity of military and political leadership. Frederick fought with limited means for
•'Paret, P., Yorck and the Era of Pmssian Reform
, pp. 9-10. Paret points out
that the two groups are not exclusive, but the duality does establish a fundamental
tension within the officers* corps which is played out in the reform-reaction dichotomy.
"Ritter, G., The Sword and the Scepter , v. 1, trans. H. Norden, p. 26, Univ. of
Miami Press, 1969. The placing of war last in this conception is highly instructive of
Frederick's view of the place of war in his conceptual hierarchy of governance.
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limited ends. His small, professional, mainly mercenary army fought for territorial,
dynastic objectives. He "lasted," victorious in wars of attrition by refusing defeat.
Even at the end of his life, he still b>elieved that "to win a battle means to compel
your opponent to yield you his position."*' Frederick improved and "perfected" but did
not transcend the nature of eighteenth century warfare. Frederick "achieved the utmost
possible within the limits set by technology and by the political and social conditions
of Prussia in the eighteenth century.""
•Frederick H, Militarisches Testament von 1768
. pp. 246-249, in Werke . v. VI,
quoted in Palmer, R.R., "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to
National War," Earic, EM., Makers of Modem Strategy , p. 60, Princeton, 1971.
"Dupuy, The Evolution of WeaTX)ns and Warfare , p. 148.
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IV. NAPOLEON AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR
Napoleon Bonaparte was the central character in the "transformation of war" in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It seems extraordinariJy trite to say
Napoleon was central to Napoleonic warfare, yet the most striking facet of the
changing nature of war in this period is how very little Napoleon had to do with it;
he initiated very few innovations and, oddly, given his reputation, acted as a brake on
change as often as he effected change. Wherever we look in our taxonomy of change,
whether armies, means, costs, superstructure, or relationships, we see the hand of
Napoleon; not, as we would think of the "God of War," as innovator, originator,
creator, but as implcmentor, taking the raw material of change and adapting it to his
purposes. Qearly, the transform function was the French Revolution and Napoleon had
little part in the transformation; but, as we shall see, his genius was to see the first
derivative in this historical calculus. It took almost a generation for his contemporaries
to sec what Napoleon had done, reform their own houses and bring his own genius to
bear against him. Of all of Napoleon's adversaries, England, Russia, Austria-Hungary
and Prussia, none was more proficient in adapting Napoleonic warfare against Napoleon
than Prussia. It did so by close study and adaptation of the French changes in armies,
means, costs and superstructure of war.
A. THE FRENCH ARMY
The roots of change predate the Revolution. Just as Frederick's victories led to
complacency and ossification in the Prussian army, the scries of defeats suffered by
pre-rcvolutionary France led to self-criticism and reform in the French army.
The anny of Louis XVI was very much the typical mercenary standing army,
the royal appendage of the Ancien Regime . The aristocracy was in nearly full control
of all access to the conunissioned officers' corps, the practice of purchase of
commissions bloating Ae corps with unqualified nobles. When we compare the pre-
revolutionary French army of 1789, defending a nation of 26 million with an army of
180,000 of which 1,159 were general officers, with the Prussian army of the same
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year, defending a nation of only 6 million with an army of 170,000 and only 123
general officers, it seems clear that the French army was ripe for reform, even by the
standards of the Frederickian system. Only 1,000 of the 10,000 officers of France in
1789 were commoners. By 1791, 6,000 of these 10,000 had emigrated. Eighty-four
generals were executed in 1793 and 1794. By 1793, 95% of the army had enrolled
since 1789 and 85% of aU lieutenants had previously been non-commissioned officers
in the old army." One million men served the tricolore by 1794.™ Given these
dramatic statistics, it is not too much to say that we see in France a new type of army;
but not an army sprung whole cloth from the turmoil and terror of France, seeds of
this army were planted in the soil of French military ideas throughout the eighteenth
century.
An important theme of many pre-revolutionary military writers was that, while
efficient, the standing army of mercenaries did not fiilly tap the greatest resource of
France—its large populace. Voltaire criticized an army which defended the state with
only the "poorest human material" and wrote that this "irrational" army should be
replaced with a militia; Montesquieu, following the example of classic Rome, believed
a republican army must be of the people, not the ruler~a citizen army to defend the
state and its people from arbitrary rule; Rousseau, looking to his own Swiss
background, held the "citizen" had a direct responsibility to defend his "nation. "''
The old order of the royalist remnant soon disintegrates after 1789 and many of
the ideas of the enlightenment, having percolated through the French army in the
eighteenth century, begin to take shq)e in the new revolutionary army of France. It
might seem surprising that these "new ideas" should have any affect on the army of
the old regime which traditionally was isolated and disconnected from the civil
populace. William McNeill points out two circumstances which allowed the army to
be "infected" with revolutionary ideas. It was normal for the officers of the ancien
••Strachan, European Amiies and the Conduct of War , pp. 38-39.
'toward, M., War in European History , p. 80, Oxford Univ. Press, 1983. See
also Van Creveld, Technology and War, p. 113.
^Preston and Wise, Men in Arms , pp. 179-180.
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regime to spend very little time with their soldiers, they were of a different class and
the garrison routine of drUl was largely left to sergeants. The advent of written orders
had caused the army since 1787 to train sergeants to read and write. This newly
literate group of non-commissioned officers had a particular grievance due to the 1781
order restricting commissions to the nobility and therefore blocking the sergeants from
commissions. Thus when the many revolutionary propaganda pamphlets began to
circulate the sergeants were able and-due to their grievance—willing to spread these
ideas among the soldiers. The second factor was the French practice of quartering
soldiers in towns unlike the Pmssian and Russian practice of garrisoning their peasant
armies away from civil society. These factors taken together led the soldiery to join
the crowd at the Bastille on 14 July 1789 and provide artillery and arms to support the
Revolution and laid the foundation of the revolutionary army.
Recmitment for this new revolutionary army was to be based on the volunteer
citizen and this leads initially to a new sense of energy; but this scheme of recruitment
fails and the Revolution was unable to tap the resources of the nation until the Jacobin
dictatorship of the Terror. The levee en masse in 1793 uses an old form to harness
this new energy. Citizen conscription produced a nationalist French army vastly
increased in size with the even greater resources of the whole state to be tapped when
needed:
From this moment until that in which every enemy has been driven from the
territory of the Republic, every Frenchman is permanendy requisitioned for service
with the armies. The young men shall fight; married men will manufacture weapons
and transport stores; women shall make tents and nurse in the hospitals; children
shall turn old linen into lint; the old men shall repair to the public squares to raise
the courage of the warriors and preach the unity of the Republic and hatred against
the kings.''
This then is the "nation in arms," and whcdicr the nation required life or labor, all
citizens were obligated to provide the nation whatever it required, indefinitely."
"Rothenbcrg, G.E., The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon , p. 100, Indiana
Univ. Press, 1980.
"McNeill, The Pursuit of Power , p. 199.
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Another thread of ideas, again predating the Revolution and Napoleon, provided
the method for organizing such a vastly increased army as a fighting entity. Guibert,
du Teil, Bourcet, de Saxe and others all dreamt of an army different from that so often
the loser in their day. Marshal de Saxe first used a divisional formation in the War
of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748).^* In 1759 de Broglie integrated infantry and
artillery in a division organization. Guibert called for the use of the division in the
1770's."
It was clear by 1794 that such a huge army could not fight or be commanded
as a whole as had Frederick's army.^* The army must be "divided" into smaller, self-
contained units, "divisions," comprised of infantry and artillery. Lazare Camot,
France's Minister of War, combined cavalry with infantry and artillery in 1794.^ As
a separate entity the division could fight alone until support arrived; and, if properly
spaced on the battle front, divisions could "march to the sound of guns" providing the
strategic mobility necessary to properly use the manpower resources now available to
the French army.™ The entire French army was organized on the division concept by
1796. In 1800, the French general Moreau grouped his eleven divisions of the Army
of the Rhine into four separate Corps to allow administrative control over his army of
200,000 men."
The French division of 1795 contained 12 infantry battalions, 1 cavalry regiment
and 32 guns. The battalion had 584 officers and men organized in eight companies
of musketeers and one company of grenadiers. Two of these battalions formed a
^*Another "first" of this war was Maria Theresa's use of the "wild Croats" as
Austrian skirmishers. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, p. 165.
"Preston and Wise, Men in Arms , p. 191.
'•Along with the levee gi masse , annexations nearly doubled the number of
"Frenchmen" available for service, from 25 million in 1789 to 44 million in 1810.
McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, p. 200.
"Dupuy and Dupuy, Encyclopedia of Military History , p. 736.
'T^opp, T., War in the Modem Worid
. p. 102, Collier, 1962.
'^Dupuy and Dupuy, Encyclopedia of Military History , p. 737.
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regiment, the administrative fomiation of the French army. By 1799, the seven corps
uf the Grande Armee each contained 2-4 infantry divisions, a brigade or division of
hght cavalry and corps artillery, cavalry, engineers and supply train."
Light infantry emerges as an important combat element in France growing,
between 1789 and 1795, from 4% to 23% of the total infantry force of the army."
This change was partially due to the poor quality of the army raised by the levee en
masse . Light infantry required less training and discipline than infantry requiring
drilled maneuver; but this was not simply invention based on necessity, skirmishers—
the tactical use for light infantry—became a vital complement to the French tactical
milieu in the late eighteenth century."
Agricultural developments which transformed the open fields of Frederick's wars
to the many "enclosures, walls and hedgerows" of the late eighteenth century provided
impetus to the use of skirmishers—riflemen providing cover for infantry—and increased
the value of the light infantry." Frederick's linear tactics required open fields for
deployment of the line, but the inception of variegated crops required enclosing the
fields and "the landsc^)c of westem Europe became increasingly inhospitable to the old
tactics." The battle lines of Frederick, rwo or three miles in length, could not now
form up from column and were unable to move to battle as a coherent force.'"* Guibcrt
and others called for tactical changes favoring the shock of attack by column-
previously used only for march and maneuver—to the superior fire of the line."
**Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, pp. 42-43, see also Dupuy
and Dupuy, Encyclopedia of Militarv History, p. 737.
"Ibid., pp. 41-42.
"Preston and Wise, Men in Arms, p. 183. For the light infantry debate sec Paret,
Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, pp. 24-42, and R.R. Palmer, "Frederick the
Great, Guibert, Bulow: From I>ynastic to National War," Makers of Modem Strategy .
pp. 49-74.
•'Ibid.
^^McNeill, The Pursuit of Power , p. 165. 7
"Ropp, War in the Modem Worid . p. 99.
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Guibert recommended the ordre mijtte . battalions in column mixed with battalions in
line fomnation, to combine the advantages of speed, mobility, shock and fire power.**
Others argued for combinations of skirmishers, line, and column.
It would be for Napoleon to finally put all this together in a form and with a
purpose that, by 1809, would "conquer" the European continent. But he would not
accomplish this historical marvel with only the "wild revolutionaries" of 1789. The
officers and soldiers of the Grande Armee were battle-hardened, professional, ambitious
and well-trained. They became veterans through the Wars of the Coalitions and
combined their hard-won professional skills with a belief in their cause—liberty,
equality, fraternity.
Those ideals were not common currency easily translated to a "professionalized"
peasantry. The need to train this "mob" of hundreds of thousands of "zealots" so
recently released from the suzerainty of the Ancien Regime meant a new methods of
training had to be found. Frederick's methods of bmtal drill and discipline based on
fear of officers would not suffice for training free men bound only by patriotism and
liberty. Esprit replaced brutality. Training had to center on the individual, the citizen,
as well as the group." It was also necessary to build upon the revolutionary fervor
through continuous indoctrination of republican zeal resulting in "a new confidence in
the might of the revolution flowed deep and strong through the ranks and began to
inspire most of the French officers as well."" These recruits of the Revolution
became, those lucky and skilled enough to survive, the veterans of the Grande Armee .
Thus this army is more than simply a much larger eighteenth century standing army.
This is a new force, the nationalistic, patriotic fervor of the citizen army combined
"Ibid., p. 100, see also Preston and Wise, Men in Arms , p. 191.
I^ston and Wise, Men in Aims , p. 185.
"McNeiU, The Pursuit of Power , p. 198.
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with the disciplined efficiency of professionalism learned in the Wars of the First and
Second Coalitions."'
After 1789, the officers' corps was naturally now open to all classes. The
sergeants of 1789 became the experienced cadre of the officer corps of 1793.'"
Promotion was now based on merit alone and the practice of purchase of commissions
ended." The "world war" also brought forth a new, younger generation of leaders.
Napoleon and eight of his future marshals promoted between 1789 and 1794 were, on
average, only 33 years old." Their youth was to provide the French army with a new
vitality. Education of these officers became a rational undertaking as opposed to the
assumptions of the noblesse oblige of the old order. The driving principle of L'Ecole
Polvtechnique (opened in 1795) and St. Cyr (1802) was that a superior officer could
be produced through merit and hard work."
In uniforms as in the other areas already treated, the French army found, as did
their society in general, value in breaking with tradition and took the field sans
cullottc . However, as with so many facets of this new army the radical "break" with
the past was more apparent than real. Tradition was for a time a concept tieing the
present with an unacceptable past. But the thread of ideas linking the Ancien Regime
with the Grande Armee was never totally severed. Apart from the momentary
symbolism, the greatest impact of wearing pants is to be found in the requirement for
mass production of uniforms for an army of a million men.
"T^othenbcrg, The Ait of Warfare in the Age of Naix)leon . pp. 112-114, provides
some useful dampening to the usually overblown reliance on "patriotic fervor" to
explain French successes.
**Ibid., p. 132, Rothenberg provides an interesting discussion of procedures for
entrance into the officer corps by sergeants.
"Ropp, War in the Modem Worid. p. 98.
'Tbid., p. 109.
"Preston and Wise, Men in Arms , p. 187.
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B. MEANS
If only because of this vast size, this new type of aiTny--the nation in amis—
required new methods for producing the means of waging war. The spirit of the
revolution and the zeal of both army and citizenry also opened new opportunities for
production. The Jacobins, through the well spring of the Terror and the levee en
masse , "revolutionized" the army. Under the leadership of Lazare Camot and the War
Cabinet, Committees of Public Safety opened the flood gates of national mobilization
of the means of war production on an unprecedented scale. For the first time we see
a "great" power calling upon itself to direct its "total" resources—economic, agricultural,
scientific, as well as manpower—toward the "needs" of the state: first survival, then
proselytization, and finally conquest.
Ehie to its size, population, and commerce, France had been the greatest economic
power in Europe at the start of the eighteenth century. By the end of the century
France had lost much ground to England and the other powers but its economy was
by no means of the second rank. Camot, "the organizer of victory" and, importantly,
an engineer, applied the methods of mass production, regimentation, and conscription
to the economic mobilization of France's considerable resources.** While many of the
programs emanating from the Committees of Public Safety had been tried before-and
failed-Camot, in much the same manner as Napoleon, hamessed the combination of
resources, methods, and a mobilized society, and added the scientific talent (especially
fiom mathematics, engineering and cartography) of the nation in a single enterprise-
war." Men like Gaspard Monge, the founder of descriptive geometry, applied their
scientific knowledge to the needs of the army. Public musketry works were established
in Paris parks and workers by the thousands were conscripted to work in them.
Foundries were supplied with materiel and manpower to work at capacity.** The entire
'*Howard, War in European History , p. 81.
"William McNeill believes that Camot "perhaps deserves the main credit for
taking the risks inherent in radically aggressive strategic and tactical moves." McNeill,
The Pursuit of Power, p. 198.
"Ropp, War in the Modem Worid . p. 111.
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nation was mobilized to overcome materiel shortages and educated in how to identify
and recover materials in short supply necessary for continued prosecution of war.
General Jean de Gribeauval, in part inspired by Frederick's innovations,
transformed the French artillery service between 1763 and 1767. "His idea was simple
and radical; to apply reason and experiment to the task of creating a new weapons
system."" He introduced artillery with interchangeable parts and standard carriages
after the Seven Years' War, and these changes had far reaching effects as
Revolutionary France began mass production of artillery." He also introduced paired
(versus file) harnessing of horses, hardwood (versus much heavier iron) axles, a screw
device for precise gun elevation adjustment, a single package of combined shot and
powder which doubled the rate of fire, solid, shell and canister shot for different types
of targets and brass measure tangent sights which allowed gunners to know where shot
would hit before they fired; the result was greatly increased mobility, speed, range,
accuracy and producibility of artillery." With this single exception of artillery, the
we^x)ns with which Napoleon conquered the continent were, in most respects, identical
to those of the Seven Years' War. The infantry continued to fight with flintlock and
bayonet and the cavalry with sword, sabre and lance. Camot's order of 1794
encouraged "action with the bayonet one every occasion" and much rhetoric was
expended on the the need to use "cold steel" against the enemies of France. But the
weight of evidence suggests that the bayonet was not a decisive factor apart from the
psychological appeal.'"* Napoleon's surgeon general Larrey reported 100 wounds from
gunfire to every bayonet wound."" France's experiment with returning the pike to
warfare was merely an expedient to make up for the lack of flintlocks and as soon as
'McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, p. 170.
'T^opp, War in the Modem World , p. 100.
'T*reston and Wise, Men in Arms , pp. 181-182. See also McNeill, The Pursuit
of Power, p. 170.
'"Tlotiienberg, The Ait of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon
, p. 69.
•'"Van Crevcld, Technology and War, p. 95.
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production increased it was abandoned. More serious was Napoleon's appreciation of
ihe lance and it became a regular tool of the French cavalry.'*"
The greatest change is found in the support of war and the effects this had on
the previously important areas of siegecraft and fortification. In the late eighteenth
century we see a near revolution in agriculture throughout Europe. Population growth
after 1700 began a geometric rise. As the population density increased, the number
of acres tilled rose dramatically. The famines of the 1780's led many to see the
benefits of the potato. From a mere 50,000 acres in 1789, France's potato production
grew to 765,000 acres in 1803.'*® This produced a surplus which provided the means
for feeding the mass armies of France. The requirement to move this increased harvest
to the towns and cities led to great improvements throughout Europe in roads and
canals which the allowed these mass armies to move over the many new and improved
parallel roadways. The problem of lines of communications was greatly eased and
resupply of mass armies and true strategic mobility became a reality.
All of these changes, combined with the new logic of the citizen soldier and
the endless supply of manpower, meant that new methods of supply could be
successfully implemented. The notions that "war feeds war" and that an army must
move to survive was as old as ancient Rome. But because of the fear of desertions,
the King-Commander could not use them to any significant extent with the mercenary,
standing army. The advent of the "volunteer" citizen-soldier made that fear illogical
and, even if this rationale was incorrect, the soldier who deserted was now easily and
quickly replaced. The administrative bureaus now applied their new methods to
requisition. Both within France and abroad, when permission was granted by neutral
powers, agents of the government preceded armies in the field and usually were
successful securing the necessary provisions. In the absence of this orderly requisition,
the abundance of crops in a more densely populated Europe allowed foraging to an
extent previously impossible.
'"Rothenbcrg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, pp. 70-72.
""Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, p. 41.
38
One profound effect of requisition and forage was to decrease significantly the
weight carried by the individual soldier and the baggage needed in the supply train.
The soldier of revolutionary France may have marched faster from the "fervor" of his
patriotism but the "revolutionary" pace of 120 paces per minute was more likely the
result of carrying less weight and living off the land."** Each soldier carried personal
provisions to last for four days, while another four days* supply was maintained on the
wagon trains which followed the troops. "These eight days of provisions were to be
consumed only in emergency; insofar as possible daily food requirements were to be
obtained by local requisition or foraging."""
The individual and collective decrease in baggage greatly improved marching
performance and with it gave France a strategic mobility impressive even by today's
standards. The size of the French army also made enemy fortresses no more than a
nuisance. French armies could march around fortresses without the need for siege and
investment because the manpower in the armies rear and the size of the forward
elements eliminated the fear of being caught by enemy forces breaking out of a
bypassed fortress attacking your rear—previously the only tactical reason for a siege
campaign. Napoleon, beneficiary of these changes, was "the first commander to set up
a properly organized military requisitioning service." The result was that "his troops
were able to march somewhat faster and farther than most others, a most important
advantage that goes some way to explain their success.""*
C. COSTS
Despite having the entire resources of the nation, its manpower, materiel and, in
fact, the whole vitality of the state, put at the disposal of war, the economic costs and
costs in lives of this new, total war were staggeringly high. The common estimate for
men on all sides killed or dead as a result of combat in the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars is 1,000,000 men. The French army, through both the revolutionary
'Treston and Wise, Men in Arms , p. 184.
'"Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare , p. 164.
'*Van Creveld, Technology and War , p. 116.
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and Napoleonic periods, was "at best indifferently supplied and equipped. With stocks
nlready depleted at the onset of the war. French financial and industrial resources were
hard pressed to arm, equip, and sustain the vast numbers in the new armies and to
replace the wastage of constant and hard campaigning."""
France's string of victories and "endless" source of soldiers allowed it to pay the
human and economic costs of war, but its maritime weakness and the hostility of
England did exacerbate its most fundamental weakness, the dependence of very costly
overland transportation. William McNeill points out that where France fought in rich
agricultural areas and completed the campaign in one season, all was well with the
Napoleonic method. But when Napoleon could not defeat the enemy in one season
and when he fought in the more barren reaches of Russia and Spain, the result, largely
due to his inability to avail of maritime transport, was disaster."* Like Frederick
before him, despite the severe limitations of his supply system (or lack thereof),
Napoleon was willing and able to bear the costs of war.
This French willingness (and ability) to give battle, is aptly stated by Camot's
1794 directive:
to act in mass formation and take the offensive. Join action with the bayonet on
every occasion. Give battle on a large scale and pursue the enemy till he is utterly
destroyed.""
This "approach" resulted in unprecedented casualties during the period 1789-1815. This
increase was due not to an increased rate of battle casualties—the proportion of killed
and wounded per battle was actually much lower than during the Seven Years' War""-
-but from the huge increase in the number of combatants per battle and the number of
battles fought. At Lcuthcn 116,(XX) men took the field; at Jena 261,000."'
•"Hothenbcrg, The Ait of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon , p. 120.
"McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, p. 203.
""Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, p. 40.
""Ibid.
"'Dupuy and Ehipuy, Encyclopedia of Militarv History , pp. 671 and 751
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In half the time. Napoleon fought more campaigns than Frederick fought battles.
Ill the seventeenth century Vauban claimed 200 sieges and 60 battles in the last 200
years; Napoleon conducted only two sieges and twelve campaigns in a generation."*
Perhaps the best description of the new costs of war is Napoleon's claim to have "an
income of 200,000 young men a year.""' *
D. SUPERSTRUCTURE
Those "young men" soon became the only defense against reaction and
restoration. With the overthrow of the Ancien Regime the superstructure of the
revolution becomes to a significant degree the reason for war. The revolutionary
superstructure created an egalite of war—republic, political equality of classes,
nationalism, secularism, denial of privilege—which quickly, after 1789, turned to the
people for defense of the state. The new mass army which answered this call had to
be used if only because it could be fed no other way. The turbulence of political
forms. Assembly, Convention, Terror, Directory, and, finally, the Consulate and Empire,
is somehow lost in the compelling national need to defend against the various
Coalitions."*
Perhaps the greatest contribution of what we're here calling the revolutionary
superstructure to the changing nature of war is the energy inherent in that turbulence.
That energy, rising out of the people, ideas, governmental forms, and especially from
the absence of any continuity of authority and order, provided an opportunity for
change. After 1789, the vacuum of stability allowed not a revolution in the nature of
war but an acceleration of the evolutionary culmination of the many threads of
progression from the limited, careful exercise of military power as an adjunct of the
personal power of the autocrat to the expression of the will of the as yet unstable
citizen-based nation attempting to solidify its national sovereignty. It would be for
Napoleon to draw togcAcr these many threads of "progress" into a coherent whole.
"^an Crevcld, M., Sui>plving War, p. 41, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977.
"'Preston and Wise, Men in Amis , p. 192.
"*McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, p. 198.
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As we might expect with revolution, the underlying relationships among
Napoleon's "young men," their officers, and commanders changed drastically. The
soldier was now of the same class—citizen—as the officer. All were bound to the
nation and the ideals of the revolution. Those ideal—liberty, equality, fraternity—indeed
demanded new relationships. But this is easily overstated and it is well to remember
that leaders and the men they lead, especially at the small unit level, naturally form
a bond at once built on love and hate, with but little to do with the larger dynamic in
society.
We can surely go too far in stressing the impact of the revolutionary ideas on
the relationshqjs within the French army."' Certainly the brutal discipline of the
Ancien Regime army, the relationship of nobility and peasant, and the class
consciousness and separation gave way to a more level playing field where ability,
aggressiveness, and hard work counted more than a patent of nobUity; but the several
relationships between soldier, officer, and commander in the early nineteenth century
still have more in common with the eighteenth than the twentieth century.
After 1801, the French officers' corps was young, ambitious, professional,
experienced, open to talent, and displayed a much greater willingness to exercise
initiative. Promotion was based on merit and merit was a function of battle, not
barracks. Commanders displayed a willingness to take risks (lest they too lose their
heads) and risks were strategically less dangerous with so many lives to spend."*
One relationship changed little. By 1799, N^xjleon, as Frederick before him,
combined political and military authority in his person. Both men retained the desire
to command aU by retaining centralized control. The size of Napoleon's armies and
scope of the battle area made this more and more difficult for him—but he never
surrendered his cs^acity as single war planner. Napoleon rarely shared his strategic
'"An example from the same era also points to the danger of overstating the
impact of ideas generated by an intellectual elite: during the Russian officer's
Decembrist revolt of 1825 many soldiers mistook the "constitution" in their rallying cry
"Constantine and Constitution" for the name of Constantine's wife. Stolfi, R.H.S.,
Qass Notes, "War in the Modem World," Naval Postgraduate School, January, 1988.
'"Strachan, European Annies and the Conduct of War, p. 39.
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vision even with his field marshals."' Staffs do begin to take on more importance
durmg this period but in no sense do we see the "general" staff, only specialized
appendages which conform to the system without strategic input or import.'"
E. MODERN WAR
Author of many of the threads of change we have addressed, Guibert foresaw the
requirement for an integrating force to break the patterns of development in the nature
of war in the late eighteenth century. He seems to call Napoleon forth, asking of
history to
let there arise—there cannot but arise—some vast genius. He will lay hands so to
speak on the knowledge of all the community, will create or perfect the political
system, put himself at the head of the machine and give the impulse of its
movement."'
It has been a secondary premise of this chapter that, in seeking to discover the change
in the nature of war between the time of Frederick and that of N^oleon, we cannot
attribute that change only to the genius of one man. The genius of Napoleon was not
of the modem sense of invention beyond the understanding of lesser mortals but the
genius, arguably of a higher order, of seeing the potential of the social, political and
technological forces of his own time and weaving the disparate parts into a coherent
whole with which to mold the energies of his nation to his own vision of the future.
We have attempted to demonstrate that the fundamental changes (1) in the size,
recruitment, organization, character and tactics of the army, (2) in the economic,
agricultural and industrial mobilization of the means of war and the societal willingness
to accept the increased costs of war, (3) in the effects of these changes on the potential
for a new tactical and strategic mobility, and (4) in the fundamental reordering of
relationships within the army and in what we've called the superstructure of the society
as a whole, that all of these changes predate Nfqx)leon's rise to power in 1799. While,
quite apart from Napoleon's impact on history, it is possible to see the change in the
"Tlothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon , p. 129.
"•Van Creveld, M., Command in War , pp. 67-68. Harvard Univ. Press, 1985.
"'Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War , p. 37.
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nature of war without Napoleon;'" it is wholly impossible to understand the lasting
effects of those changes absent the imprint of Napoleon's will in integrating the many
threads of change into a fabric which even two hundred years later we recognize as
modem warfare.
We might even, at some great risk, assert that we can understand the "changing
nature of war" without reference to Napoleon. The risk is the lack of effective
example. Napoleon made the whole work; he gave "the impulse of its movement."
The impulse was speed, energy, mass, mobility and a new understanding of the raison
d'etre of war. N^wleonic warfare is "all out pursuit" to decisive victory.''' The limits
of war previously so firmly in place are gone. Napoleon seeks the point of attack
where with his new means of warfare he can decisively defeat the enemy then pursue
for utter, total defeat. Napoleon's goal is annihilation—not attrition—of the enemy
army. With the exception of Napoleon's exercise of command. Napoleon like
Frederick attempted to retain centralized, detailed control of his battles and served as
his own planning staff and, less importantly, the lack of technological advancement of
personal weaponry, the Nqwleonic system of warfare is fundamentally different from
the Frederickian system. Throughout this examination of warfare from Frederick to
Napoleon, we have used our understanding of the constituent parts of the nature of war
to discover the changes which occurred. Those constituents which changed: armies,
means, costs and superstructure, provide a framework for understanding what emerged
in the early nineteenth century.
Armies develop from the standing army of Frederick, a mercenary cadre paid to
promote the power of the ruler, to the citizen army of the nation in arms. The near
geometric increase in size, the organizational logic, and the administrative, scientific,
economic, agricultural, and societal mobilization which allowed it to fight, were all
combined by the genius of Nq)oleon to change the nature of war from a limited
'"As Colonel Dupuy points out in The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare , p.
154, "it is only fair to note that the military instrument Napoleon used as the basis
for this system had been to a large extent inherited."
"'Ropp, War in the Modem World , p. 101.
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exercise in maneuver for the purpose of wearing down the will of the enemy mler
until he surrenders to the logic of attrition to a total mobilization of society for the
single purpose of decisive victory by annihilation of the enemy army.
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V. THE DECLINE OF THE FREDERICKIAN STATE
On July 9, 1807, Frederick William HI, heir of Frederick the Great, signed the
Treaty of Tilsit and, in effect, gave away all that Frederick had accomplished. This
act, as much as the battle outcome at Jena, symbolizes the denouement of the struggle
between the Napoleonic and Frederickian systems of warfare, between the Ancien
Regime and the forces of modernity. As J.F.C. Fuller wrote, at Jena, "Nzqpoleon
destroyed not only a feudal army, but the last vestiges of the feudal idea, and out of
the ashes arose a national army, which at Leipzig destroyed him. On the corpse-strewn
fields by the Elster, present-day Europe writhed out of its medieval shell.'""
The change in the nature of war facing the reformers in the 1807 aftermath of
Jena was a fundamental transformation of the armies, means, costs and superstructure
of warfare in the Ancien Regime . Armies had more than doubled in size and
organically changed in character, makeup and tactical and strategic expression; the
"nation in arms" required access to the entire energies and capacity of the emerging
industrial state; the costs of applying this greatly expanded resource base and the
concomitant increase in casualties required a new willingness to risk the manpower and
materiel resources of the state; the revolutionary reordering of society required a new
vision of the meaning of war in a state with "citizens" bearing the price of citizenship,
and these citizens and their leaders had to reform relationships built up over centuries
on bonds of feudal concepts no longer valid.
Fortunately for Frederick William and the Prussian state a small group of officers
had since the Treaty of Basel been woiking on what we would today call a "defense
reform" program. The "humiliation of Jena" allowed the reformers just enough latitude
to place in effect the most important of these reforms. These reform-minded officers
and their civilian counterparts were set on understanding the changes in the nature of
war and reforming the Prussian state and army to recoup the honor of both. This
'duller, J.F.C, The Decisive Battles of the Western Worid
, p. 155, Granada,
1985.
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group of military reformers, led by Schamhorst, Gneisenau, Grolman, Boyen and
Clausewitz, made a lasting contribution to future of modem warfare by redefining both
the organizational framework of command through their development of the General
Staff system and the meaning of officer professionalism.
There is no indication that that was their goal. The immediate goal of the
reformers was the survival and redemption of the Prussian state; the means to that end
was fundamental change to what was left of the Frederickian system. The challenge
was immense and there was little if any reason to believe, in 1807, that there was
much chance of success. In the end the reformers achieved their immediate goal but
were unable to effect lasting change to the feudal relationships of the Frederickian
state. That contribution though was the fundamental component of what was to come
later. The ethos of the failed reforms created an environment that is the essence of
what was to take its final form half a century later. For this ethos to take root it was
first necessary for the reformers to deal with an army rather much longer on self-image
than any real capacity to wage war. The disparity between the reality of the Prussian
army of 1792 and the self-delusion of that army resting on the laurels of Frederick
actually began with Frederick's own policies but did not become apparent until his
death.
After the death of Frederick 11 in 1786 the Prussian army slipped into a long
period of decay and petrification. As so often occurs, the heirs of victory seemed not
to understand the organic nature of warfare and paid little heed to the signs of change
emanating fi-om the West. Under Frederick's nephew, Frederick William EI, the
Pmssian army came under the influence of the prevailing atmosphere in Berlin'", then
"notorious as a center of moral laxity and sensual enjoyment;'"** and, even though the
next Hohenzollem, Frederick William in, stopped the more unseemly excesses of his
officer corps, the state of decline in the anny continued.
***rhe editor of the Preussische Staatsanzeiger claimed that "one could call Berlin
the great Babylon." Quoted in Craig, G.A., The End of Prussia, p. 12, Univ. of
Wisconsin Press, 1984.
'"Rosinski, The German Army , p. 49.
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The roots of this decline are found in Frederick's last years; even Treitschke held
ihat at the end of his reign Frederick's army was "in worse condition than that in
which he had found it on ascending the throne'"". After the Seven Years' War
Frederick turned his attention to the economic well-being of his state, and continued
his long dependence on mercenaries and his policy of liberal exemptions to the
conscription laws. Continued after Frederick's death this dependence reached the point
that by 1804 nearly one-half of the army was mercenary. The newly conquered
provinces were never fully brought under the canton system for immigration was
believed encouraged by the liberal conscription policies. The canton regulations for
1792 proudly stated that in Prussia "beside the mightiest and most formidable arniy,
all the arts of peace bloom, where the compulsion of conscription is moderated as
much as possible, and many classes of subjects are hardly disturbed."'" "How
excellent, it was said, that the state raised standing armies and drew on the lower
classes for its soldiers....while the burgher follows his trade undisturbed, and the scholar
pursues his thoughts."'" That the consequences of such a trade between many classes
"hardly disturbed" and a foreign-dominated army might be a tremendous decrease in
combat effectiveness seems not to have occurred to the Prussian leadership.
Prussia's turning away from the Prussian soldier to the mercenary exacerbated
another increasingly difficult problem, the wives and children of foreign soldiers. In
1777 only thirty percent of the Berlin garrison were married men as had been the
upper limit of policy since the time of the Great Elector, but by 1802 there were 59
wives and 78 children per 100 cantonists and 36 wives and 49 children per 100
mercenaries. This is starkly at odds with the French Agure of approximately 15
'**rreitschkc, H.v., German History in the Nineteenth Century , v. 1, p. 85, George
Allen and Unwin, 1915. Quoted in Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army , p. 22.
"*Shanahan, W.O., Prussian Military Reforms. 1786-1813
. p. 47, AMS Press, 1966.
'"Meineckc, The Age of German Liberation , p. 24. If the reader sees no parallel
with our own condition without the author persistently drawing it, it would seem of
little use, and I have refrained from beating this theme over the heads of those who
will sec it on their own.
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percent married men.'" The tensions created between these garrison families and the
townspeople, the increased costs of providing for the women and children—Prussia was
one of the only European states to provide an allowance per number of dependents—
and the increase in the number of soldiers "on leave" along with the unquantifiablc
reduction in individual effectiveness of soldiers concerned by real family
impoverishment, all these factors weigh heavily on the Frcderickian system at the turn
of the century. Any desire for effective training in garrison was likely disappointed
by these conditions and because the larger part of most regiments was on leave or
furlough."'
Another strain on the Frederickian system was the size of the army maintained
under the corrupted canton system with its many exemptions and loopholes. As the
Prussian population increased between 1760 and 1786 from 2.2 to 5.7 million the ratio
of "effectives," soldiers reasonably available for duty, to the total population remained
constant: one soldier for every 28 inhabitants. The mean for all European armies was
roughly one soldier for each one hundred inhabitants and in France it was only one
soldier for each one hundred forty-four inhabitants.'^ The "strain" this caused was the
uneven distribution of hardship within the Pmssian population. Exemptions were
liberal in the new provinces and the cities, while the bourgeoisie and city dwellers
were favored over the peasants in the countryside. The resulting army was either
Prussian soldiers bitter over the inequities of their system or mercenaries witii no
attachment to the state.
The officer corps was to an extent undergoing a similar trend towards
"mercenaries." Frederick's obsession with the desirability of the noble officer led to
the forced dismissal of bourgeois officers after the Seven Years' War. This placed a
strain on the talents of the Prussian nobility which could only be alleviated by offering
'"Corvisicr, A., Armies and Societies in Europe. 1494-1789 . trans. A.T. Siddall,
pp. 174-175, Indiana Univ. Press, 1979.
'^othenbcrg. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon , pp. 87-89, provides
an excellent elaboration of the problems inherent in the "soldier's women."
"^orvisier. Armies and Societies in Europe , pp. 113-114.
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commissions to foreign nobles. Swelling the officers' corps with foreign nobles, often
granted a patent of nobility on the eve of acceptance, led to both officers of the
highest caliber and what Treitschke called "adventurers of dubious character." It
certainly diluted the homogeneity of the Prussian officer corps and its connection to
the Prussian state which had been its great strengths.
Another long-standing shortcoming of the Prussian officer corps was its "very low
state of educational standards"."* In 1720 Frederick William I had instituted cadet
schools first at Stolpc and later at Potsdam, Kulm and Berlin. In the intervening years
the reputation of Prussian arms led much of Europe to follow and then surpass the
Pmssian example. It was not difficult to surpass the educational standards of a state
where the prevalent view was that a "general was not regarded as uneducated, even
though he could barely write his own name. Whoever could do more was styled a
pedant, inksplasher and scribbler."'" Gordon Craig holds a chief element of this
problem to be the long term tendency of the nobility to send its young boys to the
cadet schools at such an early age-Frederick called them "youth snatched from their
mothers' breasts"~that they hadn't even the most rudimentary educational skills.
With the death of Frederick and therewith release iSrom his iron rule, officials and
officers began to show signs of "conceit and insubordination." Even well-intentioned
attempts to relieve the lot of soldiers by decreasing marginally the severity of
disc5)linary measures and liberalizing leave procedures led to further reductions in
Prussian military effectiveness. Frederick's practice of furloughing cantonists for the
entire year except for the annual maneuvers was, under his successors, extended to
foreign mercenaries while maneuvers were shortened to four weeks. Training for new
recruits was reduced to ten weeks. All these reforms and economically motivated
training changes seem driven by civil interests; the net effect was a clear reduction of
Prussian military effectiv«iess.
Frederick's reaction to the rise of French military effectiveness in the wake of
the reforms of Gribeauval and his contemporaries was to downplay




artillery while emphasizing discipline and 'honor,' i.e., the traits that had always
made Prussian officers and men ready to sacrifice their lives on behalf of the state.
Frederick and his successor thus chose to rely on old-fashioned military virtues and
deliberately turned their backs on rational experimentation and technical reform of
the sort Gribcauval carried through. In 1806 the cost of this conservative policy
became evident. At the battle of Jena, Prussian valor, obedience, and honor proved
an inadequate counterweight to the new scale of war the French had meanwhile
perfected, thanks, in large part, to the often reluctant hospitality French army
commanders showed to the rational and experimental approach to their profession.*"
The depth of the decline of the Frederickian system became clear when this
army took the field as part of the First Coalition in 1792. Frederick William n,
having endured the Prussian retreat at Valmy and with the states reserves financially
drained, finally accepted the terms of the Treaty of Basel in 1795, ceding the left bank
of the Rhine and accepting a neutrality based on Prussian weakness. There followed
a decade of uneasy peace in Prussia, a p)eace welcomed by all but a few soldiers still
proud of the Prussian heritage but aware of how far their army had fallen since
Leuthen. Those soldiers recognized that the "Frederician army's organization and
tactics*** were obsolete, and were no match for the resources of the new era"; that their
"obsolete army was no longer the force that Frederick had led; its strength had been
sapped by the destractive effects of the new spirit, so that the weaknesses of the old
and new era fatally converged.." They recognized all of this for they were wimesscs
when "the old Prussian state crambled like dry rot.""' Their challenge was to convince
the Prussian leadership that reform was not only necessary for recoupment of the faded
glory of the Frederickian era but essential to the survival of the state.
'"McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, p. 173.
"*For a detailed explanation of the efforts at tactical reform prior to 1795, see
Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform , pp. 47-110.
'"Meinecke, F., The Age of German Liberation , p. 42.
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VI. THE INITIAL REFORMS: BASEL TO TILSIT
The challenges facing the Prussian state and army at the turn of the nineteenth
century were the same as have faced nations ever since: how to field a large enough
army, with ranks filled with the "right" type of men and led by the "right" type of
officers, at a cost which does not unnecessarily impede the economic well being of the
state, with a tactical and operational doctrine which can meet the prevailing threat, and
with an institutional ethos and strategic doctrine in consonance with the principles of
legitimacy underpinning the raison d*etre of the state. These central questions were,
for Pmssia, critical to its survival; yet in 1800 only a very small number of Prussian
officers and civilian officials seemed aware of the need for reform to meet the twin
challenge of the decline of the Frederickian system and the rise of Napoleonic France.
It is always tempting to see in momentous events such as the Prussian reform era
a clear break with the historical past, but it is the historian's first duty to find in every
discontinuity the continuity of change which reminds us that history is a continuum,
not the fresh page of a new chapter which it often seems. The usual starting date
given the woric of the Prussian Reformers is 1807, but as Otto Hintze reminds us in
his article "Prussian Reform Movements Before 1806," the "past gave them
justification; and so long as the basic features of Old Prussia—the army and the
bureaucracy—were maintained, the continuity of Prussian history was preserved."'**
The ranks of the Pmssian officer corps were not unaffected by the spirit and
ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. General von Ruchel reformed
the cadet schools in die 1790's and four higher military academies were established
between 1763 of 1806. Ruchel's adjutant. Major von Knesebeck, (and a later opponmt
of the reformers) called in 1803 for fundamental reform of the army to create a more
national force to meet the French challenge. Georg von Behrenhorst and Generals von
"•Hintze, O., "Prussian Reform Movements Before 1806," The Historical Essays
of Otto Hintze. ed. F. Gilbert, p. 67, Oxford Univ. Press, 1975.
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Courbiere and von Ruchel called for a cadre system which could be quickly expanded
in the event of war, the starting point for advocacy of universal military service.'"
Many of these new ideas were generated in the Militarische Gesellschaft . This
Military Society, in existence since 1801 but officially founded in Berlin on the
anniversary of Frederick the Great's birthday in 1802 by Colonel Gerhard Johann von
Schamhorst and seven fellow officers and two professors at the Berlin Institute, had
as its aim the reform of the Prussian army."* The first article of the Society's by-
laws declared its purpose "to instruct its members through the exchange of ideas in all
areas of the art of war, in a manner that would encourage them to seek out truth.""*
Schamhorst, "one of the greatest military thinkers of all ages and the one man who
had already guessed the riddle of Napoleon's miraculous success and gained an inkling
of the magnitude of the change brought about in warfare by the Revolution and its heir
and successor," used the society as a platform for his tactical reform proposals: "the
distribution of the forces into divisions, the deployment of troops for battle in depth
rather than in breadth, and the combination of the traditional Prussian line tactics with
the more elastic new French system of swarms of sharpshooters".'*** Presided over by
General von Ruchel, the military society included most of the future reformers of 1807,
Schamhorst, Grolman, Boyen and Qausewitz, as well as Major Knesebeck, Ruble von
Lilienstem and Colonel von Massenbach.'*^
Schamhorst had entered the Prussian service in July 1801 and after an initial
posting with the artillciy service he was called to the Quartermaster-General's staff of
Lieutenant-General von Geusau and given responsibility for reorganizing the military
school at Berlin, the Berlin Institute. Schamhorst expanded the curriculum to include
"'Gocriitz, W., History of the German General Staff, trans. B. Battershaw, p. 12,
Wcstvicw Press, 1985. Sec also Craig, The Politics of the Pmssian Army, p. 28.
"^oerlitz. History of the German General Staff, p. 17.
'"Paret, P., qausewitz and the State , p. 66, Princeton Univ. Press, 1985.
'^I^osinski, The German Army , pp. 58-59.
***For a complete description of the work of the Military Society, see White, C.E.,
The Enlightened Soldier. Praeger, 1989.
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the study of strategy and used this Academy "superimposed upon the more elementary
Institute" to begin the education of the generation of leaders necessary to implement
his ideas of reform. The initial classes at the Institute included Boyen, Grolman,
Tiedemann, Ruhle and Clausewitz.'** It was with these individuals that Schamhorst
was to attempt the fundamental reordering of the Prussian army. To accomplish this
task it was necessary to create a new type of Prussian officer and it was his individual
creativity and initiative that Schamhorst sought through education to bring forth.
Central to his efforts was Schamhorst's use of the concept of Bildung to explain the
life-long process necessary to create such a soldier. Bildung . literally culture, was not
"the social polish needed to enter court life" but "the perfectibility of the individual's
character and intellect through education,"'*'
The Military Society and the Berlin Institute became Schamhorst's vehicles for
planting the seeds of Bildung within the Prussian officers' corps. Schamhorst
expanded the curriculum of this "national academy" to include a three year course
centering on military history, geography, applied and pure mathematics, logic and
Schamhorst's own lectures on strategy, tactics and the duties of the general staff. He
designed this ciuriculum with the principal aim of "forming the intelligence and at
exercising the power of judgement." Schamhorst saw that "it is as important for a
soldier to possess these qualities as it is to acquire knowledge more directly related to
the practice [of war]. ...It is extremely important to guide the student toward
independent thought."'** This emphasis on the individual and his powers of
independent thought was given the greatest practical application in the study of military
history. He sought to use history, "the most complete intellectual representation of
reality," to guide the student toward an understanding of "war as it actually is" and
'*1bid., p. 59.
'*'White, The Enlightened Soldier , p. xii.
'*1*aret, Clauscwitz and the State , p. 69.
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was "not in the least impressed by the pretentious theories" of the then currently
popular Bulow and Jumini.'*^
Schamhorst is quoted as asking an associate in the Military Society, "What will
happen when the men Frederick n trained during the Seven Years' War are no longer
with us? The crisis can be met only be educating our officers." Peter Parct attributes
the focus of his educational energies as not only on the officer corps in general "but
also of a program that prepared an elite for the duties of superior command." That
elite was to be composed of future commanders and "those who served in a
reorganized and strengthened general staff."
Schamhorst might well have asked "what will happen when Frederick n is no
longer with us." Already before his entry in the Prussian service due to his service
in the Hanoverian Army during the First Coalition, Schamhorst realized that absent a
Frederick a new way must be found to meet the challenge of Napoleon and that the
answer was to establish a general staff "removed from its former subsidiary position
and educate it for a role of central significance."'**
In 1802, Massenbach, an ardent admirer of Napoleon's military accomplishments,
provided the organizational logic for Schamhorst 's plan writing two memoranda which
outlined the requirement for a permanent general staff which would operate in peace
and war and provide in peacetime war plans for all possible contingencies.'*' These
memoranda "justify his being called. ..the father of a unitary General Staff organization."
Massenbach laid the theoretical groundwork for what was to become the Prussian
General Staff, urging that (1) the quartermaster-general's staff be reorganized into three
separate brigades each with specific responsibility for a given geographic area, either
Austria, France or Russia, (2) that war plans be developed by these brigades for
'*'Ibid.. pp. 69-71.
'**Schamhorst to Lieutenant J. G. von Rauch, 15 August 1802, quoted in Paret,
Clausewitz and the State
, pp. 67-68.
'*^Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter, pp. 163-164, is at odds with Paret. Craig and
Goerlitz on whether Massenbach 's proposals on the General Staff were contained in the
memoranda of 1802 or an earlier proposal offered to the Duke of Brunswick in 1795.
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contingencies in their respective areas, (3) that the staff participate in exercises
designed to provide familiarity with potential terrain problems both in Pnissia and
abroad, (4) that staff members be rotated between troop units and staff assignments,
and (5) that the head of the quartermaster-general staff be granted direct access to the
king, the Immediatevortrag , and the right to provide advice to the king on all military
matters.'*' Masscnbach's prop>osals were finally accepted in 1803 by Frederick William
in but only over the objections of Field Marshal von Mollcndorff, head of the
Obcrkrcigskollegium. and Gencralmajor von Kockritz, head of the Oeneraladiutantur .
Mollendorff and Kockritz represent an incredibly complex and duplicative system
of military administration which was a holdover from the policy of Frederick n which
set the king's ministers at odds and thereby allowed the king to pick from the several
often conflicting opinions of his primary war advisors.'*' In the period between the
Treaties of Basel and Tilsit there were six centers of power and influence over the
king within the Prussian army. The Militardepartement of the General Directory was
created by Frederick WUliam I to aUow his exercise of authority over administrative
army matters. The Govemors of the Prussian garrisons had near autonomy over the
administration of their assigned regiments and were independent from control by the
Militardepartement in matters of training, education and methods of recruitment for
their canton. Overall supervision of recmitment and the canton system was vested in
the general inspectors. The Generaladjutantur
.
also begun under Frederick William I,
were originally merely the personal aides to the king tasked with handling royal
military correspondence. However, throughout the Eighteenth century largely due to
their immediate access to the king their influence grew and, by 1806, they had
responsibility through the separate infantry, cavalry and artUlery Generaladjutants for
transmitting all royal directives to the other agencies of military administration. The
Oberkriegskollegium
.
established in 1787, was designed to control this bureaucracy and
'*''Goerlitz, History of the Gemian General Staff, pp. 20-21.
'*'For the development of the Prussian bureaucracy see Rosenberg, H.,
Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy. The Prussian Experience 1669-1815 , Beacon
Press, 1958.
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coordinate the actions of the various agencies, bringing under central direction all
military matters."" The final piece of this bureaucratic maze was the
Generalquartiermeisterstab
.
the direct antecedent of the general staff. Since the time
of the Great Elector its functions had included engineering services, plans for march
routes and selection of camp sites and fortified positions.'" It was not until
Massenbach's memoranda that any serious effort was undertaken to resolve the duties
and the Quartermaster General Staff.
The failure of the reform proposals of Schamhorst and the other members of the
Militarischc Gesselschaft prior to 1807 was in large measure due to the resistance of
the "old Prussians" such as MoUendorff and Kockritz, a result of attempts to protect
their positions within the bureaucratic labyrinth of army administration. A second
cause can be ascribed to a certain amount of anti-intellectualism long present in the
Prussian officer corps. Mollendorff, a hero of the Seven Years* War, is said to have
greeted all reform proposals with the comment, "this is altogether above my head."
But there is also present an honest disagreement and resistance to changing the forms
and institutions of Frederick the Great.'"
Whatever the real cause of resistance to change, the only successfully
implemented proposals during the decade between Basel and TUsit were Massenbach's
general staff proposals and Schamhorst's divisional organization proposal. Neither was
fully implemented before the Jena campaign of October 1806. The General Staff was
organized under the first chief, General von Geusau, with three brigades each under a
Generalquartiermeisterleumant
.
with equivalent rank of colonel, and eighteen
"**Craig, The Politics of the Pmssian Army
, pp. 29-30. See also Goerlitz, History
of the German General Staff, pp. 9-10.
'"Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff
, p. 3.
'"Schamhorst was to use thi<: Predprirkian sentiment in many of hh Inter reform
proposals by claiming Frederickian precedent tor his actions. 'The historical
demonstrations used by Schamhorst as a means to persuade the King that his bold
plans were correct were not merely for show (Blendwerk); it was just this miraculous
blending of old and new that was characteristic of the military reform." Hintze, The
Historical Essays of Otto Hintze
. p. 74.
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subordinate staff officers. While this is no doubt the most important milestone in the
development of the Prussian General Staff concept, its original exemplification fell far
short of the reformer's designs and in no way provided the "unified control of strategic
policy" envisaged. Geusau, the holdover Quartermaster-General, still viewed his
responsibilities, as did the king, as administrative. The three section heads,
Schamhorst, von Massenbach and Major-General von Phull, in complete disharmony
over questions of strategy and tactics, were allowed to follow their own divergent paths
as long as they remained within the prevailing orthodoxy of military opinion. Just
months before the fatal campaign of Jena, Schamhorst 's request for a recotinoitering
of Westphalia and Thuringia was disapproved by Geusau because "he feared the
expense, and that the presence of Prussian officers on foreign territories would cause
comment and might give rise to misinterpretations."'" Additionally, the still dominant
Byzantine system of military administration with its unspecified areas of responsibility
did not allow for effective implementation of the proposals laid out by Schamhorst and
the other members of the Military Society. Even Schamhorst *s proposal for divisional
organization, well understood and appreciated by all who had studied Napoleon's
campaigns, was only implemented "on the march to Jena" far too late to benefit the
army. This stUl-bom reform movement had done what it could but it was not enough
and Schamhorst knew it. He wrote to his daughter on the eve of Jena, "I know what
we ought to do, what we will do is known to the Gods alone."'"
'Paret, Clausewitz and the State , pp. 76-77.
*Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff
, p. 25.
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VII. THE PRECONDITIONS FOR REFORM
The still-bom reform efforts of 1801-1805 were unable to overcome the
fundamental decay of the Frederickian system in time to alter the battle outcome at
Jena, Auerstadt, or Friedland, and finally Prussia was forced to accept Napoleon's
terms in the Treaty of TUsit. The hostility of crown, cabinet and nobility to the ideas
and program of the reformers, the apathy of a Prussian people separated from the state
and its army by a seemingly unbridgeable gulf, and the wholly deficient military
preparations for war made Prussia's downfall in 1806 and 1807 nearly inevitable.
The preconditions for successful reform were a reversal of the reformer's lack of
credibility with the crown and creation of a connection between the Prussian people
and their state and army. Absent these preconditions the military reforms necessary
to overcome the decline of the Frederickian system were not possible and the
reformers' dreams of a professional cadre leading an army of citizen-soldiers to victory
against the hated Napoleon would remain illusive. Equally illusory would be a future
Prassian General Staff which might, through Schamhorst's concept of Bildung .
institutionalize the excellence of Frederick the Great and rejuvenate the Prussian officer
corps.
The nascent Prussian General Staff started the campaign of 1806 not as a
coherent whole but as a fragmented body totally unable to provide coherent leadership
or the missing unity of command and decision making which proved to be the single
greatest weakness of the Prussian forces in its struggle with Napoleon. "Tlius a war
accepted under the worst possible conditions was fought in the worst possible way, and
what was ultimately to become the Great Pmssian General Staff made its debut on the
stage of history with a fiasco.'""
When the army of Frederick Wjllinin ITT took the field apain<;t Napoleon's Grande
Armee in October 1806, Prussian command and control was hopelessly divided.
Geusau, Chief of the General Staff, and his three section heads, Schamhorst. Phull and
'"Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff, p. 25.
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Massenbach, were divided between the three Army commanders and the King's
Headquarters. Phiill went with Geusau to the Royal Headquarters while Massenbach
became chief of staff to Ehike Hohenlohe and Schamhorst chief of staff to the Ehike
of Brunswick. Each headquarters acted independently and the royal entourage provided
only conflicting guidance at best."*
Schamhorst 's plan for concentrating Prussia's inferior forces was ignored and
Hohenlohe 's First Army was defeated by Napoleon at Jena while Marshal Davout
defeated Brunswick's superior numbers at Auerstadt. Blucher's reserve Third Army
arrived too late to assist Hohenlohe. Schamhorst's insistence on the folly of the "plan"
being executed by this command menagerie led to his banishment by Brunswick to the
left wing.'"
Taking command Schamhorst "managed for a moment to maintain the fate of the
day in the balance" but the lack of reserves inevitably led to retreat. Wounded and
having taken a position in the line with musket after giving his mount to the king's
brother, Prince Heinrich, Schamhorst left the field on foot with the last stragglers.
Eventually linking up with Bliicher, who at the time was attempting to save what
remained of the Prussian artillery, Schamhorst assisted Bliicher in the diversionary
engagements and successful retreat across the Harz Mountains to Mecklenburg.
Eventually surprised by French cavalry at Liibeck, Bliicher capitulated and sent
Schamhorst to the king with the news. Reassigned to Marshal L'Estocq, Schamhorst
'"Writing of Schamhorst's impossible conditions, Clausewitz asked his reader "if
one realizes that three commanders-in-chief and two chiefs of staff serve with the army,
though only one commander and one chief of staff ought to be there....How much must
the effectiveness of a gifted man be reduced when he is constantly confronted by
obstacles of convenience and tradition, when he is paralyzed by constant friction with
the opinions of others." Gausewitz to Marie v. Bniehl, 29 September 1806,
Correspondence
, p. 65. Quoted in r.iici, Llauseuiiz aiid the Sutc . p. 1^4.
"^osinski, The German Army
, p. 60. has Schamhorst "sent by the irritated Duke
half in disgrace from central direction to the left wing." Paret, Clausewitz and the
State
, p. 124, has Schamhorst using a "pretext of attending to affairs on the left wing"
and calls this a "renunciation of responsibility on Schamhorst's pan that makes it easier
to understand the moral exhaustion of many lesser men."
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again distinguished himself at Preussisch where he "deprived Napoleon of an almost
certain victor}'.'""
Gneisenau, Bliicher's later chief of staff, also distinguished himself by holding
the Pomeranian seacoast fortress of Colberg until the armistice, one of the very few
examples of a "vindication of the honor of the Prussian arms" in the entire canq)aign.
Gneisenau had refused to surrender with Hohenlohe at Prenzlau and this stark
differentiation between the new Prussian honor of the reformers and the old Prussia of
the defeated Frederickian remnant which surrendered forces and fortresses across
Prussia, often without a fight, made an impact on Frederick William."'
Thus the first precondition for reform was fulfilled by the reformers'
performances in battle. They demonstrated the type of valor, leadership and honor
heretofore held by Frederickian tradition to be the sole province of the East Elbian
caste. More to the point, in the mind of Frederick William UI his favored courtiers
had dishonored the name of Prussia surrendering fortresses without a shot being fired
and offering not leadership but futility in operational planning and command.
Even the hesitant Frederick Wniiam had known since 1795 that his Army was
a "diseased body which must be helped back to health."'*^ Hintze wrote that
"Frederick William HI was a long way from sharing that blinding optimism so
common in Prussia before Jena." And that he held with some certainty the knowledge
of what should be done, "the reforming mood that he showed from the beginning came
from a conviction that he often expressed, that prevailing conditions both in the army
and in the civil service would speU ruin for the state unless something were done."'*'
'"Rosinski, The German Army , p. 60. Goerlitz, History of the German General
Staff
, p. 28, ascribes surrender to "lack of ammunition and supplies." Schamhorst's
relationship with Marshal Blilcher became the precedent for the "military marriage" of
the "naturally gifted commander and a scientifically trained Chief of Staff."
"'For Gneisenau's own summation of hi«: experiences of 1806. <;ee Anderson,
E.N., Nationalism and the Cultural Crisis in Prussia. 1806-1815 , p. 179, Octagon
Books, 1966.
'*Tlosinski, TTie German Army
, p. 17.
""Hintze, The Historical Essays of Orto Hintze
. p. 68.
61
But to force his hand to action required the profound humiliation of the very existence
of Prussia and the Hohenzollem dynasty being completely at the mercy of Napoleon's
will and Czar Alexander's beneficence to j>ersuade Frederick William to tum to the
only source of energy left in his domains—the reform party, Stein and Schamhorst.
The two "Jacobins" seemed to offer the only prospect for "mutilated Prussia" to
reassert herself and recover all that was lost. As Golo Mann has written, "It was an
extraordinary time and it gave extraordinary men a chance."'*^
Frederick William had good reason to fear these men. Their intention was to
transform the Prussian state into a nation. A nation of individuals expressing their
moral freedom through service to the state was not in the best interests of the
autocratic Hohenzollem dynasty nor could it be seen as anything other than the death
knell of the Junker nobility's hold on the Prussian officer corps. For implicit in the
service of free men to a nation was their stake in the life of a nation.
Heretofore Prussia had been a "machine state" where the reformers saw that "the
individual was to function as a cog in a mechanism. ..a mere means to an end, and his
moral energies were suppressed."'" The reformers' intent was to release those moral
energies for the benefit of the state, but the heavy hand of Hohenzollem history left
neither the Prussian peasant nor the emerging bourgeois with either enthusiasm or
outlet for the individual spirit now dormant in the disinterested Prussian populace who
seemed not to share in the defeat of their king. That the people should feel no share
in the affairs of the Pmssian state is amply demonstrated by the detached advice they
received after Jena from the king's chief minister, Count Schulenburg, "His Majesty
had lost a battle and the citizen's first duty was to remain calm."'**
The reformers "clearly recognized the deeper causes of Prussia's collapse—the gulf
which existed between the state machine and the Pmssian people, which made it
'"Mann, G., The History of Germany Since 1789
, pp. 34-35, Frederick A. Praeger,
1968.
'"Holbom, H., A History of Modem Gennany 1648-1840
. p. 393, Yale Univ.
Press, 1964.
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impossible for the people to identify themselves with their government and which
deprived the state of popular support in tune of crisis.'"" Tlie fact that the reformers
were able to overcome the disinterest of a conquered people, a hostile nobility, a
frightened king and perhaps the most able conqueror in history "must forever rank as
perhaps the proudest page in [Pmssia's] history and one of the most memorable
instances of the triumph of the spirit over all material obstacles as well as human
malice and indolence.'"**
TTiat Frederick William turned to these "extraordinary men", Stein, Schamhorst
and their collaborators, is best understood in light of the dire circumstances in which
he found himself, the contempt he felt for the old school officers who had in many
instances acted reprehensibly in the campaign of 1806-1807, and the new battle-tested
credibility of the reformers who had performed superbly in the losing effort. It was
clearly time to try the new approaches of the reformers lest all be lost, there was no
altemative. The clear defeat of the Frederickian system opened the way for reform for
"if decline begins at the zenith recovery starts at the nadir.'"*^
France had let the genie of nationalism out of the bottle and now that its power
was apparent Napoleon could not put back the cork and declare empire. The dynamic
effects of the French example were not lost on the Prussian reformers, but their
program was not to be simply imitation. The Prussian reforms "were also an
independent, imaginative reaction against the misery of the defeat which necessitated
them.. ..It attracted ideas and their originators, men of enthusiasm and ability who came
to the rescue from different parts of Germany.'"*'
The chief reformer was Freiherr vom Stein.
He was what many think they are but only few manage to become: a patriot. For
him Germany was something noble and precious. For the liberation of Germany
from French rule he was ready to sacrifice his money, his possessions and his life.
'*'Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army , p. 38.
'**Rosinski, The German Army
, p. 53.




The reforms which he was allowed to make in Prussia in 1807-8 were in the last
resort intended to serve the cause of liberation.'*'
Liberation was then the cause of both civil and military reform in Prussia. The civil
reforms of Baron Stein supplied the second critical precondition for the success of
Schamhorst's military reforms. Stein believed that the "purpose of good government
was to educate citizens to educate themselves, or at any rate to take an organized part
in public life so that the state lived from within and so that there could be no
repetition of the deplorable collapse of 1806.'"™ His supreme objective was to "arouse
a new patriotic spirit among the people by founding the state on the nation's moral
energies. "''' Schamhorst desired to harness this new spirit by bringing "the army and
nation into a close union."'" Stein and Schamhorst understood the critical links among
the civil status of the Prussian middle class and peasantry, the political life of the
community and the willingness of the Prussian populace to answer a call to arms to
throw out the French invader. "Without the personal liberty of the peasants, without
the abolition of the political separation of the social classes, and also without the new
organization of the governmental structure, the building of a new army would have
been impossible."'"
After accompanying the royal party to Konigsberg after the Jena debacle. Stein,
then minister of the excise and factory department of the General Directory, became
the most outspoken of those calling for reform. In April of 1806 Stein sent the king
a memorandum calling for establishment of five ministries with complete responsibility
for their respective areas of military affairs, foreign affairs, national police, public
finance and legal affairs, unifying state administration and replacing the king's
"Ibid., p. 32.
"°Ibid., pp. 32-33.





cabinet.'^* Stein's insistence on ministerial independence and responsibility led to what
Hajo Holbom calls "a revolt of the high bureaucracy against the autocracy of the
Prussian monarchs.'"^' Stein was dismissed by Frederick William in January of 1807
as a '"recalcitrant, truculent, obstinate, and insubordinate servant' for his insistence
upon the abolition of autocratic rule and irresponsible cabinet-councillors and the
establishment instead of a joint and independent council of ministers.'"^*
Frederick William recalled Stein and named him his chief minister, ironically at
N^wleon's insistence, in the aftermath of the Treaty of Tilsit. The man Stein replaced
and the object of Napoleon's concern, Count Hardenberg, had smoothed the way for
Stein's ministerial reform and Frederick William quickly assented. Within a week of
Stein's recall to office on 4 October 1807 the reform program of ministerial
responsibility, liberation of the peasantry, municipal government reform, and national
representation began to take form. Though the plan for national representation was
never enacted the rest of Stein's program was implemented.
Liberation of the peasants was effected by the Royal Edict of October 9, 1807
which proclaimed: "After St. Martin's day of 1810 there shall be only free people, as
is already the case on the domains in all our provinces.'"" On 19 November the
Stadteordnung , the new order for the cities, created a system of divided legislative and
executive power in the cities. A city assembly of popularly elected deputies elected
a mayor and town council which together formed the Magistrat which governed the
city. The assembly had budget approval authorit>' and supervised the Magistrat .
Though Stein's plans for a national assembly on this model were thwaned, these two
reforms provided the absolutely essential basis for military reform.
Stein's civil reforms filled the second precondition for military reform by placing
the individual's freedom and limited right to (municipal) self determination in balance
""White, The Enlightened Soldier
, pp. 125-6.
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with the state's need for his service in the coming crisis of national survival.
Ciciiibility for the reformers had to come in battle and it was at Jena and in its
aftermath that the reformers demonstrated to the crown both their personal worth and
the complete collapse of the operational doctrine, planning and tactics of the anti-
reform cabal. Boyen described the deficiencies of this Prussian army as "1. the
leadership which thought in terms of concessions and prestige values; 2. the
overconfidence of the army officers; 3. the unwillingness of the civil officials to grant
more money to the army; 4. the neglect of all that had to do with real preparation for
war.'"" The first two deficiencies point to the weakness of the crown and the Junker
officer nobility and implicitly the potential strength of the reformers while the third is
a timeless complaint of military officers. The fourth deficiency establishes the
reformers' claim to a new professionalism in war fighting, an understanding of "war
as it really it," which will lay at the center of their efforts to reform the Prussian
army.
'"Boyen, H. v., Erinnemngen aus dem Leben des General-Feldmarschalls Hermann





Johann Fichte delivered his Addresses to the German Nation in occupied Berlin
late in 1807. He declared to the once proud German people, "We are conquered, the
clash of weapons is ended. If we will it, a new struggle of principles, of morals, of
character now begins."'^' The Pmssian reformers, Stein, Schamhorst, Gneisenau,
Grolman, Boyen and others, were already well on the way to answering Fichte's
clarion call to a new beginning.
The significant work of the Prussian Reform Movement had three major
components and lasted merely eighteen months, from July, 1807 to December, 1808.
These major reforms were largely the work of the Commission for Military
Reorganization and included the purging of the officer corps by the Commission
offshoot, the Superior Investigating Commission, reorganization of the army and the
reform of the army which included reorganization of the army schools, the new
Articles of War, the Access to Commissions Order, and the establishment of a central
War Ministry.
King Frederick William HI initiated the "period of the reforms" when he
appointed the Commission for Military Reorganization on July 25, 1807."° The work
of the Pmssian Reform Movement is often called reform from above'" to distinguish
it from the revolution in France and this can best be understood by the chief
instrument and method of reform. The king appointed and provided detailed
instructions for the Military Reorganization Commission. This reading of the events
of 1807 is much at odds with the view of the reformers as radicals subverting the
'"Quoted in Meinecke, F., The Age of German Liberation , p. 44.
'"^Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army , p. 38.
'"The origin of this idea, repeated in nearly every work on the period, is related
in Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze
. p. 69, "The Prussian Minister
Stmensee in describing Prussian social reform plans to the French charge d'affaires [in
August, 1799]: 'The creative revolution was made in France from below; in Prussia it
will be made slowly and from above.'"
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royal prerogative. Although the king's actions, particularly as regards his aprpointments
ajul continued reliance on his cabinet, denied the reform party clear victories in many
cases, it is hardly clear that they were working at odds with his will.
The original membership of the commission included Major General Schamhorst,
Major General von Massenbach,'" Colonel von Gneiscnau, Lieutenant Colonel von
Bronikowsky and the soon to be appointed (August 18) Adjutant-General, Lieutenant
Colonel Count von Lottum. On July 15, 1807 Frederick William had ordered
Schamhorst and Lottum to arrange for release of officers taken prisoner during the
preceding campaign and begin demobilization of the army. On the twenty-fifth the
additional members were named and the new and broader mandate evident in the
commission's title added to their work.
The Commission was Frederick William's creation and as was his wont he
exercised the Hohenzollem habit of balancing the commission's membership between
the reformers and the anti-reform party. "He felt it was his duty to hear both sides
before deciding what was best for all.'"" The original membership was balanced in
favor of the conservatives, Massenbach, Bronikowsky and Lottum, with Schamhorst and
Gneisenau representing the reform party. Lieutenant Colonel von Borstell, another
conservative, was added in October, 1807. Recognizing the possibility of impasse, in
early 1808 the king appointed Schamhorst head of the Commission and replaced the
most obstinate of the conservatives, Borstell, with reformers, Count Gotzen and Major
von Boyen, and reduced the participation of Bronikowsky and Massenbach.'** At the
same time Major von Grolman, another reformer, was added giving the reform party
'"Shanahan, Prussian Military Reforms. 1786-1813
. p. 102. This is not the
Colonel Christian von Massenbach of the earlier pre-Jena reform era who had been
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clear leadership of the Commission. Captain Clausewitz, Schamhorst's personal
ailjntant, also brought liis considerable talents to the work of the Commission as did
Freiherr vom Stein, the newly recalled chief minister.
The king provided the Commission'" with his "Guiding Principles for the
Reorganization of the Army." This initial "charge" contained nineteen points which
required the Commission to "investigate the recent campaign, to cashier and punish
those officers whose conduct had been improper, and to propose changes in army
organization, supply, service regulations, selection of officers, and education and
training""' and secure "the end of foreign recraiting, the admission of non-aristocratic
officers, a new method of educating officers, organization in divisions, better uniforms
[a particular interest of Frederick William], reform of the supply system, reduction of
baggage, prohibition of Freiwachter . a new organization for the cavalry, revised Articles
of War, and new regulations for each branch of service."'" Thus the king provided
a fairly comprehensive outline of what was to come. However, both his placement of
officers opposed to these reforms on the Commission and his continued adherence to
the administratively convoluted system of cabinet counsel and competing ministers
acted as a brake on the reform program he had outlined.
A. THE PURGE OF THE OFFICERS' CORPS
That the reform party was able to accomplish anything at all is perhaps due
solely to the fact that the Commission reached agreement that those officers found
guilty of dishonorable conduct during the past campaign should be severely punished.
The king then established a separate "Superior Investigating Commission" on November
27, 1807 "to investigate the capitulations of the fortresses and the field armies and
determine in each case the strength of the enemy, the capacity for defense, and the
'"Shanahan, Prussian Military Reforms, 1786-1813
, p. 103. makes the distinction
between the king's "recommendations rather than his commands."
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preparations of the commanding officer.. ..to determine whether the officers' conduct
had been completely honorable."'"
The work of this separate Commission dragged on right to the eve of the Wars
of Liberation and never addressed the events of 1807. Had the issue of the conduct
of officers not been diverted from the program of the Reorganization Commission no
significant reforms could have been addressed, for the king and the Prussian public and
press were most interested in this one issue. The main focus of the Investigating
Commission work was the twelve cases of surrender in the field during 1806. Due to
often contradictory testimony and the lack of significant documentation—most of the
army's plans were lost during the retreat—the Commission's work proved extremely
difficult, but in the end, except for Blucher who held out until lack of food and
ammunition forced him to capitulate, each commanding officer who CE^itulated was
found guilty.
In the fmal accounting this process cannot easily be called a purge. Only 208
of the 7,166 officers in the Pmssian Army of 1806-7 were found guilty and many of
these, tried in regimental tribunals, were not harshly dealt with. Furthermore, efforts
to remove all "incompetents and cowards" were even less successful. Over one-half
of the officers who served in the Wars of Liberation in 1813-14 had served in 1806-
7, including "almost aU the officers of the field armies and most of the officers in
responsible posts."'*' During the period 1806-1813, 4,933 officers left the service,
leaving 1,791 who had served in 1806. But many of these officers were furloughed
on half pay receiving "quarters, bread, and charcoal from the government until the
outbreak of war brought then back to active duty." Thus at least 3,898 officers who
had been held corporately responsible for the debacle of 1806 fought in the Wars of
Liberation and became the new victors of 1813-1814.
Perhaps the most important result of the work of the Superior Investigating
Committee was the standard of accountability it proclaimed. TTie officer owed his state




the people. That this process was closely followed in the press added a new
dimension to the relationship of peoj>le and army. The result of the Commission's
work was less a purge than an "act of self-purification" which rid the army of its worst
elements and better suited it for the "requirements of modem war" an achievement
"wholly without historical precedent."""
B. REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY
In a state whose very social, political, economic and geographic existence was
wholly dependent on its military superiority, it should not be surprising that a
Hohenzollem king would upon defeat turn his immediate attention to purging the
officers corps of those "responsible" for its defeat but the immediacy with which
Frederick William HI, often labelled the most irresolute of Prussia's Kings, turned to
his armies deficiencies is remarkable.
In the immediate aftermath of Jena and Auerstadt and before the year 1806 was
out, Frederick William issued four decrees which outlined his program for changing the
"tactics, discipline, and organization of his remaining armed forces." Frederick
William's Instruction for the Generals with the Army in East Prussia , his memoir from
Osterode issued in November 18, 1806, a third memoir issued on December 1, 1806
and a fourth undated memoir attempted to impress upon the army still in the field the
urgent requirement to change its tactics. He recommended "vigorous warfare" and
"energetic and bold" tactics, avoiding "artful maneuvers" which had proven useless.
The reconnaissance earlier denied Schamhorst was now encouraged so that "the attack
could be made at the most favorable moment" and "scattered dispositions were to be
avoided!" The cherished line formation was abandoned for the column and greater use
of skirmishing and tirailleur tactics was encouraged.'"
The December 1 memoir outlined the intended purge of the officers' corp,
dismissing all officers involved in the capimlntion at Prenzlau. cashiering all
commanding officers who had capitulated without resistance and ordering the
""Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff, p. 30.
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commandant of Custrin to be shot. Again presaging the reforms to come, Frederick
Wjlljnni wrote that as "long as the war lasts, the non-commissioned officer and man,
when distinguished by cleverness and presence of mind, will make as good an officer
as the noble." It was of course far too late to undue the years of decline and the
tactical petrification of the army but these memoirs set the tone for what was to come
and clearly undermine the argument that the reformers lacked royal support.'"
The first six months of the Reorganization Commission's work was spent on the
question of officer conduct and, in line with the Commission's title, not reforming but
reorganizing the army. In the main this was "the reconstruction, on paper, of the
Prussian army."'" The first step was a demobilization and reduction of the size of the
army for political and economic reasons. No one knew how large an army Napoleon
would tolerate and until the September 8, 1808 Treaty of Paris set the army's
manpower limit at 42,000 the reformers' work was largely a guessing game and an
effort to live within the greatly restricted means of the much reduced Prussian state.
State revenues would not allow an army in excess of 70,000 men even though
Pmssia's population of five million would support an army of 150,000 men. The
result was a paper army of sixteen infantry regiments and eighty cavalry squadrons.
The army was reorganized into three corps areas, Silesian, Prussian and
Brandenburg-Pomeranian, each with a recmitment population of 1,600,000. This plan,
outlined in a memorandum of September 25, 1807, would provide from each area two
divisions, "totalling eight infantry regiments, four cavalry regiments, four batteries of
six-pound unmounted artillery, two batteries of six-pound mounted artillery, and as
reserves a battery of twelve-pounders and another of mounted artillery." Although
establishing change only on paper, the Commission was clearly establishing the
precedent for combined arms divisions. Over the next few months the Commission
had to reduce the size of regiments, squadrons and companies to accord with the fiscal
realitie<; of defented Prussia Rv November. 1807 the <;trength of the Pnis<:ian army
was 54,180 officers and men: Infantry, 37,754; Cavalry, 12,060; Artillery, 4,366; total
"%id.
"'Ibid., p. 109.
officers in the combat arms, 1,696. By September of 1808 at the time of the Treaty
of Paris the anny had reached approximately 50.000 men of which nearly one-half
were furloughed. Seen in this light Napoleon's limit of 42,000 was roughly all that
Prussia could afford and did not severely hamp>er the efforts of the Reorganization
Commission.
During the Commission's first year the issue was not how to increase the size
of the standing army—the finances of Prussia and to a lesser extent the provisions of
the Treaty of Paris precluded that—but how to organize and recruit a reserve force
available for the final contest with the French forces of Napoleon then occupying the
state. The work of the Reorganization Commission in its first six months was largely
void of meaningful change and resulted in the king's Cabinet Order of December 21,
1807 recalling the measures he had originally suggested and requiring a more
"systematic presentation of the commission's reports.""* The real stumbling block was
the reserve. All understood its vital relationship to Prussia's reemergence, but there
was bitter disagreement on what form it should take and what basis it should have in
law.
The idea of universal service was formulated and discussed, but remained
miresolved. The question of exemptions for the previously privileged nobility and the
middle class appeared insurmountable. Divisions within the Commission largely
revolved around the questions of privilege based in the old canton system and
Schamhorst's attempts to align his proposals with the Frederickian past were
unsuccessful. Schamhorst's refusal to link the reserve with the standing army was, at
this point, merely a reflection of his understanding that there was so little support for
the military in the popular mind that to invite the citizen to service with that army,
with its brutal traditions of discipline, would ensure failure for any efforts at broad-
based recruitment or any national appeal for volunteers.
Universal service with no exemption*; as proposed by Stein wa<: viporoii<;lv
blocked by the conservatives and none of the militia projects advanced by the




sources of resistance to universal service: (1) "objection of the large cities to being
subject to any form of military service at all"; (2) resistance of landed nobles to "their
employees' service in the new egalitarian force"; (3) from the more radical reformers,
which "denounced Boyen's creation as half hearted and stunted by compromise"; and
(4) the "intrigue against it at court" by the king's cabinet.'*'
Stopped by this resistance to universal service, yet still aware that the need for
a larger army was critical, in July, 1807, Schamhorst proposed the Kriimper system.
This system gave leave to trained soldiers and then provided a few months training
with the amiy for raw recruits followed by release from active service. The Knimpcr
system succeeded only in providing a marginal increase in the available reserve
manpower pool. As compared with the 42,000 allowed by Napoleon's terms, 65,675
officers and men were available by March of 1813."*
The first instance of the reformers' real goal of universal service being
implemented was in the call for an East Prussian Landwehr to support General von
Yorck's actions in support of the Russian Army, implemented by the convention of
Tauroggen on 13 December, 1812."^ On February 9, 1813 universal service came
closer to becoming a reality throughout the Prussian state when all exemptions to
military service were cancelled. On March 17th, Frederick William called forth the
creation of a Landwehr of all men 17 to 40 years of age and followed this on April
13th with the Landsturm edict which made all men not previously called to service
liable to service as an emergency defense home guard of "guerrilla bands.""'
In technical matters the reformer's were less constrained. The Reorganization
Commission effected important tactical changes, reequipping and reorganizing the army.
"'Simon, The Failure of the Prussian Reform Movement. 1807-1819
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Without these changes Prussia would have been totally unprepared for the coming
bniilc for liberation. Technical improvements in the production and efficiency of small
arms and artillery were accomplished along with the establishment of new foundries.'"
The reformers recognized the necessity of coordinated action of the infantry,
cavalry and artillery, but were unable to field the division-sized elements which the
Napoleonic example provided. Their response was to introduce the brigade
organization in place of divisions. Six brigades were formed and training in line with
new training manuals which emphasized the use of tirailleurs (light infantry),
skirmishers, columnar battle formations and coordinated operations of the combat arms.
The brigade replaced the regiment as the largest administrative unit and equipment,
quartering, conscription and supply became brigade responsibilities.^*"
The past campaign had shown the hopeless confusion of Prussia's supply service
and on August 1, 1808 field supply administration was placed under a new War
Commissariat with representatives, war commissars, at each of the six brigades. This
important reform brought to an end the old system of company and regimental
commanding officers treating their units as personal fiefs and placed all army
"housekeeping" on a national basis. The War Commissariat was responsible for the
completely overhauled supply services and made centrally accountable for all
distribution and accounting for supplies.^'
These important tactical and technical improvements were all made in 1808. The
only real progress made by the Reorganization Commission in 1807 was to substitute
grey for white trousers, shakoes for hats and to order the training of sharpshooters and
scouts for the third rank. The king's nineteen point program was met, the army was
reorganized and new manuals were written, but it was only a paper reorganization not
true reform. Frederick William understood the impasse on real reform and acted to
support Schamhorst in early 1808. Replacing Schamhorst's chief antagonists, Borstell
"'Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army
, p. 50.




and Bronikowsky, with the reform-minded Count Gotzen and Major von Boyen,
Ficdcrick William gave Schamhorst a clear reform majority on the Commi<!sion and
set the stage for a year of reform of the reorganized army.^
C. REFORM OF THE ARMY
With Schamhorst's newly solidified royal support and Stein's continued
ministerial backing, the path was clear for the program of reform originally worked out
in the Military Society. Schamhorst clearly stated his program: "to raise and inspire
the spirit of the army, to bring the army and the nation into a more intimate union and
to guide it to its characteristic and exalted destiny."^
The uitemal logic of the reform program followed in 1808 is undeniable. Prussia
could not throw off Napoleon's yoke without a large army. Due to the Pariis
restrictions on the size of the standing army, the diminished geographic holdings of
Pmssia and the resultant reduction in Canton districts, and the reformer's own success
in accomplishing their goal of ending the system of mercenary hire, the only avenue
left to achieve a large army was the Prussian people. Since the reformers believed that
the French model of the lev^e en masse could be applied in Prussia only after the
rights and liberties of the Prussian people were respected. TTie Prussian people,
especially the middle class but also the peasantry, had to be assured that their sons
would be serving an army both devoid of the hated discipline of the corporal's cane
and the gauntlet and one which could match the legal rights of the civU code with an
equally just military code. Given that this new mass army could be raised, the officers
who might lead the more educated middle class soldier would necessarily be an
educated officer and the only way to attract significant numbers of educable officers
was to open commissions to all and provide the education necessary for modem war.
Given the energies of the people selected for service by lot on a universal basis and
led by officers educated for the reality of modem war it was also necessary that the
""'Simon, The Failure of the Prussian Reform Movement. 1807-1819
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state administration for support of this new army be rationally organized with
cctitrnlizcil decision making and a chain of command linking the anny with the
monarch through a single minister of war. It is certainly dangerous to place upon a
different time a logic drawn nearly two centuries later but the consistency of the
Pmssian reform program of 1808 seems to have its own logic clear in both its intent
and its execution.
Throughout the spring and early summer of 1808 the Reorganization Commission
worked on these interconnected reforms and in August a series of orders accomplished
the great bulk of necessary reforms of the Articles of War and the Ministry of War,
and of access to commissions, and the education of officers. We have already seen
the prerequisites for reform, the liberation of the peasants and the municipal reforms,
which taken together laid the basis for the desired connection of the people and the
army. The next step was to dissolve the harsh system of discipline and justice so
injurious to public good will.
1. The Articles of War
As Shanahan points out, "if universal service were to be obtained, and this
might be conceived as the ultimate though not the immediate goal of Schamhorst and
his followers, the conditions of service would have to be made more tolerable to the
vast numbers of subjects who had not previously been called into service."^ The king
had tasked High Chancellor von Goldbeck and General Auditor von Konen to revise
the old Articles as early as September, 1806 and now these officials, along with Boyen
and Gneisenau and in concert with Stein, worked out the final revisions of Konen *s
draft. There existed agreement on eliminating the Gassenlaufen
.
the running of the
gauntlet, but conservative opposition to the ban on caning was only overcome by
Gneisenau 's eloquent appeal for Freiheit des Ruckens
.
Freedom of the Back.
The new Articles of War, Orders on Military Punishment and the Orders
on the Punishment of Officers were all i«:sued on Aupust 3. 1808. Frederick William's
birthday. The articles abolished the gauntlet and corporal punishment for minor
disciplinary infractions and instituted a system of penalties more in line with civilian
*Shanahan, Pmssian Military R eforms, 1786-1813 . p. 135.
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sensibilities. Severe punishments had to be the resuh of military court decrees and the
iloiifh pcnnlty could only be issued by the king. Confinement replaced caning and
instead of facing a firing squad a deserter could be sentenced to ten years of fortress
arrest. By these actions the basis for the open repugnance of the people to military
service seemed to be overcome."' As a further sign of change the wording of the
military oath of obedience required of soldiers with the publication of the new Articles
of War was changed so that the soldier swore his allegiance not to the Kriegsherr . War
Lord, but to the Landesherr. the Sovereign.
2. Access to Commissions and Selection of Officers
The next step in the reformer's program was to open the avenues to
commissions to all classes and ensure that selection for a commission were based on
talent as opposed to class. Grolman, the most radical of the reformers, wrote that:
In order to fight it is not necessary to belong to a special class. The melancholy
belief that one must belong to a special class in order to defend the fatherland has
done much to plunge it into the present abyss, and only the opposite principle can
pull it out again.^°*
It is largely owing to the king's antipathy to the Junker nobility's singularly bad
showing in the last campaign and Stein's surpassing contempt for "the inhabitants of
these sandy steppes—these artful, heartless, wooden, half-educated men""^ that the
reformers desires for a truly open officer corps were realized.
The "Regulation for the Appointment of Comets, and the Choice of Officers
in the Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery," written by Grolman and issued on August 6,
1808, stated that:
A claim to the position of officer shall from now on be warranted, in j)eace-time
by knowledge and education, in time of war by exceptional bravery and quickness
of perception. From the whole nation, therefore, all individuals who possess these
qualities can lay title to the highest positions of honour in the military
establishment. All social preference which has hitherto existed is herewith
"'Ibid., p. 135-136. See also Craig. The Politics of the Prussian Army , p. 48.




terminated in the military establishment, and everyone, without regard for his
background, has the same dutie«? and the same rights.^*
This Fundamental Order of 1808 "meant that Bildung and personal stamina, in place
of the accident of birth, constituted a claim to the position of officer" and this "new
principle blasted a trail for enduring modifications of old-style noble privilege."*"
Henceforth all candidates for commissions would enter the army at seventeen
years of age and serve a minimum of three months as a soldier before being eligible
for regimental examinations for the rank of comet. Examinations were also required
for higher grades and advancement to lieutenant was by a centralized examination
committee in Berlin.*'" The Gefreitekorporal system of twelve and thirteen year old
sons of the nobUity serving as corporals untU commissioned was abolished.*" This
reform was greatly resented by the Junker nobility and is reflected in the remark of
General Yorck to Prince William that "if your royal highness deprives me and my
children of our rights, what foundation is left for your own?"*'* It is important to note
the continuation of the requirement that candidates "still needed to be approved by the
officers of the units they wished to join—a condition that preserved the exclusive and
unified character of the corps, though its ethical base would slowly change from the
personal relationship between king and nobility to that of a patriotic, national-minded,
and professionally competent order of knighthood."*"
*"%id.
*^osenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy. The Pmssian Experience
1660-1815
. p. 215.
*'"Shanahan, Prussian Militarr' Refomis. 1786 IS 13
. p. 132.
Holbom, A History of Modem Germany 1648-1840
. p. 418.
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*'*Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army , p. 44.
*"Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, p. 130.
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3. Officer Education
A necessary coroUarj' to the new system of selection of officers was some
means of providing the education required by the new system of examinations which
would also instill in the students the qualities Schamhorst sought—Bildung . An
increase in the number of schools and the quality of education of cadets and officer
candidates was essential if the system was to succeed. As we've seen, Schamhorst
was the Director of the Berlin Institute before 1806 and it was in the reform and
elevation of the standards of army education that he made his most lasting concrete
contribution to the Prussian army.
Prior to 1806 the military education system was an "haphazard and
disorganized." The four Cadet Institutes and the Military Orphans' Home School
trained boys for a few years prior to their entry into the army as comets. Their
curricula were neither coordinated nor standardized. Schamhorst implemented a system
of military education under the supervision of a single director which provided
continuity between the Cadet Institutes which prepared boys for the comet examinations
during a five year prescribed, standardized course (curiously op>en only to sons of
officers), and advanced schools for selected officers with the most potential.^'*
These three advanced courses of nine months duration were offered at "War
Schools" at Berlin, Breslau, and Kbnigsberg. At the Berlin school a three year course
in "advanced military science" was also offered for fifty selected officers. This became
the Kriegsakademie at the celebrated Number 19 Bergstrasse. The upper class provided
the Selekta, the best students of each class which formed the recmiting basis for the
Great General Staff.'''
"*Shanahan, Prussian MUitary Reforms. 1786-1813
. pp. 133-135.
'"Craig. The Politics of the Pni<:sian Arrny. p. 46.
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4. The Ministry of War
The final piece in the ref(»nn puz7.1c was the administration of the military'.
The labyrinth of competing bureaus and agencies within the Prussian bureaucracy was
a major contributory element of the decline of the Fredcrickian system. Stein's second
ministry had pressed the reformers' demands for a more rational system of state
administration resulting in the memorandum of November 23, 1807 in which Stein
proposed a Staatsministerium of five ministers reporting directly to the king each
responsible for their separate spheres of government administration. The fifth ministry
of the Staatsministerium was a proposed War Ministry. This ministry was to consist
of two sections, one dealing with command and organization and one dealing with
administration and supply.
The initial failure of this proposal was due to the bedrock of Hohenzollem
rule: royal command and direct control of the military. The personal link between
crown and army was seen both by the conservative nobUity and Frederick William to
be threatened by the interposition of a war minister between the crown and the army.
The reformers understood that without this fundamental change no rationalization of
military administration was possible. As long as military administration was not
rationalized the fate of Pmssia would forever rest in the hands of either a great mler
in the Frederickian mold or the cabal of courtiers which would hold sway over
indecisive or disinterested rulers such as Frederick William U and m.
At Stein's insistence the November, 1807 draft plan received temporary
approval in the Cabinet Order of July 15, 1808 which divided all army matters
between two departments. The Allgemeine Kriegs Departement (General War
Department), headed by Schamhorst, and the Militar Okonomie Departement (Military
Economy Department) under Count Lottum's direction. Both Schamhorst and Lottum
were granted direct access to the king thereby ensuring Frederick William's continued
dominance of all militarv matter<; and continuing the division between reformers and
conservatives by appointing the two leaders of the opposing factions to co-equal
positions. This temporary arrangement was made permanent by royal decree of the
Ministry of War on December 25, 1808. All previous arrangements were maintained
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but the king refused to name a single minister of war.^"* The War Ministry was to
have nuthority "over everj'thing whicli pertained to the miJitary and to its constitution,
its establishment and its maintenance and...everything which hitherto lay within the
jurisdiction of the Oberkriegskollegium . the Militardepartement of the General
Directory, the Provincial Magazine Departments of Silesia and Prussia as well as the
Generalintendantur . . . . "^ ' ^
Schamhorst as the Chief of the General War Department was responsible for
all command, organization and administration matters. The Department had three
divisions. The First Division under Grolman was responsible for personnel matters
such as "promotions, pay, decorations, justice, and dismissal" and replaced the
Generaladiutantur . The Second Division replaced the Generalquartiermeisterstab and,
although Schamhorst was also given the largely honorary title of Chief of the General
Staff, Boyen's Division became the later Great General Staff and was responsible for
"training, education, war plans, and mobilization" as well as the War Commissariat.
The Third Division was responsible for supervising "artillery, engineering, fortifications,
ordnance, and the testing of inventions." The Oberkriegskollegium and the
Militardepartement also disappeared.^"
The Military Economy Department under Lottum was comprised of four
divisions and was responsible for matters of supply and finance. The First Division
was responsible for the Military Treasury, bookkeeping, payments and financial matters.
The Second Division provided oversight of the supply of food and forage to the
Commissariat. The Third Division maintained control of inspection and supply of
uniforms. Management of the Invaliden and their pensions was the responsibility of
the Fourth Division of the Military Economy Department.^"
"'Shanahan, Prussian Military Reforms, 1786-1813
. pp. 143-145.
^'^Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army
, p. 51.
''Ibid., pp. 51-52.
"'Shanahan, Prussian Military- Reform s, 1786-18!?
. p. 146.
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As with the educational reforms of Schamhorst the War Ministry reforms
CM'Ivcd only ver}' slowly into something approaching the centralized administrative
body desired by the reformers. Although the king refused to appoint a war minister,
Schamhorst acted as de facto Minister of War and during the period 1808-1813 these
structural changes did allow the reformers to take over administrative control of the
military.^" When the War Ministry began to function in March of 1809, the Military
Reorganization Commission was dissolved. The army was reorganized, the reform
program nearly complete. Time was now needed to allow the reforms to work in the
education of officers, the training of troops in the new tactics, and the workings of the
new administrative apparatus; and time was granted by Napoleon's desire to enjoy his
empire.
But the resistance of the king and his former cabinet continued"' and though
the reform party was clearly victorious and the last vestige of the Frederickian
administrative melange was officially dissolved, it continued to function as the old
adjutants were appointed to positions throughout the War Ministry and also within the
hearts of the great majority of the old line waiting for the sure fall of the reformers.^"
Yorck provides a vivid representation of the true feelings of the old line when he
commented on Stein's fall in November of 1808, "One mad head is already severed,
the remaining rabble of serpents will die in its own poison.""^ Thus the influence of
the old line Junker nobility remained a continuing though muted force in Prussian
military decision making.
""Ibid., p. 224. Only on June 3, 1814 in the aftermath of Napoleon's defeat was
Hermann von Boyen named Pmssia's first Minister of War.
"'Resistance was especially strong against the reformers' plans for universal
service, the implementation of a militia and the Kriimper system. For a full description
of these events see Shanahan, Pnissian Militnr>- Reforms, 1786-1813 . pp 150ff.
"Ibid., p. 147.
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"'Craig, The Politics of the Pnissian Army, p. 49. See Paret. Yorck and the Era
of Pmssian Reform , for a convincing refutation of the normal reaction to Yorck's oft-
quoted statement on the reformers. In fact. Paret argues that Yorck was an integral
force in the tactical success of the refomi movement.
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This continuity present in Prussian history even during the turbulent
N:i|>i>!e<)Mic em and the discontinuity obvious in the pre- and post-reform periods
should warn us that the reform era was not and could not be a complete reversal of
the Frederickian state's raison d'etre . Once the peril of the Napoleonic challenge was
met the fate of the reformers was sealed. By 1819 all were gone, either mortally
wounded in battle like Schamhorst, or politically neutralized like Boyen, Grolman,
Gneisenau, and Clausewitz. Their work lived on imbedded in the rational structures
and traditions of excellence they wove into the fabric of the Prussian army. It is this
lasting influence which should concern us most and is so very difficult to explain when
it reemerges in the mid-nineteenth century apparently again victorious over the forces
of reaction. The key to this lasting influence has linle to do with structure and much
to do with ideas. It is to those ideas we must now turn to discover the essence of
Pmssian officership.
84
IX. THE SYNTHESIS OF MODERN WAR
As early as the War of the First Coalition Schamhorst believed he understood the
secret to meeting France's revolutionary challenge to the military system of the Ancien
Regime . Then in the service of Hanover, Schamhorst recommended universal military
service, adoption of the new tactical doctrine on the French model, establishment of
a general staff and reorganization of the army into combined arms divisions of infantry,
cavalry and artillery.^" But he also understood that to merely adopt the organizational
forms of Revolutionary or, later, Napoleonic warfare was not nearly enough—as Jena
and Auerstadt were so conclusively to demonstrate. Schamhorst saw that the causes
of the Allies' defeat "must be deeply enmeshed in their internal conditions and in those
of the French nation."^
The "internal conditions" of France were the key to the new energy of the French
army embodied in the spirit of the Revolution; the "internal conditions" of the Allies
caused them to rely on a feudal system unable to respond and a public citizenry
apathetic to the fortunes of the regime. Schamhorst—"equally opposed to radical
innovators and to the incurable admirers of the old system""*-did not believe the
answer was to be found either in the Revolution or the old forms of the Frederickian
system but in a synthesis of the two to be accomplished by fundamental reform of the
"internal conditions" of the Allies. He wished to release comparable energies in the
people of Hanover and later in Prussia and the road to this reform lay in opening up
these societies to the full resources of the individual through education. The clearest
lesson of the reform era was that the institutional form could not be appended but had
"*White, The Enlightened Soldier , pp. 1 8-20.
"'Schamhorst, G., "Basic Reasons for the French Success." 1797. quoted in P.
Paret, "Clausewitz and the Nineteenth Century," Tlie Theory and Practice of War , ed.
M. Howard, p. 25. Indiana Univ. Press. 1975.
"*Paret, Clausewitz and the St ate, p. 64.
85
to be adapted to the society they were to serve—a synthesis of old and new had to be
realized in a more effective use of botli uistitutions and individuals.
When finally Schamhorst began to implement this synthesis he often used the
historical mantle of Frederick the Great to make his reform proposals more palatable
to Frederick William and the Junker nobility. Otto Hintze writes of the "historical
demonstrations used by Schamhorst as a means to persuade the King that his bold
plans were correct were not merely for show".^" While the many allusions to
Schamhorst 's use of Frederick—and the implicit charge of political deception—are no
doubt correct, they leave out an important aspect of the relationship of old Prussia and
the new dreams of the reformers. Hintze continues:
it was just this miraculous blending of old and new that was characteristic of the
military reform. The new Prussian army created by Schamhorst and Boyen still
bore, unmistakably, the basic character of the Frederican era...^"
The greater part of the attraction of Prussia to the large number of non-Prussian
reformers was their "admiration of Frederick the Great and of the liberality of the
Pmssian system, which showed no prejudice against energetic outsiders and offered
them responsibility and advancement.""' As Meinecke wrote:
Frederick's personality and heroism had far-reaching effects. No matter how
strictly we separate the man from his work, gradually his character cast a brighter
light even on his state. Prussia could then appear as the personification of political
energy itself, and that attracted energetic men from throughout Germany to her
service. Prussia, we know, was also the state of a more liberal Protestantism.
Heroism, military glory, energy, enlightened Protestantism—these were the forces that
made Prussia appealing in Germany, and that brought her many of the great men
who later had the task of returning Pmssia to the German fold.^^
It is not trivial to note the certainty of a connection between the decisions of men such
as Stein, Schamhorst, Gneisenau, Grolman and Clausewitz—men either of foreign birth
or with tenuous claims to nobility—to seek service in Prussia and a respect for and
"^Hintze. The Historica l Essays of Otto Hintze. p. 74.
""Ibid.
"'Craig, The End of Pmssia
, p. 10. Craig is writing of Stein but the quote speaks
to the other reformers as well.
^"Meinecke, The Age of German Liberation
, pp. 34-35.
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adherence to the traditions"' of Prussia. There exists a special sense of cherished
connection once a man becomes—even as the newest "suba]tem"--a member of the
same proud fraternity of arms with the great men whose deeds were dreamt of in
youth. Certainly these men felt that youthful connection to Frederick the Great and
the pantheon of Prussian heroes such as Keith, Schwerin, Winterfeldt, for it "was
reality when Frederician Prussia, however machinclike and artificially designed,
produced men and heroes who made the heart beat faster.""^
That the reformers might harbor these feelings and still remain true to their
convictions and, in effect, attempt to destroy many of the pillars of the proud past to
which they had attached their self-worth is a profound testament of the highest sort of
patriotism—a love of the patria strong enough to subsume one's own self-interest and
adolescent dreams of belonging to a glorious fraternity. This connection among the
Frederickian system, proven unsatisfactory yet still able to stir pride and a desire to
conserve, the Napoleonic challenge of the new ways of war, and the reforms necessary
to throw out the oppressor and reassert the "glory of Pmssia" created a synthesis of the
best of the old and the necessary new. From this blending of old and new emerged
a synthesis which was to establish the limits of excellence in modem warfare from
1813 to 1945 and define modem officer professionalism as the essence of Prussian
officership."'
The thesis of the Frederickian system of war developed in this study is that of
the aristocratically-led, predominantly mercenary, standing army whose size is limited
by the ambitions of the monarch whose royal will is also the controlling element of
the army. The soldier serves only a minimal portion of the year and is trained through
brutal excess to be an unthinking automaton in a war machine. That soldier has little
"'Traditions which must at first appear greatly at odds with the reformers later
attempts to "liberalize" Prussia.
"^einecke. The Age of German Liberation , p. 27.
"'Huntington. S.P., The Soldier and the State, p. 12, Belknap Press, 1957. I have
unintentionally borrowed this phrase trom Huntington who writes of an "essence of
officership...embodied in the traditional admonition to Annapolis men that their duty
will be to Tight the fleet.'"
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identification with the citizens of or allegiance to the state he serves. The army is
ailiiiinistratively designed to support the Kompaniewirtschaft system. In this "company
economy" the company commander receives an annual income^'^ and therewith acts as
an independent businessman profiting—to the extent that he can decrease costs by
furloughing the maximum possible number of soldiers for the greatest amount of time
while still meeting garrison commitments-from his role as supplier and pay agent for
his company. When operationally deployed, the army is supported by the expansive
supply train necessary to support an army prone to desertion if not fed or allowed the
freedom necessary for forage. Tactically it acts as an instrument of concentrated
firepower delivering that fire in unison from each of the three linearly deployed ranks.
Artillery and cavalry units are employed separately from the infantry, but not so
independently to bring down upon their commanders the responsibility of "independent
command." The whole army acts as the single appendage of (hopefiilly) the genius at
its head, the matter settled in an elaborate series of feints and deceptions designed to
bring the affair to an unbloody conclusion at the first sign of advantage. The highest
order of generalship was in Lloyd's view "to keep on waging war without ever being
under the necessity to strike a blow.""' As Gerhard Ritter has written:
It was even possible now to consider the supreme military achievement to be the
winning of a war without any major bloodshed....Bellona, the furious goddess of
war, was to be rendered tractable, tamed like a kitten on the hearth."*
Set against this thesis of the Frederickian system of the limits of warfare in the
ancien regime is the antithesis of the Napoleonic"^ model of warfare. These two
systems first met in battle at Valmy on September 20, 1792, and on that battlefield for
""In Prussia at the turn of the century this amount was 1500 thalers.
"'Cited in Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter , p. 41-42.
"*Riner, The Sword and the Scepter, p. 41.
"^As Gunther Rothenberg has pointed out "after [Napoleon] became master, he
made changes which increased the striking power of this great war machine, but
otherwise he remained faithful to the methods of the Revolution." To differentiate
between Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare is beyond the scope of this study
though some effort is made in Chapter 4 to provide the distinction. Rothenberg, The
Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon
, p. 124.
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the first time a '"people's army' had defeated the old order." Although the immediate
results appeared less than noteworthy. Goethe, accompanying the Prussians under the
Duke of Brunswick, saw in this short contest that "from this place and day commenced
a new epoch in the world's history.""'
The Grande Armee was a citizen army conscripted by the levee en masse , led
by an officer meritocracy promoted from the ranks, and trained not by driJl but through
a political indoctrination in the ideals of the Revolution. The citizen soldier of the
"nation in arms" fought for that nation and not his pay; the connection between soldier
and state was complete, the nation was the army and its support. The soldier served
"for the duration" and was less commanded than led by fellow citizens, compatriots in
the revolutionary spirit of the nation. The army's size had only the limit of the
nation's population and grew ten fold between 1789 and 1797 to a million men.
Though profit remained the motive of a few, their heads were the price of profit and
the system of the condottiere was as dead as the Seventeenth century, replaced by the
rationalism of central administration. The soldier's new connection to the army and
the state allowed the supply train to diminish and forage supplemented provisioning,
for fear of desertion diminished as the supply of replacement soldiers increased.
Unable to train this vast mob of citizen soldiers, tactics opened up as "the French used
their ill-trained masses en debandade
.
that is as loose skirmishing swarms.""'
Eventually the skills of the heavy infantry, light infantry and the skirmishers merged
into an "all-purpose" infantry capable of the combined arms combat of shock effects
of columnar attack and highly mobile pursuit of the new object of war: the enemy
army. Combat was now sought out and the conclusion of battle was the bloody,
complete defeat of the enemy, his utter annihilation as a possible opponent.
Contrap>osition of the two systems lends great credence to Jean Colin 's judgment
that seen from the "military point of view" the "transformation of war" was "the end
"*Rothenberg, The Art of Warfa re in the Age of Napoleon , p 11.
"Ibid., p. 63.
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of a world. "^° From the Prussian point of view the challenge was to the very
existence of the state. Frederick Williain entrusted the survival of the Prussian state-
-and with it the Hohenzollem dynasty-to Gerhard Schamhorst and the reformers.
Their eventual success was due not to replacing the defeated Frederickian system with
a hastily built imitation of the outward organizational and tactical forms of the
Napoleonic system but to their ability to synthesize the old and the new, replacing
what they revered with a new system which combined that which still had value in the
Frederickian system, those elements of the Napoleonic system which could be adopted
without revolution, and the political reforms necessary to make effective this synthesis
of modem war."'
To bring into sharper focus the accomplishments of these men as military
reformers, and therefore, an object of interest to present day attempts at defense
reform, we will attempt to describe the results of the reform era in terms of the
Pmssian army of 1813 and the means, costs and superstmcture of the Prussian society
and its military expression, that is, in terms of those constituents of war which had
been changed by the forces of revolution in France. The political reforms which
emanated from the Military Reorganization Commission are the normal focus of
historical interest in the Prussian Reform Era. While these reforms were critical to the
survival of the Prussian state they in no way assured a competent and successful army;
for an army to be successful in battle its officers and men must be trained, armed,
supplied, led and supported both by the citizenry and the idea of the state they fight
for or they will eventually become merely the statistics of war—casualties.
""Colin, The Transformation of War
, p. 206.
"'While the following sections may appear to again cover the material presented
in chapter 7, that is not the author's intent. Most surveys of this period do not
sufficiently delineate the Prussian army of 1813, which is to say the army which
resulted from the reform era, from that which came before the period of reform and
the results of the period of reaction after 1819. Moreover this section attempts to use
the framework established in chapters 1-4 to elaborate the work of the reformers in the
postulated synthesis of the Frederickian and Napoleonic systems of war.
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A. THE PRUSSIAN ARMY OF 1813
In the aftermath of 1807 the most radical of refomiers and the most conservative
of Junkers could agree that Prussia's army faced three severe deficiencies: its army
was far too small to meet the challenge of the occupying forces of France; its stock
of arms was outmoded and severely depleted in the actions of 1807; and its tactics
were clearly unable to meet the Napoleonic transformation of war.
We have already seen the reform efforts to circumvent the will of Napoleon and
increase the size of the Prussian army through the Kriimpersvstem which after 1809
enrolled small numbers of men above allowable Paris Convention limits while regulars
were on furlough and then after a few weeks training released the minimally trained
Kriimper to reserve status. The approximately twelve thousand men so trained between
1807 and 1813 were, of course, a welcome addition to the 42,000 man limitation
imposed by Napoleon. But the only clear answer to the simple problem of numbers
was to call the masses of the Prussian populace to arms. The call of the Landwehr
together with the limited successes of the Kriimpersvstem . in the end, met this first
deficiency."^
To meet the tactical deficiencies of the Pmssian army Frederick William finally,
in 1811, appointed two commissions, each under Schamhorst's leadership, to develop
new manuals for the infantry and cavalry; Schamhorst had already begun work on the
manual for the artillery. The outcome and compilation of this work was the Reglement
of 1812 which Friedrich Engels, no apologist of Prussia, called "the best in the world.
Simple, logical, based on the principles of sound human understanding, they leave little
to be desired.""^ This accomplishment was not however the work of one man or one
year, rather it was the fruition of five years work by most of the reformers,
Schamhorst, Gneisenau, Boyen, Grolman, and Clausewitz, as well as men such as
Lieutenant Colonel Karl von Tiedemann, Major Johann Wilhelm Krauseneck and
General Hans D. L. von Yorck, in adapting the French methods which sprang from the
"^e will treat the deficiency in quality and supply of arms in the next section.
"'Engels, F. Ausgewahlte Militarisch Schriften. quoted in Rothenherg. The Art of
Warfare in the Age of Napoleon , p. I9}i.
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revolution to the Prussian system of Frederick in the cause of overthrowing the Empire
of (he hated Napoleon.
According to Peter Paret the "major steps in this process of accepting
revolutionary methods were the instructions that Yorck issued in 1810 and 1811, the
lectures on tactics, given at the War School for Officers by Ticdemann and Clauscwitz,
and finally the Reglement of 1812."^ To this list we might add Gncisenau's
instruction of March 27, 1809 on the basic elements of skirmishing, Krauseneck's rules
for the infantry. Instruction zum Exerciren der Infanterie . approved by Frederick
William on July 16, 1809, and Schamhorst's Handbuch fur Offiziere and his Handbuch
der Artillerie . Prussian officers during the critical period of preparation after 1807
were encouraged to read the Handbuch fur Offiziere which contained "a 'complete
course of instruction' in the theory of firearms.""' Published in 1787, Schamhorst's
Handbuch "was an attempt to explain the various arms of the service and to clarify
their interrelationships in war." It provides an early outline of his central message to
his fellow officers that:
Only when the officer understood the theory of his profession would he be able to
determine what was essential in war, 'and then to know with certainty what he must
do.' In shon, 'officers must study war in order to have some idea of what to do
in every situation.'"^**
Gneisenau's instruction on skirmishing, Krauseneck's instructions for the infantry
and Clausewitz's War School lectures on the "little war" centered on the third rank of
infantry and light troops. Each of these men had combat experience with skirmishing
and understood the central role of light infantry in the evolution of Prussian tactical
doctrine. Taken together with Yorck 's instructions and the compilation of all of these
works in the comprehensive but concise Reglement of 1812 we see a complete
abandonment of the eighteenth century fascination with an orderly, controllable, and
mathematically precise battlefield and the acceptance of war on its own terms as a
^Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform
, p. 157.
**'Ibid., p. 159.
"'White, The Enlightened Soldier
, p. 14.
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realm of chaos and chance best mastered by officers and soldiers imbued with the few
skills necessar)' and an understanding of the opportunities offered by chance to
individuals ready to exercise personal initiative during the mere seconds during which
those opportunities could be turned to tactical advantage. The best entree into this
uniquely Prussian understanding of "war as it really is"**' Yorck's "Instruction for the
Light Troops for the Maneuvers of the Year 1810" which states in part:
Nor can this instruction offer a compilation of entirely new opinions, since as
already stated its only purpose is to summarize known truths and experiences into
a consistent training guide. Still less is it possible to provide precise formulae for
all eventualities in an art such as that of war, in which results depend so greatly on
chance, the elements, and—to be particularly noted—on free will , i.e., on the
intelligence, courage, or cowardice of the individual parts of the machine. Only
general rules can be sketched here. TTieir appropriate application to prevailing
circumstances distinguishes the thinking officer from the one who considers his task
mechanically, or seeks the perfect picture of war in the fitting together of learned
evolutions."* [Emphasis added.]
These concepts of chance, free will, and the individual are the bedrock of the
opened up form of warfare Prussia sought with its evolving tactical doctrine. The
choices to move from close to open order battle, from the linear to the columnar, from
the shock of volley fire to the gradual building up of pressure on the enemy through
aimed, individual fire, from the single, unitary battalion formation committed to battle
in an aU or nothing effort to the "gradual escalation of pressure" through echelonment
of the new brigade deployment all demanded of the individual a new standard of
initiative, courage, discipline and training each raised to a new level of personal
excellence encompassed by the concepts of free will and thinking, individual qualities
not to be found in the old concept of the machine of war in service of the absolutist
statecraft."'
"'We have come to call this view of wRr Clausewitzian but the concepts whicli
Clausewitz so ably elucidates permeate all of the tactical doctrine developed during the
period of reform.
"'Quoted in Paret. Yorck and the Era of Pmssian Reform , pp. 158-9.
"Ilothenberg. The Art of Warfnre in the Age of Napoleon , p 1^4.
93
Yorck's theory of battle centered on the "loss of distinction between the light
infantry and the line." He believed tliat the "whole secret of tactics, regardless of how
one looks at it, lies in the intelligent disposition of the impulse""** which was to be
provided by the "gradual escalation of pressure" in the brigade deployment of two
fusilier battalions in skimiish line supported 150 paces back by the skirmish reserve
soutiens
.
followed at 300 paces by the first main combat element of three musketeer
battalions, again followed at 200 paces by the second main combat element of the elite
grenadier battalion and the fourth musketeer battalion, with the reserve cavalry and
horse artillery in the rear or on the flanks,"'
The requirement for a "thinking officer" was felt especially at the company
commander level where initiative could now be shown and, in fact, was now critical.
Companies became the focus of energy in the new more open but equally
uncontrollable deployments. "Thus the company commander rather than the battalion
commander became the man in immediate control of the fire-fight.""^ The Reglement
turned the company into the basic tactical unit for the fusiliers, stating that:
The company commanders use the specific advantages that the terrain affords their
purpose, they decide which squads or sections are to skimiish, they reinforce or
reduce the skirmish line according to the course of the action, choose an
advantageous position for the closed sections from which these can easily support
the skirmish line..."' [emphasis added]
While it can be argued that the qualities of individual initiative and judgement
and the new understanding of war as the arena of chance and momentary opportunity
applied only to the light troops, the intention of the reformers was clearly to use the
lessons of the little war and the tactics of the light infantry as a vehicle to energize
the entire army. In 1811 Schamhorst had suggested to Frederick William that "a
measure of tactical fi-eedom" be allowed the line company. While the king refused it
is important to note that with the third rank of the line and the 15 (of 46) fusilier,
""Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform , p. 161.
"'Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon
, p. 194.




Jager and Schiitzen battalions, "over half of the Prussian infantry consisted of troops
that were expected to know how to figlu in open [and closel fonnations".'^*
The appeal to the individual as the center of battle is found throughout these
documents. Yorck, recalling Gneisenau's instruction, wrote that:
Tiraillement is an opened-up battle formation, in which man does not cling to man.
On the whole is must be led in one direction, but it affords the individual the
advantage of moving freely in any terrain, of firing accurately aimed shots, and of
benefiting according to circumstances from all possibilities that the ground offers..."'
Paret writes that Yorck, in enumerating the lessons necessary for skirmishing, points
out that the private soldier must learn "how to operate as a member of a unit without
losing his individuality""* and that "the underlying purpose of Yorck 's instructions"
was "to show how the individual soldier could be freed from the impediments of
formalism and tradition"."^ The Reglement of 1812 states that the "sections of the
third rank are to be primarily used for combat in open order, although this stipulation
by no means removes the need for every infantryman to know how to fight
individually."""
In the eighteenth century students of the great captains had attempted to buUd
systems which totally excluded chance, now the Pmssians attempted to build around
the individual a system which might fully exploit chance by accepting the reality of
war that chance and the opportunity it produces is an individual phenomenon which so
quickly passes in battle as to exclude all but individual initiative from exploiting it,
even to the level of the musketeer. Perhaps the greatest risk in challenging the
individuality of the soldier was that the unit could no longer act in unison but here the
Pmssians held fast to a new doctrine of uniformity which complemented the seemingly
conflicting doctrine of individual.






Unlike the French the Prussian doctrine required a uniformity of tactics, units and
traiDiog. The tactics developed ahove were transmitted throughout the army and each
man was expected to leam and observe the new regulations. The six brigades in East
and West Prussia, Upper and Lower Silesia, Pomcrania and Brandenburg each were
stationed in and recruited from the locale from which they took their names. This
made mobilization much faster and increased unit cohesion. The brigade was made up
of two regiments of infantry each with one battalion of fusiliers, two battalions of
musketeers, one elite grenadier battalion and between 10 and 14 squadron of cavalry.
The peacetime artillery brigade of 12 and 6 pound cannon and 7 and 10 pound
howitzers was apportioned upon mobilization with one light foot and one horse battery
going to each infantry brigade. The remaining artillery formed the Corps and army
reserve. Initially the corps was made up of two brigades but upon mobilization in
1813 four Corps were established each with four brigades of both regular and
Landwehr units.
Training was also standardized but this was not the mindless drill of old. In
Paret's words, Yorck's second Instruction of 1811 held that for "all these forces,
removed from the center of authority, success lies in the greatest possible exploitation
of initiative; at the same time they must always act in conformity with an over-all plan
to the extent of sacrificing themselves.""' Training for initiative and conformity with
an over-all plan required that drill should be realistic and even carried out at night.
The tough objectivity found in Yorck's view that "the basic principle of fighting in
open formation lies in accurate shooting" and that men should practice "creeping and
crawling" led Paret to write that:
The maneuvers of 1810 were the first realistic field exercises on a large scale in
the army's history. The troops were instructed to practice patrolling, set ambushes,
attempt night attacks, and other ways freely employ ingenuity.****
Those maneuvers proved unsatisfactory, largely due to the ingrained "background of




more detailed instructions for 1811 which criticized the "erroneous ideas of extended
(»idci". The instruction also elaborates "the infantry tactics that were to dominate
European battlefields until the advent of the machine gun":
Often it has even been assumed that the tactics of light infantry were nothing more
than firing either standing still or advancing in a schematically formed open line;
on the contrary, the tactics of light infantry consist in the ability of appropriately
combining in any given situation, according to circumstances and terrain,
movement in close formation with a superior well-aimed fire, which can only
be achieved in open order."' [Yorck's emphasis.]
Paret further notes that:
The training they prescribed was realistic; their own texts were not to be followed
word for word, but interpreted in the light of experience and common sense.
Tactical differences between fusiliers and the line were minimized. ...Battles were
won by deceiving the opp>onent, exploiting the unforeseen, keeping reserves in hand;
they were neither chivalrous contests nor pertained to the realm of mathematical
certainties.. ..a new military attitude. By turning away from the search for absolute
laws that had occupied the previous generation of Prussian theorists and tacticians,
they opened war to the free play of intelligence of all of its participants."^
The reformers understood that there were "no unfailing recipes in the art of war."
The Reglement of 1812 pulled together all the strands of independent thought produced
by the reform movement and produced a "complete, coherent system" heavily indebted
to the methods of revolutionary France but also wholly new in its emphasis on the
individual and his free will and initiative.
Whatever their differences on specific social and political questions, they regarded
the common soldier and the subaltem as individuals, who possessed dignity and
intelligence, and whose physical energy was related to moral factors. Consequently
they sought to introduce the force of free wUl to the battlefield. The flexibility that
the Reglement of 1812 expected in every infantry unit....developed into the most
advanced doctrine of the age: the disappearance of specialist tactics, and their
replacement by the complete amalgamation of the methods of the light service with







Clausewitz wrote in 1807 that "we lack all war material and supplies and during
the next five to six years we have no expectation of being able to support a
considerable army from our own resources."^** Much of the Prussian supply of arms
was confiscated by the French and given over to the German states of Napoleon's
creation, the Confederation of the Rhine. What was left to Prussia was an assortment
of "modem, obsolete and damaged small arms." Under the auspices of the
commissions established to rewrite the manuals for infantry, cavalry and artillery, the
Pmssian reformers undertook a comprehensive examination of all the basic equipment
of the army. "Diligent attempts were made to improve the supply and efficiency of
small arms and artillery, and new foundries were established for the manufacture of
arms, although the rate of output was always severely limited by the shaky finances
of the state.""'
Stein's reforms of state administration and the resulting five ministries provided
the minimum necessary centralization for overcoming the extreme shortages noted by
Clausewitz. Workshops reminiscent of the Paris musketry works of Lazare Camot
were established in the garrison towns of each of the six brigades at Neisse, Glatz,
Graudenz, Konigsberg, and Berlin and the main factory at Spandau was expanded. The
"new Prussian Model" musket was a simplified version of previous models with a
straight butt and larger caliber to allow use of all available ammunition. By 1813
however the weapon foundry at Spandau had produced only 55,000 and in the end
rearmament of the Prussian army was only possible with English assistance. England
supplied over "100,000 stands of arms, considerable quantities of powder, and flint and
even Austria contributed some field pieces and muskets.""*
As might be expected the resulting mix of arms was a "supply officer's
nightmare" and required extraordinary ingenuity. Gunners trained on obsolete pieces
"^Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon , p. 192.
"'Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army , p. 50.
"*Rothenherg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon , p. 1Q3. See also
Shanahan, Prussian Military Refonns, 1786-1813
. p. 211.
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to save wear on the mere 236 serviceable guns available. After the initial actions of
1813 demonstrated the severity of lack of weapon uniformity, regiments traded out
muskets to at least achieve regimental uniformity. To meet the French challenge of
speed and mobility the Prussian supply train was severely reduced and cost most
officers their personal mount and pack horse. The individual soldier carried only a
"blanket roll over the shoulder, the haversack, ammunition pouch, and water bottle"."'
The King had taken special note of the relationship between Prussia's slow movement
in the last war and her cumbersome supply train and inflexible supply system. The
advent of light troops in the Prussian service caused a general decrease in the amount
and types of supplies and impedimenta believed necessary to wage war. The increase
of the standard march step to 108 paces per minute (with increased rates by drum
command) versus the previous 75 gave the Prussians a much greater chance to move
against the French army with its rate of 120 paces per minute."'
The new War Commissariat with a representative located at each brigade and
recent rationalization of the military economy under Lieutenant Colonel von LxDttum in
the Military Economy Department of the War Ministry allowed "a complete
overhauling of the supply services, and distribution and accounting of supplies were
now centralized"."' It is then fair to say that the Prussian army went to great lengths
to meet the changed nature of the means of war as they understood them. Martin Van
Creveld has, however, shown that "Pmssia's whole doctrine was based on the
assumption that Napoleonic warfare was qualitatively different and represented an
entirely new departure." Because of that belief they also assumed that logistics also
underwent a profound change which led Clausewitz "to invent an army which did
without magazines, lived off the country, paid no attention to considerations of supply
and sometimes seemed to grow wings in its marches". That Napoleonic logistics did
not undergo such a profound change and that it was merely—as were his strategy,
"Ibid., p. 195.
"Ibid., pp. 190-6.
"'Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army , p. 51. See also Shanahan, Prussian
MUitarv Reforms. 1786-1813
. pp. 141-3 and 179-85.
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tactics, organization—the "logical outcome of progressive developments originating in
ihc previous thirt}' or forty years" does not. however, release the Pnissian army of the
day from the responsibility, which they ably exercised, of finding workable remedies
for the disparities in performance attributable to logistics, even if, in retrospect, the
more astonishing accomplishments of the Grande Armee are more attributable to
Napoleon's genius than his system.""
C. COSTS
The Prussian response to Napoleon's "income of 200,000 men a year" was
twofold: they mobilized the entire nation in a manner reminiscent and perhaps more
complete than the levee en masse and they paid particular attention to the lives of their
soldiers by developing safety as a cornerstone of the new tactical doctrine. The
financial and geographic strictures of the Treaty of Tilsit and the Paris Convention
meant that Prussia was indeed a second class power and the road to reattainment of
its former stature was to be had only a great cost. Frederick WUliam had not either
the thalers or the will to pay them; to Prussia's great fortune, men such as Stein and
Schamhorst were willing. Stein had the immense foresight to move the state treasury
from Berlin to Konigsberg and Schamhorst reorganized and reformed the army in a
manner which cost not thalers but tradition.
In the end, as Herbert Rosinski writes, "Everything was lacking—money, arms,
equipment; the front rank of the Landwehr infantry and the whole Landwehr cavalry
had at first to be armed with pikes; but with the help of the many officers maintained
since 1801 on half-pay, these raw levies were so far drilled into shape that the Prussian
army, which had begun its spring campaign with a total strength of 135,000, after the
summer armistice was able to take the field again with the imposing total of 279,000
men, later raised to 300,000, or 6 per cent of the total population.""' The personal
costs to those on half-pay and more those cashiered after 1807. officers usuallv without
"'Van Creveld, Supplying War
, pp. 72-74.
"'Rosinski, The German Army , p 40.
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personal funds, led Gneisenau to describe the lot of those who came back to Prussia's
service at the call, "Their misery is indescribable."^"
Throughout Yorck's instructions there appear many allusions to the safety of the
individual. He speaks of "combining the greatest possible security of the individual
with the greatest possible damage dealt to the enemy", that "the tirailleur should hit,
and not make noise", and of "hurting the enemy in safety".^" It would go too far to
attribute this concern solely to some humanitarian impulse,"* but it seems clear that
part of the reason for the repeated references to safety and security was an
understanding that this made objective and tactical sense and, above all else, that
Prussia did not have "an income of 200,000 men" to squander.
D. SUPERSTRUCTURE
The reformers were in no sense democrats. Though we have seen their efforts
as an attempt to break down the rigid class structure of the Frederickian system and
open the army to the energies of the whole society this does not imply that they
sought the end of monarchy. To the contrary they were attempting to preserve the
state by creating a nation but it was to be a nation of men dedicated to the ideal of
a just and rational monarchy which might unite all of Germany under Prussia's
leadership. This stmggle was of course a severe threat to all three estates and the
reformers were as much opposed by the middle classes as they were by the nobUity
and the state clergy.
If we must accept the failure of the reforms to achieve what seems such a
limited goal—at least relative to the French Revolution~we should remember that
"^tchen, M., A Military History of Germany from the Eighteenth Century to
the Present Day , pp. 42-3, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975.
"^Paret. Yorck and the Era of Prussian R eform, pp. 159-161.
"*Though arguably it existed, 1 am unable to show any conclusive evidence of a
great humanitarian impulse on the part of either Yorck or the other reformers. It is
interesting to note how abhorrent each found combat on its own terms, decidedly
different in tone are their letters describing their reactions to the wanton destruction of
life and property that marked Napoleonic warfare and the common description of
Pmssian militarism and glorification of war.
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Prussia and the Fifth Coalition were victorious, and they defeated not a republic but
an empire. Paret writes that:
They had failed in guiding the state; their achievement was limited to the
construction of its new military instrument. But in this circumscribed task they
succeeded remarkably well. In every field except conscription the schemes for
modernization that were launched in 1 807 had been carried forward without meeting
crippling defeat. In the development of tactical doctrine, especially, the past three
years had wimessed a decisive turning towards the ncw.^"
And in the end the accomplishments endured to the extent that by 1871 the goals were
largely met, after a period of reaction and restoration and the failures of 1848, but the
ultimate goal, a united Germany, a nation under a rational monarchy, was achieved.
Gunther Rothenberg describes the difference between the typical Prussian soldier of
1806 and the Prussian soldier of 1815 as the difference between the previous
mercenary or reluctant conscript, now he was animated. ..by patriotism [which]
expressed itself, as it had in the days of Frederick, by religion. As the Prussian
infantry saw the French retreating the evening of Waterloo, the fusiliers began to
sing the old Lutheran hymn, A mighty Fortress is our God , the same hymn their
forefathers had sung on the field at Leuthen and Kunersdorf.""*
The religion of Luther was first and foremost an expression of Germany, the original
expression of the language, the first stirrings of nationalism and ultimately the focus
of the state's moral energy. That in the end that connection of the German religion
and the German nation of centuries past should so express itself is the ultimate irony
of the Prussian answer to the new superstructure of the French Revolution.
In no single area was the challenge of the Napoleonic transformation of war
more daunting than to the Frederickian relationships of aristocracy, bourgeoisie
,
peasant
and king. Forged by Frederick's father, the tradition of the social compact between
king and Junker was the foundation of the state. That tradition gave the landed
nobility complete dominance of the peasantry on their estates in exchange for the
service of their sons in the king's army. From that compact flowed nearly all other
relationships in Prussia.
"'Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform
, p. 157.
"'Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, p. 195.
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The central core of the reformer's challenge to this system was their demand for
nn end to the nobility's sole claim to commissions and a system of military justice
which put an end to the bmtal barracks discipline which was merely a continuation of
the manorial justice practiced widely and just as widely understood and accepted. And
for what? So that the middle class might be lured into providing their sons for the
army and relinquishing their part in the compact—to pay taxes and thus be released
from the requirement of service. It seems a fool's bargain, but it worked because the
reformers saw beyond the self-interest of the various groups in society to something
larger, a love of and willingness to die for a concept not yet even spoken, a German
nation.
Pmssia produced a synthesis of modem war between 1807 and 1813. The
members of the reform movement, in league with other enlightened officers such as
General von Yorck, raised the concept of the individual to the center of their agenda
and, in so doing, achieved a military tradition which preserved the best of the
Frederickian system while creating a new type of officer to meet the challenge of
modem war. Out of this cauldron of change emerged a lasting legacy to the
profession of arms—the Pmssian officer.
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X. CONCLUSION
The purpose of history should be to allow us to use our reason and imagination
to test our prejudices against the reality of other men, in other times, facing similar
circumstances, and, in the testing, to discover the questions which may lead us down
right paths. History, however, has become a political weapon wielded to "teach truth"
through lessons rather than a traveler's torch which can light our way with informed
questions. Our purf>ose here is the latter. Our subject is confounded by the former.
If we are to believe the collective wisdom of our modem "eminences griscs,"*"
we face a turning point in history, comparably as momentous and divergent as 1815.
But not even these "wise men" seem to know what is ahead. The questions are
compelling. Is the cold war over? What is out there "beyond containment"? Are the
two superpowers giving way to a multipolar world politic? What comes after post-
war? What sort of military establishment should we have in this new order? Was our
1986 Defense Reorganization Act sufficient to allow us to develop a consistent military
strategy"* to meet the unknown challenges ahead?"' The best advice we hear is to
"keep our powder dry" lest we ignite the world's uncertainty. What lies ahead is
"The political pundits, op-ed page writers and think tankers who fill our
newspapers, magazines and television sets with the distilled wisdom of the last twenty-
four hours.
"'Strategic inconsistency seems epidemic. After roundly criticizing Soviet
proposals to remove troops and tanks from Europe as a propaganda ploy that would
merely remove aging equipment and create a leaner, more effective Soviet threat, our
military leadership's reaction to President Bush's proposal to remove troops and tanks
from Europe is to "take steps to isolate its newest equipment from cuts while cutting
older systems." Gordon, M.R., '"Busli I'acl WuulJ Allect Uidy Uldti /Vjiiis, rcMlng<Mi
Officials Say," The New York Times
, p. A6, June 2, 1989.
"'The furor of our defense reform movement has quelled, happily, and defense
reform analysis is today usually of the post-mortem or status-report genre. TTie
implication seems to be that Goldwater-Nichols, given time and adherence, will cure
our ills.
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known to none of us, but we can be fairly certain that our military establishment, even,
especially as presently "reformed," cannot remain static in a time of turmoil.
If history can play a part in helping us find the right questions about the path
ahead then surely a logical test case for our reason and imagination is the period of
the "transfomfiation of war" when the static world of the two superpowers of the late
Ancicn Regime . France and England, along with their respective coalitions, dissolved
into and out of chaos emerging into the multipolar world of the Concert of Europe.
Prussia was caught in the middle of this contest, by necessity forced to immerse the
whole of Prussian society—the civil state, the cities, the military, the nobility, the
middle class, the peasantry—in an examination of the old order and the relationshqw
by then most comfortably assumed by all. A central element of that examination was
the Prussian reform movement and the attempt to deal with the question of civil-
military relations in the midst of an uncertain, changing world.
Our study of that movement raises important questions relevant to our times;
questions concerning the meaning of "failure" in defense reform, fundamental questions
about civil-military relations, the applicability of foreign ideas and institutions to our
government, and finally questions about what it means to be a professional military
officer in a time of turmoil.
A. THE FAILURE OF REFORM AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
The historical judgment of the Pmssian Reform Movement can best be
summarized in one word: failure. Rosinski has written that
With the fall of Stein the reform as a whole lost its head and heart—the dynamic
personality that amidst the universal despondency had breathed its fiery energy into
the hearts of his collaborators and co-ordinated their widespread and manifold
activities. Under the weak ministry that followed him, the civil side of the reform
stopped almost completely As for the military reformers, their work was hardly
less affected."""
Ritter writes that "the reform efforts came to nought and the old bureaucratic
absolutism with its sharp contrasts between subjects and rulers re-emerged".''*' With
""Rosinski, The German Army , pp. 69-70.
'''Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter, p. 107.
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characteristic venom, A.J.P. Taylor's judgment of the "jacquerie organized from above"
Ls that "Prussia came out of the 'years of reform* not freer than before, but with a
government harsher, more extensive, and more absolute than ever."^" W. O. Simon
dedicated an entire monograph to his search for the Failure of the Prussian Refomi
Movement , why Prussia "reverting to the political, social, and military forms of the
ancien regime , turned her back on the political heritage of western Europ)e: on the
Enlightenment, on English constitutionalism, and on the French Revolution.""' Gordon
Craig even asks, "why...was this failure so complete?""* Fricdrich Meinecke might
have been correct that when the Prussian Reform Movement died in 1819, the first of
three "critical alternatives in the history of Germany", Germany chose "to remain
faithful to the twin principles of authoritarianism and militarism.""' But in the
choosing Prussia established a model of reform which, while rejected, can assist us in
seeing the possibilities for their "failed" reform, and ours.
The central reason for the failure of the military reformers is then the failure of
the civilian reformers. The military reforms were highly dependent on a restructuring
of the civil relationsh^s of the estates and the place of the individual in the state.
The fall of Stein"* and the subsequent "failure" of the military reformers to carry
through his civUian reform agenda led inexorably to the reestablishment of the previous
"T'aylor, A.J.P., The Course of German History
, pp. 40-41, Paragon Books, 1979.
"'Simon, W.O., Failure of the Prussian Reform Movement , p. 4.
"*Craig, The End of Prussia
, p. 19-20. His answer is that "Stein's personal
direction of affairs was so short, ...Stein's successor, Hardenberg, approached them with
a different spirit and set of priorities. ...(b)ut the most important reason for failure of
the reforms was that the old Prussia, the Prussia of clearly differentiated Staende
(estates) and dominated by crown and landed nobility and army, was stronger and more
resilient than Stein, for one, had imagined, and its recovery stifled the reforming
tendency."
"'Meinecke, F., 1848: Eine Saekularbetrachtung
. pp. 8-9 and 27-29, Beriin, 1948,
quoted in Simon, The Failure of the Prussian Reform Movement
, pp. 3-4. The other
two "critical alternatives" were 1848 and 1866.
"'For a comprehensive examination of the background and effects of Stein's fall
see Raack, R.C., The Fall of Stein
. Harvard Univ. Press, 1965.
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relationships of the estates and the subsuming of the individual in the state. But is
victoiy over the invader and establishment of an entirely new administrative and
organizational structure, along with institutions and traditions which would last for the
next century and a half to be considered failure?^" The military officer's search for
meaning in the final outcome of the Prussian Reform Movement is better served by
Golo Mann's less judgmental observation:
after a time the reforming movement largely came to a halt. The moments in
history in which noble enthusiasm reigns are short and one must be grateful for any
lasting achievements from such a period.^"
There were indeed "lasting achievements" of the Prussian Reform Movement
which can provide tests for our own efforts at defense reform and shed light on
previously asked questions of civil-military relations. The great captains of pre-modem
history—Alexander, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, Napoleon"'~ail
had one thing in common, they combined in their person both military and civU
leadership. The advent of modem war can be seen to begin at the moment when the
political leader can no longer retain actual military leadership on the field of battle
because that battlefield had grown too large and too complex for any individual to
control in detail.^'** Once the executing portions of political and military leadership
were separated, the issue of civil-military relations was transformed into a question of
integrating the two heretofore separate segments of society—united only in the person
of the monarch—into a workable whole, henceforth a central issue in all questions of
defense and demanded new forms in consonance with the public weal.
To meet this new requirement of war the Prussian reformers instituted rational,
centralized management of the war apparatus through a Ministry of War; they initiated
"'We have seen the opinion of the historians, it is necessary to ask what the
nature of this failure was—did the reformers fail history or the values of those
historians who wrote it?
"'Mann, The History of Germany Since 1789 . p. 35.
"'Before 1813.
^'Tn each subsequent instance where tried the result is failure. Napoleon after
1813 and Adolph Hitler are two clear examples.
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a system of conscription which gave the citizen a stake in the state and the state a
claim on the citizen's service legitimated by an equitable military justice system; they
developed a system of command which placed the old and the new side by side—the
commander and his chief of staff—supported by a General Staff made up of the most
qualified officers in the corps; and they placed the individual at the center of this
system by insisting on an educated elite open to all and informed by a spirit of
Bildung .
The Prussians were not the first men to face this new reality of civil military
relations. Where the Prussians were forced to realize that the king they had was
unable to lead as Frederick had and that they therefore needed a system of genius to
replace the genius' system, the American colonists had desired simply to be rid of their
king"' and the military system the repugnance of which was part of the decision to
break with England. They realized they needed a system of military organization
which avoided that which was repugnant yet was able to provide "for the common
defense." In facing this new question of civil -military relations in the American
Revolutionary War, the founding fathers established the issue as a critical element of
our new form of government. Taken together, the American and Prussian exf)eriences
mark the beginnings of both modem command and control and the concomitant need
for civil-military relations. A comparison of the two demonstrates the questions which
still remain today.
The conflict was there from the beginning. The Declaration of Independence
charged that King George had "affected to render the military independent of, and
superior to, the civU power.""^ [Emphasis added.] Simply put, that is the issue: what
should be the balance between the civil and military powers? The framers understood
the problem, they must "provide for the common defense" for as John Jay noted in the
third of the Federalist Papers, "among the many objects to which a wise and free
"'Though many were willing to take on a new one if General Washington had
been of that mind.
"^Smith, E., and Spaeth. H., eds . Tlie Constitution of the United States, with
Case Summaries
, p. 28, Harper and Row. 1987.
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people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems
to be the first.""' The problem was to provide for their safety without a military
independent of and superior to the civil power. Hamilton felt that civil-military
relations were not a problem for "if circumstances should at any time oblige the
government to form an army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to
the liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little if at all inferior
to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights
and those of their feUow-citizens.""* That Hamilton was on the side of a nationally-
controlled militia and lost the argument, is a harbinger of the balance which still
endures. Americans distrust-instinctively—military power, whether King George's or
their own. The balance established was no balance at all but a long-standing test of
a weak standing army, with but little voice in the councils of government, relying on
the nation's natural distance from potential enemies and our eventual ability to produce
our way out of whatever contest we might face. That this strategy has not held up
over the last forty years should be obvious. But the civU-military "balance"~or rather
the lack thereof—which flowed from that strategy still maintains.
Samuel Huntington tried thirty years ago to find a new balance which might
"reduce the danger of progressive deterioration in American officership." Concerned
of the consequences should "the voice of the professional soldier" go unheeded,
Huntington wrote that
Unless a new balance is created, the continued dismption of American civil-military
relations cannot but impair the caliber of military professionalism in the future. A
political officer corps, rent with faction, subordinated to ulterior ends, lacking
prestige but sensitive to the appeals of popularity, would endanger the security of
the state. A strong, integrated, highly professional officer corps, on the other hand,
immune to politics and respected for its military character, would be a steadying
balance wheel in the conduct of policy."'
"'Hamilton, A., Madison. J., nnd jnv. J
. TlLLX^-O^liLLbLXiir?-!' ^ • '^" ^- P '^-•
NAL Penguin, 1961.
"*Ibid., No. 29, p. 185.
"'Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 464. It is left to the reader to pick the
more correct forecast of the current state of American officership, the author finds more
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Huntington concludes his study with an idyllic portrait of the military community, "a
different world" of "ordered serenity", in stark contrast to the "tiresome monotony and
the incredible variety and discordancy of small-town commercialism." His point
seemed to be that the proper balance was only to come through a civilian shift toward
a military standard and the military values of "loyalty, duty, restraint, dedication" with
which the civil society might "eventually find redemption and security".^
By 1977, Huntington believed that instead of the civil moving toward—even
adopting—the values and standards of the military, "the dilemma of military institutions
in a liberal society can only be resolved satisfactorily by a military establishment that
is different from but not distant from the society it serves."^" [Emphasis added.]
Thus Professor Huntington's view of the proper balance in civil-military relations has
moved from national salvation to salvage; the civil must respect the inherent difference
from and distance at which the military must exist in a liberal society.
It would seem the professor has taken a page from the reactionaries who brought
down the Prussian Reform Movement. There the dilemma of liberal military
institutions in a conservative society could only be resolved satisfactorily by a military
establishment that was different from but not distant from the society it served; the
reformers presented a conservative society with a military which espoused liberal ideals
which could not be fully tolerated in that conservative society. There the "difference
and distance" between the military and the civil was intolerably wide and was finally
closed by "purging" the reform element while accepting certain seemingly institutional
evidence of the "political" than the "professional" model.
^Ibid., pp. 465-6.
"'Huntington, S.P., "The Soldier and the State in the 1070's." Civil-MUitary
Relations , A. Goodpaster aji«l ST. ilmnmglun, p. J/, /Viiiciican I nlciptisc hjstitute,
1977. This difference and distance is currently so wide that to find a Democrat in
uniform is akin to finding a pro-union Republican. While Republicans might find this
natural it is indicative of a deeper problem which explains the current imbalance in
civil-rmlitary relation, a chasm of political difference between the opinion forming elite
and the uniformed officer egalite.
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changes: a centralized Ministry of War, citizen conscription^", and a command system
built on an elite General Staff dedicated to professional excellence. All of these
changes were designed to meet liberal notions of equality and freedom based on a
belief in individuals and their capacity to achieve Bildung through a life-long
education, but accepted with an explicit rejection of transference of those notions to the
larger society.^"
In our own case the military values—order, discipline, prescription—are supposedly
at odds with the prevalent civil values—freedom, equality, choice.*" The logic of our
"balancing" of these value sets is that the military values are accepted as necessary
for the efficient management of the armed forces but shall not be allowed to
impinge on the dominant values of the larger civil society. It is a logic strangely
parallel to the Prussian case and fraught with the question, how far may the difference
and distance be allowed to grow before the society cannot tolerate the chasm?
Our history of civil-rrulitary relations suggests the American solution was to
retain as weak an Army as possible; to prescribe a citizen-militia so that there existed
no threat from the military to the civU society because the military was made up of
part time soldiers with a greater stake in the civil community than it had in the
military. In the aftermath of World War II we accepted—grudgingly—the requirement
for a strong, professional, standing armed force. But we have never accepted the
concomitant requirement for a strong, professional military voice in the business of
^*For the uneven progress of the concept of the citizen's military obligation see
Paret, P., "Nationalism and the Sense of Military Obligation," Military Affairs , v. 34,
February, 1970.
"If one takes the removal of proponents of transference from power as explicit.
""The labelling of these supposedly conflicting value sets as conservative and
liberal is a useless venmre which Huntington attempts but fails. The Prussian
reformers were liberal because they scuglil tu t-iilciigf llie siiaic <>l iIk- titizcii in tlic
state, they were equally concerned with conserving those values which we today
incorrectly assert conflict. In a correct understanding of the words one can be both
liberal—one who advocates civil liberties and legal equality—and conservative, if those
political values presently maintain. See Epstein, K., The Genesis of German
Conservatism
, pp. 3-11, Princeton Univ. Press. 1966, for an excellent typology of the
strands of conservatism present in the early nineteenth century.
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governmental decisionmaking. TTiough without historical basis, the fear still exists that
some new King George might affect to render the military power independent of,
superior to, the civil power.
The example of the Prussian Reform Movement provides a method for balancing
the difference and distance between the military and civil by acceptance of military
institutions and ideas at odds with prevailing civil values, yet not so onerous to be
seen as threatening. The civil was seen to prevail in the period of reaction yet the
new military institutions were able to build a system of excellence founded on ideas
then alien to the civil society.
Under Napoleon's terms, announced as the Treaty of Paris, the Prussian reformers
faced a greatly reduced army; the geographical, and therefore fiscal and population,
diminution of the state meant real reductions to the personnel and force structures
available to the army. We may also face a period of diminishing forces, personnel
strengths and dollars available for defense, and it would seem imperative that we
compensate by an enhancement of our planning capability, which is exactly what the
Pmssian reformers achieved. We must make up for brute strength with intelligent use
of what remains, and without jeopardizing the delicate American civil-military balance.
Perhaps the most compelling outcome of the Prussian Reform Movement is one
which Peter Paret believes "other societies—both old and new—are still learning: armed
forces cannot be relied on as tools for general reform.'"*" This statement both provides
the best summation of the failure of the Prussian reform movement. The military
cannot reform the civil society. But perhaps the converse of Professor Paret 's
statement is also tme: armed forces cannot rely on the general society for specific
reform of the military. The defense reform debate of the 1980's came to be centered
on the unnecessarily involved question of jointness.**" Now that we have hopefully
settled this issue it is still necessary to address the more fundamental question of how
^'Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform
, p. 244.
'"That this issue had to be addressed is itself a paean to the power of interservice
rivalry. That it is considered reform to admit that we must fight together and therefore
will establish institutional safeguards to force us to fight together is a painful
declaration that our "reforni" movement also was a failure.
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we can achieve a dynamic system of national military planning and strategy
(1cvelnpment--one that doesn't require momentous events to overcome the bureaucratic
inertia evident in the latest national security review—and produce, on a continuing
basis, reasoned, imaginative ideas on military questions from the very source which
should be producing them, the military. Our defense reform movement was a civilian
undertaking with very little military participation. The chief reason for this lack of
military involvement in the debate was that there exists no military institution of
individuals with standing to join the debate. One answer to this void is an American
General Staff, but such an undertaking would require a readjustment of the difference
and distance between the civil and the military powers and an acceptance of foreign
ideas and institutions. Again the Prussian example coupled with our own history
provides the basis for the questions we should ask.
B. THE ADOPTION OF FOREIGN IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS
A hundred years before the conflict between George Washington and Nathaniel
Greene over American military strategy, a debate existed in the colonies over adapting
Indian methods of fighting to an "American" style of militia warfare or retaining the
English-European model.'"' A continuity of conflict has ever since existed between
those elements of our armed forces which wish only to find a way of fighting which
might allow American forces to win and those elements, equally desirous of victory,
who also demand a particularly American style of military organization and operations.
This conflict has come to include interservice rivalry and the "not invented here"
syndrome. These two institutional biases, along with a germanophobic hostility
engendered by two world wars and our continuing concerns about the balance of civil-
military relations stand as the primary impediments to our adoption of foreign ideas
and institutions such as an American general staff system after the Prussian model.
The genesis of the Prussian General Staff was. as we've shown, not the major
focus of the energies of the Prussian Reformers but as Professor Liaig has pointed out,
"no part of the work of the reformers of 1807 had been more permanent than the
303
Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense , pp. 6-18.
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General Staff system."*** It is ironic that an institution so thoroughly, if incorrectly,
detested by the most (self-proclaimed) liberal of men was in fact based on the most
liberal of principles. The General Staff system was a logical outcome of the
reformers' insistence on Bildung as a guiding principle leading to a fundamental belief
in the essentiality of education and individual excellence within an institutional
approach to rational preparation for "war as it really is." A real appreciation of the
liberal views of the leaders of that movement can add a dimension often lacking in the
debate over adoption of their system. Schamhorst, Stein, Gneisenau, and Clauscwitz
believed in a Prussian nation-state and believed that the army could provide the energy,
education and equality of individuals necessary to raise Prussia to the level of Great
Power. They were drawn to Prussia from all over Europe in the hope of flnding in
that more tolerant state a home where their education and abilities counted for more
than their family name or title. The reformers believed that individuals—regardless of
station—had a right to share in the responsibility to defend the state and that, flowing
from that right, individual citizens also had a right to full participation in the state.
Though discredited and removed from service by 1819, these men laid the
foundation for the "tradition of excellence" which came to be the hallmark of the
Prussian General Staff. These traditions did not die even during the reaction and
restoration which blocked much of their remaining political program. In the half
century after 1813, within the walls of Berlin's Bendlerstrasse redoubt, the Prussian
General Staff, at a distance and difference from the prevailing reactionary mood,
developed a method for commanding and controlling the means of war unleashed by
the French Revolution, what we know as modem war. This "Brain of an Army"'***
came precariously close to perfecting the art of waging modem war. How close is a
matter of historical interpretation long muddied by the unstated prejudices of liberal
historians. But what is undeniably clear is that the Great General Staff of Helmuth
von Moltke was so impressive an instniment that every great power in the late
nineteenth century sought to copy its efficiency and power.
'***Craig, G.A., The Battle of Koniggratz
. p. 22. J.B. Lippincott Co., 1964.
'^"Wilkinson. S., The Brain of an Army. Constable, 1913.
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The story of what became of this instrument in the twentieth century is well
known. WTiat seems more difficult is an historical interpretation of the bases of the
instrument and the example this "institution of excellence" can provide. The Prussian
Reform Movement provides a vivid example of appropriating foreign ideas and
institutions even from a hated enemy, TTie question this raises for us is can we afford
to reject the example, can we not adapt the institution to our own system when the
liberal premises upon which it was founded so closely parallel our own? Furthermore,
why have we rejected the traditions and forms of the Great General Staff as tainted by
the German leadership of World War I and n and yet not recognized the logical
inconsistency of rejecting the instrument because the user is evU?'"*
The false premise of those who argue against adopting the Prussian model is that
it is inherently "of the hated "Prussian militarism" which caused two world wars. A
balanced view of history would hold that the views of the Prussian reformers were
more in consonance with our own American views of a citizen-militia, e.g.. the
Landwehr and Landsturm
.
than with any concept of state militarism derived from this
century's historical experience with Germany.'"^ The Great German General Staff
which served as the model for most Western (and some Eastern) powers in the late
nineteenth century was the creation of Schamhorst, as refined by Moltke; the later
General Staff—the "technicians of power" of Ludendorff-became the cause celebre to
which American politicians pointed, aghast at the idea of America taking on such an
ominously anti-democratic institutional form, and ultimately rejected the idea of an
American general staff system. Our rejection of this foreign institution is founded both
on our perception of the reality of twentieth century German militarism and on our
^We might as well have rejected the tank because it served the TTiird Reich so
well.
'"'Additionally, the General Staff'*^ lole in Woild War I ajul the rise of Liuiendorff
were the direct result of the failure of the civU government not state militansm. The
relationship of Bismarck and Moltke is clear evidence of the historical acceptance by
the General Staff of its subordinate role in foreign policy. The German General Staff's
role in World War n was, after Hitler's establishment of the OKW, that of a political
and military eunuch not the wearer of the militarist talisman.
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misperception of the ideas underlying its conceptual foundation. The ideas of the
Piussian reformers, though of foreign origin are not foreign to our national values; they
are in fact very close to our own ideas of the relationship of the state and the military,
the state and the individual, belief in the educability of the common man and his right
to a share in both the burdens of citizen responsibility and the opportunities of
leadership.
Our general staff debate has taken the end result as the only possible outcome
of a noble beginning.'^ We should instead look at the beginning and appraise its
merits and possibilities. The earliest historical example of a general staff is the French
service d'etat-major des logis des armees which, under the leadership of Lieutenant
General Pierre Bourcet, sought, in 1766, to right the Franco-Prussian military imbalance
following the Seven Years' War.'*^ In fact, the most significant imbalance was that
Prussia had a military genius, Frederick n. What is truly ironic is that the "enduring
development" of the general staff—the French staff disbanded after only five years
^'Gordon Craig, in his Introduction to Rosinski, The German Army
, p. 8,
summarizes the development of the German Army after 1871 as "materialism,
glorification of science and technology, and admiration of wealth and power (which)
tended to subvert the humanistic values that had characterized German life and thought
in the fust part of the century. This profound change could not leave the military
establishment unaffected. The best officers of the period before 1848—like Schamhorst
and Gneisenau, Boyen and Clausewitz, and all the younger officers who modeled
themselves on these heroes—were cultivated men with wide intellectual interests,
students of history and contemporary politics, possessing both responsibility and a sense
of perspective. But after 1871, and particularly after 1890, things were different, and
even the ablest of the army's chiefs were apt to be professionals of a new kind,
technicians of power, intent on the problems of their metier , with little or no interest
in anything that lay outside the confmes of the garrison the tragedy of the
modem German army might be summed up in the victory of I ndendorff over
Schamhorst.
'
'Irvine, D.D., "The Origin of Capital Staffs." Journal of Modem History , v. 10,
p. 162, June, 1938. Irvine admits to many other examples of pre- 1766 staffs which
could on "the basis of superficialities...be traced back, through somewhat different lines
of development in various countries, almost indefinitely."
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because of its "great expense"^'"—began in the early nineteenth century as a result of
another Franco Pms<;ian military' imbalance; only this time the military- genius was
Napoleon Bonaparte, and it was for Prussia to fmd an organizational solution to this
imbalance of genius. That solution resulted in the Prussian General Staff. Out of this
process of attempting to meet the challenges of the birth of the as yet unidentified
epoch of modem national warfare we see the general staff system take form as the
unique Prussian answer to modernity.
It can be argued—incorrectly—that, while we don't call it a general staff, we in
fact already have one. In fact we have several poor imitations of what a general staff
might be: the National Security Council Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the respective Army, Air and OPNAV staffs, and the staff of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff In this era of jointness we might hold out some hope that this last
body might become what it should be the central uniformed planning agency for the
armed forces. Unfortunately, even if that were desired by our leadership—which it
manifestly is not—current statutory law expressly forbids it. Section 143 of Title 10,
United States Code, a restatement of the stUl active portions of the National Security
Act of 1947, states:
The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces
General Staff and shall have no executive authority. The Joint Staff may be
organized and may operate along conventional staff lines to support the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in discharging their assigned responsibilities.
The expressly forbidden general staff has been defined as a "special corps or
establishment of officers which provides staffs to assist various commanders of
combined arms in exercising the functions of command and administrative control, as
distinct from the functions of administrative management within established
administrative departments."'" The general staff p)erforms the following functions: "(1)
the systematic and extensive collection in time of peace of specific information which
mav be important to the future conduct of operations or to proper preparation for




through systematic development of skill for the handling of contingently anticipated
situations or through the elaboration of specific plans for war. or both."'" Our defense
reform attempted to address these two functions but "failed" to find new solutions to
meet the urgent requirements for preparing for war.
"The neglect of all that had to do with real preparation for war."'" Boyen's
fourth deficiency of the Prussian Army of 1806 contains a concept central to
understanding what the Prussian reformers attempted: war as it really is. This concept
implies that the reformers believed they understood the reality of war. If we have any
hope of achieving our goals of a coherent national military strategy and an armed force
which can implement that strategy, we must also find in our midst men who
understand war as it really is. Our best hope for fmding such men is in the armed
forces. Our best hope for achieving the stated goal is to give them a voice to leaven
the debate with the reality of war. Our best hope for giving such men a voice is an
American General Staff.
C. THE ESSENCE OF PRUSSIAN OFFICERSHIP
Our defense reform efforts of the eighties "failed" because they were directed not
at the fundamental deficiencies of individuals involved in the "preparation for war" but
at superficial institutional power relationships which have very little to do with war.
The "appeal of the Prussian reformers was directed not to the political freedom of man,
as in the French Revolution, but to his inner, moral freedom as an intelligent and
responsible person."'"* That appeal was successful in the most "lasting achievement"
of the reform era: their synthesis of the Frederickian and Napoleonic systems in a new
understanding of the reality of modem war and the resulting model of the modem
"'Ibid., p. 165.
"'Shanahan, Prussian Military Reforms, 1786-1813
, pp. 86-87.
"*Rosinski, The German Armv. p 66. For a more complete treatment of the
traditions and assumptions of the particular German approach to the concept of freedom
see Krieger. L., The German Idea of Freedom
.
Beacon Press, 1957.
soldier in the emergence of what one writer has called the "enlightened soldier".'" The
iliia1itie"5 of that enlightened soldier can he descrihed as the essence of Pnissian
officership and must be understood if we are to adapt the forms of Prussian military
thought and their institution of excellence.
There are two approaches to institutionalizing f)erformance of groups. One
approach may be broadly termed the "great man" approach, its best examples to be
found in the Frederickian and Napoleonic systems. In this approach a "genius"
establishes the theory and application, sets the rules of how men will act in their facet
of group performance. All members of the group follow the great man's admonitions
and eventually this approach becomes a system. History seems to demonstrate that
these systems named for great men thrive for little longer than the lives of the men
from which they take their names, then lacking the energy of the originator they
become increasingly bureaucratic, regimented by the supposed "sanctity" of the great
man's postulates.
A second approach is centered not on a great man but on a great idea. Systems
built on this approach generally do not become personified because they live through
the diversity of individuals and acquire their energy from the individual and necessarily
change, adapt over time. TTiat there are no references to a Schamhorstian or Moltkean
system is due to the place of the individual in their approach to war. Faith in the
individual and the ability of the group to produce an endless stream of men competent
through education to reenergize the system—and thus to change it—is the real hallmark
of what the Prussian Reform Movement produced and this acceptance of the individual,
both soldier and officer, as the centerpiece of their system led inexorably to the
essence of Prussian officership—the educated individual. This educated individual is
the key to understanding the ethos of the Pmssian General Staff.
To transplant this concept to American military soil and institute an American
General Staff will require us to accept this ethos. ITnforTunatelv. the concept of
civilian control of the military as the driving conceptual framework for American
defense organization analysis has resulted in a fundamental distortion of the Pru.ssian
315White, The Enlightened Soldier .
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General Staff and flawed interpretation of its meaning as a model for American defense
oigaiiizatioji. Conceptually, civilian control of the militar}- implies a power
relationship. The civilian in civil -military relations must dominate, therefore analysis
of reform proposals start and end with the question: who has power? TTie Prussian
Reform Movement was not about power but about excellence—of the individual and,
only derivatively, of the institution. When analyzed in light of power relationships the
very excellence bequeathed the Prussian military by the general staff system acts as its
chief accuser; an "institution of (military) excellence" by its very excellence and its
aura of admitted elitism threatens civilian control.
Our societal preoccupation with equality leads naturally to distrust of elites.^'*
Unfortunately, the military sub-society must necessarily be a meritocracy led by an elite
to produce a vision of future war that might provide "for the common defense." In
maintaining the imbalance of civil-military relations we have allowed egalitarianism a
foothold in military thinking. This is profoundly dangerous for "egalitarianism means
conformism, because it gives power to the sterile who can only make use of old
values, other men's ready-made values, which are not alive and to which their
promoters are not committed . Egalitarianism is founded on reason, which denies
creativity""^ and it is exactly that creativity which is most desperately needed in
today's armed forces.
Unfortunately, our defense reform movement ignored creativity and its source,
individuals, and instead began and ended with power relationships. Congressional
debate on defense organization analyses devolved to wiring diagrams and hierarchical
rank equations. What is the relationship of staff to line, Congress to staff, executive
to staff, who has power? This is all irrelevant to the true nature of the Prussian
model. The Prussian Reform Movement sought to find a structure which provided a
substitute for individual genius, a guardian against royal ("civilian") incompetence—
^'*For the evolution of military elites see Bamert. C, "The Education of Military
Elites," The Journal of Contemporary History , v. 2, July. 1967.
"iBloom, A., TTie Closing of the American Mind
, p. 201. Simon and Schuster,
1987.
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therewith the real threat to the civil-military balance. But this fear should not threaten
;i mm lire democrncy. Is our system of government so fragile as to he in mortal danger
from a military which is excellent? It would appear some believe so. What is truly
alarming is that our system seems to demand a mediocre military rather than possibly
upset the cornerstone of our military tradition, civilian control.
If we are to call into question the prejudices of our leadership—and implicitly,
errors in thinking about future war—we must begin with a coherent understanding of
the past in the light of our probable future. Our military future is unknowable. But
we can see a political future taking shape. Several near "unstoppable" trends are at
work in the denizens of the "defense thinkers" currently shaping our military future.
Our future force structure will continue to be technically oriented towards better
machines versus a professional orientation towards better leaders. Our forces will be
smaller, quite possibly retrenched to garrisons in the United States versus our present
forward disposition of troops. Our manpower will probably remain volunteer—and thus
continue the lack of connection between citizen and soldier—because there is no threat
which can overcome the apparent unwillingness of our upper and upper-middle classes
to accept the responsibilities inherent in freedom."' We may return to a pre-World
War I militia military, with a cadre of professionals and the bulk of our forces in the
reserves. Operational strategy wUl be joint versus the past service-specific solutions.
As our political leadership faces up to fiscal reality the defense budget wUl tend to
tighten versus the possibly too ample defense budgets of the 1980's. Defense policy
will tend more toward "consensus" between Democratic Congresses and Republican
administrations resulting in less coherence.
It is clear that doing more with less is not an answer but a cliche. It is time for
new ideas to solve the fiscal-military conundmm. The answer to our military problems
has to be found within the military, not without. One answer yet to receive a balanced
"*The recent debate over the Citizenship and National Service Act and the
resulting wails of "indentured servitude" from the spokesmen of the upper middle class
and the academy would seem to make the point. See C. Moskos, "A Boon for the
Poor" and W.M. Evers, "Indentured Servitude" in "A Dialogue on National Service in
Exchange for Education, Does America Need a 'G.I. Bill' for Youth." The New York
Times
, p. 15, April 15, 1989.
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hearing is an American general staff. An American general staff could reinvigorate our
aniied force*; and provide uniformed leadership in solving the defense problems of the
next century: if we overcome our fear of elites—an egalitarian armed force is
necessarily mediocre; if we apply objective criteria to selection of officers to the most
important staff positions in the armed forces—the joint, combined and unified command
staffs; if we reorder our military priorities from procurement to planning—procurement
must follow strategy, not lead it; if we accept the necessity of the defense unification
supposedly accomplished in 1947—interservice rivalry may be our greatest opponent;
if we accept the military as a fiill partner in the defense establishment-the military is
subordinate to the national command authority, not all civilians in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense; if we accept the Prussian model of effective military command
and control; then perhaps we can meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. That
future may require us to return to simpler notions of defense, with no natural enemy;
and this implies both a reduction in our civil raison d'etre and an elevation of the
military's moral claim to a place in the political discussion arising in uncertainty. If
we don't know the future we must constantly be a part of the daily resolution of
tomorrow. We have for forty years had a trusted enemy, as that reality fades so will
the stability of civilization we have come to accept. The place of the officer in an
uncertain society is arbiter of the end, the final stopgap between civilization and chaos.
It is due to that place of the officer in American society that the vocation of the
American officer must be that of a cultured student of history. Cultured because the
military officer stands on the ragged edge of the line between civilization and the
horror of war. Society may ask him at any time to cross over that line in its defense.
Without cultured, educated officers-the BUdungprinzip of Schamhorst—the real danger
exists that the line will become an abyss back from which we wiU not be able to
cross. A student of history because the "lessons" of war can only be studied under the
lamp of the past—the immediacy of wartime experience forbids reflection and onlv after
war expires can its lessons by learned. Cultured, educated men are necessary to tame
Bellona, for the first requirement is to know who Bellona is. It is the qualities
inherent in the essence of Prussian officership which provide the best example for the
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American officer, "cultivated men with wide intellectual interests, students of history
and contemporary- politics, possessing botli responsibility and a sense of perspective.'""
This study has attempted to show how a small group of liberal military officers,
facing an uncertain, changing world and at odds with the prevailing ethos of both their
military and civil societies, through Bildung—faith in the educability of individuals, the
necessity of the lifelong quest of culture, acculturation, in even the most acultural of
undertakings, in their belief in the right of all men to an opportunity to achieve true
citizenship and therewith both the duties to and fruits of the fortunes of their state,
with a tough objectivity and understanding of "war as it really is,"—transformed their
state's military instrument from the "dry rot" of the decayed forms of the Ancien
Regime into a synthesis of modem war which unleashed the imaginations and reason
of generations of their nations' officers. The Bildungprinzip of the Pmssian reformers
is available as an example to inform our questions and we should not ignore the
potential fruits of that example as we look forward to our own uncertain future.
To paraphrase Professor Bloom: this is the American moment in world history,
the one for which we shall forever be judged. Just as in politics the responsibility for
the fate of freedom in the world has devolved upon our regime, so the fate of western
civilization may at any moment devolve upon our military instmment, and the two are
related as they have never been before. The gravity of our given task is great, and it
is very much in doubt how the future will judge our stewardship.""
^"Craig, Introduction to Rosinski, The German Anny
.
p. 8.
""Bloom. TTie Closing of the American Mind, p. 382. Professor Bloom was
speaking of his profession and its e.vpK ^sion. the university, but I believe his eloquence
also speaks to the profession of amis.
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XI. IMPLICATIONS
This thesis suggests the value of the past in our present command, control and
communications analysis efforts. If history is to have value to military officers, it must
be found in the simple truth that only history provides the ultimate operations analysis-
-what real men, facing real problems, actually did and what actually was the result.
No computer projection, war game, simulation or academic postulate can provide the
precision of reality.
The participants in the Pmssian Reform Movement faced a reality which, though
distant in time, nonetheless included many of the issues presently confronting our
American armed forces. The period of the "transformation of war" with its political,
social and economic tumult raised a specter of a future in which the changed
constituents of war had to be addressed lest the Prussian state become a permanent
satellite of France. Armies, means, costs and the superstructure of war were then, as
now, the agenda of the defense reform debate. The recent history of defense reform
demonstrates our fundamental inability to address these constituents as anything more
than management issues amenable to organizational and institutional readjustments of
power relationships.
The example of the Prussian reformers provides a paradigm for defense reform,
an approach anchored to a fundamental tmth many today deny: war is the realm of
violence and chance, subordinated to politics, Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity;" and not
our modem apostasy, bureaucratic power and operations analysis, subordinated to
management theory. The Prussian reformers sought to understand war "as it actually
is;" our American defense establishment has redefined it as war "as we wish it to be."
TTie American image of war is that of a business problem which allows us to
comfortnHy concentrate on that which we American*: do best: manage a bu<:ine<;s. But
the reality of violence, chance and subordination to politics keeps rearing its ugly head
and demonstrating—in Viemam, Koh Tang Island. Desert One, Grenada, Beirut-that
war is most fundamentally men trying to kill each other within a chaotic arena
dominated by political realities not under their control. This real war cannot be
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"managed," however pleasing such aphorisms as "management of violence" might be
to American business sensibilities.
Once the reality of war is accepted, it is but a short step, guided by the historical
example of the Prussian Reform Movement, to acceptance of the critical link between
the nature of war and the centrality of the individual in its execution and the
achievement of excellence. If the American people tmly desire excellence in our
military establishment its uniformed officers must acknowledge that excellence is a
personal trait, not an institutional one. Effective institutions of war must be built on
individual excellence. Our present course is founded on the opposite, false premise
that if "excellent" institutional forms are adopted; that is, forms with the correct (but
in the author's opinion, irrelevant) power relationships—"effective" individual will,
mirabile dictu, somehow magically be produced. The Prussian example is the
necessary corrective. The essence of Prussian officership is that of a cultured,
educated, liberal officer alive to the chaotic reality of war and able to deal with the
complexity of war precisely because this officer was not shackled to some management
theory or checklist mentality but was free to exercise his independent intellect and
initiative in the instantaneous evolution of battle.
How then might our behemoth American defense establishment—unimaginable in
size and complexity to a nineteenth century warrior—accept the Prussian model? A
beginning is acceptance of the concept of an elite, the natural outcome of the pursuit
of individual excellence. The example of the General Staff must be reevaluated
without the blinkers of historical reductionism. Many would reject the model of the
General Staff because it leads to Schlieffen, Ludendorff and Hitler, but this is argument
post hoc, ergo propter hoc. We must begin at the beginning—the Prussian Reform
Movement—instead of the end. The General Staff emerged as a logical consequence
of the Reformer's acceptance of war on its own terms. War is not a democratic
enterprise, and the historian's insistence on formalistic purirs' does a dis<:er\'ice to the
practitioner's quest for guidance. It is not beyond our capabilities to find the point at
which this evolution—from Frederick to Schamhorst through Clausewitz to Moltke and
then to Schlieffen, Ludendorff and then, finally. Hitler—went wrong. The General Staff
concept is not a formulation of Nazii^^im. it is not a nauiral predecessor of the
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dogmatic, technocratic approach of Ludendorff, it is not a logical predecessor of the
ijiflcxibility of Schlieffen; but even if if were, are we not capable of seeing the
potential, the requirement for an elite to deal with the complexity and uncertainty
ahead? Politics must become more uncertain, unstable and complex in the near future
as the world redefines itself. War, its subordinate extension, must follow. America
needs a new voice at the table which can think, speak, and act, not as a union
representing some vested service or military-industrial special interest, but as the
nation's defenders willing if need be to step across the abyss to the realm of violence
and chance but also able to return fully pKJssessed of the nation's political values.
America's Jena may be at hand. Our checklists do not include chaos and we
will be alone on that battlefield, unarmed to meet the violent moments of oppommity
which will pass by unnoticed while we consult our Command and Control Nets for
guidance. A General Staff with members deployed at every staff level is the absent
link between the genius of the commander and the chaos of the battlefield. The
presence of an elite staff can provide the missing leadership. For American forces to
excel on the future battlefield, we must appeal to our natural, individual desires to be
part of that elite. The egalite is comfortable in peace, but it will be lethal in war.
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